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The retail price of a good is the price end consumers can buy one unit of the good for in the 
retail market. Most people in most countries buy retail goods or services on a regular basis. 
Owing to the retail industry, we can get the products we require in exchange for money instead 
of producing them ourselves. This, in turn, imply that we spend significant amounts of money 
on retail goods and services (Frankel, 2018). Therefore, pricing decisions by firms are important 
for both firms and consumers. This thesis is about retail prices and factors that one way or 
another are related to firms’ retail pricing behavior. A central theme in this thesis is how retail 
pricing affects firm performance. 
Retail prices are important to profit-maximizing firms as they determine the profit margin 
per unit of a good. The higher is the price offered to the end user, the larger is the margin per 
unit. However, these prices also affect consumers’ demand for a product. The more sensitive 
consumers are to price changes, the more sales a firm would lose by increasing the price offered 
to end users. Therefore, there is a trade-off between price and volume firms must take into 
account when determining retail prices. 
How sensitive consumers are to price changes hinges among others on whether consumers 
can purchase the product from other sellers. Therefore, the price a firm sets on its product 
depends on whether it faces competition or not. If consumers can buy a good from more than 
one seller, price sensitivity likely increases. Prices can thus potentially tell us about the 
competitive situation in a market and the degree of market power of firms. 
In oligopoly markets, characterized by a small number of sellers, price setting is crucial as 
competitors will respond to a firm’s price action, which can influence market shares and profit. 
Since consumers have different tastes for variation, non-price competition can influence the 
price competition among firms as well. Consumers can value the same product of the same 
quality from two different brands differently even if they cost the same due to preferences for 
brands. Consumers might we willing to pay a higher price to get the variety of the product 
which they prefer the most, hence firms must take horizontal differentiation of their goods into 
account. Even if products are homogenous with no diversity, factors like physical distance 
between firms might affect consumers’ ranking of one seller over another, which again 
influence firms’ pricing decision. 
Apart from price level, which price strategy to adopt is another consideration for firms to 
take. Most of us think of uniform pricing, that is, one fixed price on each product, as the 
“standard”. However, firms can also price discriminate by selling two units of the same physical 
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product at two different prices, either to the same consumer or to different consumers, after 
taking the cost of serving consumers into account (Tirole, 1988, p. 133). For instance, in the 
airline industry, youths are often offered “youth tickets” which are cheaper than ordinary tickets 
(see e.g. Airfrance, 2018; SAS, 2018). This is called third-degree price discrimination. Today, 
with all the available data on consumer information, firms are more capable of charging 
individual prices to each and every customer for the same good, a price strategy known as first-
degree price discrimination or personalized pricing.  
Even if firms set one fixed price on each good, this fixed price can vary over time. In certain 
markets, for instance retail gasoline markets, firms are observed to set a uniform price that 
varies over time in a saw-tooth pattern, with large price jumps followed by several small price 
cuts. These price patterns can be relatively predictable, which leave consumers the opportunity 
to plan their purchases by adapting to the pattern.  Further, in some markets, a retail price change 
of one firm is observed to be followed by other firms shortly after, with a price change of 
approximately the same amount. Price leadership can bring on a market-wide price 
coordination, suggesting that retail prices in themselves can serve as a communication tool 
among firms. 
This thesis focuses on some of the aspects of retail pricing mentioned above, and examines 
them in more detail. 
The first chapter is co-written with Øystein Foros and Hans Jarle Kind. Motivated by the 
fact that consumers leave increasingly more digital footprints which improve firms’ ability to 
practice personalized pricing (first-degree price discrimination), we ask whether there exist 
strategic effects that reduce firms’ incentives to do so. To answer this question, we first note 
that it is optimal for a firm that price discriminates to set the purchasing price equal to marginal 
costs from consumers who buy from a rival. This is true independently of whether the rival has 
made any non-price commitments (e.g. strategic product differentiation). In contrast, if a firm 
uses uniform pricing, the rival has incentives to make strategic commitments that soften 
competition. Consequently, we find that firms might find it optimal to commit to uniform 
pricing to avoid being trapped in a highly competitive equilibrium. The key insight is that a 
firm’s incentives to undertake strategic price-softening behavior depend on the rival's choice 
between uniform and personalized pricing, and not the firm’s own choice. 
The second chapter examines how price coordination, and importantly, coordination on 
price restorations, is carried out in retail gasoline markets. In the studied market, one firm 
breaches a fourteen-year lasting regular price cycle overnight by publicly announcing a change 
to its retail price policy. Prior to the announcement, the regular cycle occurred across brands 
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and all over the country. I show that the recommended price of this particular company, which 
is publicly available on the company’s website, serves two functions for its network of retail 
stations. First, it determines the price restoration level. Second, it serves as a signal of when to 
implement a restoration day: Every time this company announces an adjustment to the 
recommended price in the early morning, price restoration is implemented the following 
forenoon. I further show that other companies are following the new practice as well. Hence, a 
new way to coordinate on prices and synchronize price restorations inter-brand and across local 
markets has emerged, using prior announcements of the price leader’s recommended price as a 
signaling device. 
The third chapter is co-written with Øystein Foros and Frode Steen. First, we analyze how 
regular days off from competition and a time-dependent price pattern affect firm performance. 
Second, we examine the effects on firms' profitability from consumers’ changing search- and 
timing behavior. We use microdata from gasoline retailing in Norway. From 2004 to 2017, 
firms practiced an industry-wide day off from competition, starting on Mondays at noon, by 
increasing prices to a common level given by the recommended prices (decided and published 
in advance). In turn, a foreseeable low-price window is open before every restoration. During 
the data period, we observe an additional weekly restoration on Thursdays at noon. The 
additional day off from competition increases firm performance. As expected, a conventional 
price search of where to buy reduces firms’ profitability. In contrast, consumers who are aware 
of the cycle and spend effort on when to buy have a positive impact on firms’ profitability. If 
consumers spend effort on when to buy, they attempt to tank during low price windows. By its 
very nature, this shrink consumers’ ability to compare prices at several outlets. Consequently, 
more attention to when to buy may soften price competition. 
The fourth chapter is co-written with Frode Steen. Applying detailed consecutive daily 
micro data at the gasoline station level from Sweden we estimate a structural model to uncover 
the degree of competition in the gasoline retail market. We find that retailers do exercise market 
power, but despite the high upstream concentration, the market power is very limited on the 
downstream level. The degree of market power varies with both the distance to the nearest 
station and the local density of gasoline stations. A higher level of service tends to raise a 
seller’s market power; self-service stations have close to no market power. Contractual form 
and brand identity also seem to matter. We find a clear result: local station characteristics 
significantly affect the degree of market power. Our results indicate that local differences in 
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Abstract: Consumers leave increasingly more digital footprints which improve rmsabil-
ity to practice personalized pricing (rst-degree price discrimination). We ask whether there
exist strategic e¤ects that reduce rmsincentives to do so. To answer this question, we rst
note that it is optimal for a rm that price discriminates to set the purchasing price equal to
marginal costs from consumers who buy from a rival. This is true independently of whether
the rival has made any non-price commitments (e.g. strategic product di¤erentiation). In
contrast, if a rm uses uniform pricing, the rival has incentives to make strategic com-
mitments that soften competition. Consequently, we nd that rms might nd it optimal
to commit to uniform pricing to avoid being trapped in a highly competitive equilibrium.
The key insight is that a rms incentives to undertake strategic price-softening behavior
depend on the rivals choice between uniform and personalized pricing, and not the rms
own choice.
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1 Introduction
Personalized pricing (rst-degree price discrimination) was once the prevailing pricing
method in the retail sector. Indeed, prior to the mid-nineteenth century, sellers in the
U.S. and Western Europe negotiated on prices with each individual customer (Phillips,
2012; Wallmeier, 2018). It was not until the 1860s that we saw a shift towards the present
pricing standard, uniform pricing. The establishment of the rst department stores initi-
ated the shift. Personalized pricing requires detailed information both about purchasing
prices for each single good and about individual consumersexpected willingness to pay.
It thus turned out to be an ine¢ cient pricing method for department stores that o¤ered
a wide variety of products and served a large number of customers.2 Imposing one single
xed price on each good made the pricing task substantially less time consuming (Phillips,
2012, p.33), and by 1890 advertisements like "One Price for Every Man" and One price
to allmarked the uniform price policy as the new pricing norm (Phillips, 2012, p. 32;
Resseguie, 1965, pp.302-303).3
Today, personalized pricing is again on the agenda. Consumers use apps that are cus-
tomized to collect individual data, and leave digital footprints on the Internet. In contrast
to the early nineteenth century, sellers can directly learn about consumerswillingness to
pay.4 Moreover, Big Data and machine learning algorithms allow rms to come much
2Clerks used to adopt a price codesystem where information about prices written on the price-tags
was understandable only for the clerks and not for the customers (Phillips, 2013, p.30). Hence, when stores
grew larger, not only was negotiation more time consuming, but keeping track of all the codes became more
cumbersome as well.
3Among pioneers was Alexander T. Stewart, who established a dry-goods store in New York in 1826.
Stewart is often credited as being the rst to use the one-price-to-all-principle in the United States. Britan-
nica (2018) writes the following: "Instead of haggling over prices with each individual customer, Stewart
set standard prices on all his goods, which was an innovation in his time." Macys announced its one-price
policy in 1858 (Resseguie, 1965), and the same policy was applied by John Wanamaker in Philadelphia
some years later. In Western Europe, some Parisian stores had one-price-to -all-ads already in the 1830s
(Wallmeier, 2018; Resseguie, 1965; Phillips, 2012).
4The high prole Facebook-Cambridge Analytica case illustrates that such information is not restricted
to information directly collected from own consumers. Cambridge Analytica achieved access to private
information from the counts of more than 50 million Facebook users. The rms tools could identify the
personalities of American voters and inuence their behavior, according to the New York Times (2018).
Market players as well as politicians may use such information from intermediaries.
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closer to applying personalized pricing than before, for instance by inducing a shift from
third-degree (group based pricing) to rst-degree price discrimination. Information costs
are signicantly reduced, and rms are often capable of practicing high-scale personalized
pricing. In Varians (2010) terminology, "Instead of a one size ts allmodel, the Web
o¤ers a market of one. This development may further give rms stronger incentives (and
better abilities) to tailor their products to match individual preferences. By reducing the
mismatch between basic product characteristics and what each single consumer prefers, the
size of the market and the consumerswillingness to pay for the good should increase.
This development raises the question of whether personalized pricing will again become
the standard in retail markets. How do rmsincentives and protability from practicing
personalized pricing compare to what we would observe if they practiced uniform pricing?
Owing to textbook examples in ECO101, many relate personalized pricing to a monopolist
seller who extracts all consumer surplus by charging each individual a price equal to her
maximum willingness to pay for the good. Before the arrival of department stores 150
years ago, sellers were often local monopolists in their product lines (Jones, 1936, among
others).5 The advantage of using personalized pricing in such markets is well illustrated by
the textbook example. However, in retail markets today, there are usually more than one
seller; digitalization in itself increases the alternatives for consumers through online sales.
If they use personalized pricing, rms might then end up competing intensively for each
and every consumer (a market of one).6 As shown in the seminal paper by Thisse and
Vives (1988), even though rms are better o¤ if they all use uniform pricing, they could be
trapped in a prisoners dilemma situation where each has incentives to unilaterally adopt
personalized pricing.
5At that time, the general retail store in a region o¤ering some product lines was often the only source of
supply of goods which people could not produce themselves in their homes. Further, special stores o¤ering
one product line were rare and usually found only in large cities (Jones, 1936, p.134).
6In their bestseller, written for a business audience, Shapiro and Varian (1998, pp. 40) gave a warning:
"If your online travel agency knows that you are interested in deep-sea shing, and it knows that deep-sea
shermen like yourself are often wealthy, it may well want to sell you a high-priced hotel package. On
the other hand, if the travel agency knows that you like snorkeling, and snorkelers prefer budget travel,
then they can o¤er you a budget package. In these examples, the provider can design a package that is
optimized for your interests and charge you accordingly. But be careful about those premium prices for
deep-sea shermen: even wealthy deep-sea shermen can change travel agencies."
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There certainly exist examples of personalized pricing, for instance among hotel and
airline agencies (see, e.g., Mohammed, 2017). However, most rms set a xed price for
each product, even when they have access to large amounts of consumer data. Hence, for
the time being, a widespread shift to personalized pricing in retail markets seems to be
absent. In the same vein, it is interesting to note that despite the information revolution
and huge advances in for instance supply side management and computer assisted design,
rms do not seem to match their products according to each consumers preferences to
such an extent as one might expect.
The continued prevalence of uniform pricing could partly be due to privacy concerns
and resistance from consumers who dislike information gathering and personalized pricing
(see Acquisti et al., 2016, for a comprehensive survey). Consumers might also consider
personalized pricing (haggling) as unfair, and prefer to buy from rms that commit
to "One Price for Every Man". Phillips (2012) argues that this e¤ect can help explain the
move from personalized to uniform pricing in the nineteenth century example above.
We abstract from these e¤ects on the consumer side, and focus on strategic interactions
between competing rms. In particular, we ask whether a rm by committing to uniform
pricing might be able to prevent a rival from undertaking aggressive non-price decisions.
More specically, our research question is how a rms incentives to reduce the level of
mismatch cost (we consider other non-price commitments in an extension of the basic
model) depends on its own and its competitors choice of price policy (uniform pricing
versus personalized pricing). We also ask whether endogenous non-price commitments
change the prisoners dilemma outcome from Thisse and Vives (1988) described above.
To approach these questions we consider competition between two rms located at each
end of a Hotelling line. At stage 1, each rm can commit to using uniform pricing (price
policy commitment).7 At stage 2, the rms simultaneously choose a rm-specic level of
mismatch cost. At stage 3, the rms compete in prices. If a rm has not committed to
uniform pricing at stage 1, it is free to choose between uniform pricing and personalized
pricing at stage 3. Stages 1 and 3 of the game resemble Thisse and Vives (1988); however,
they assume that the level of mismatch cost is exogenous. In contrast, we follow Ferreira
7A recent example that literally ts into the spatial Hotelling framework is Staples who o¤ered individual
discounts based on the distance between the customerslocation and the rival stores (Wall Street Journal,
2012).
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and Thisse (1996) and let the mismatch cost be one of the rmschoice variables.
In equilibrium, a rm that uses personalized pricing will set price equal to marginal
cost towards all consumers who are buying from the rival. This is a robust result, see
Thisse and Vives (1988) and Lederer and Hurter (1986), and is independent of the rivals
decisions on mismatch cost. In contrast, a rm that sets a uniform price will lower its price
if the rival reduces its mismatch cost. This is true because the competitive pressure for the
rms marginal consumer increases in the rivals reduction of mismatch cost since the rivals
product becomes more attractive. Therefore, we show that a rms incentives to change
its mismatch cost depend on the rivals choice between uniform pricing and personalized
pricing. A rm nds it optimal to reduce its own mismatch cost only if the rival uses
personalized pricing; the optimal choice regarding the mismatch cost is independent of the
rms own choice between price policies. Hence, a rm may choose to stick to uniform
pricing in order to prevent the rival from reducing its mismatch cost and expanding its
market. Personalized pricing comes at a cost because it triggers an aggressive response
from the rival in tailoring its product to each consumers preferences, which is harmful for
the other rm.
More generally, a rival using personalized pricing optimally sets price equal to marginal
cost in the other rms market region, which means that the rm cannot a¤ect the rivals
behavior towards these consumers by adjusting its non-price variable (such as mismatch cost
or location). Hence, price discrimination by the rival, and the rival only, removes strategic
e¤ects of non-price commitments. To our knowledge, this has not yet been highlighted in
the literature. In the spirit of Fudenberg and Tirole (1984) and Tirole (1988) we show that
a rms choice of whether to commit to uniform pricing at stage 1 is a choice of whether
to give the rival strategic incentives to undertake commitments in non-price variables.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews related literature. In Section
3 we set up the basic model with the standard assumptions in a Hotelling framework. Before
solving the game we consider some general implications of personalized pricing on rms
strategic incentives in non-price variables. We extend the model in three ways in Section
4 by considering a two-sided market, location incentives and by opening up for partial
multi-homing by consumers. Lastly, Section 5 concludes.
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2 Literature review
Recent developments in information gathering technologies make it possible for rms to
collect more accurate information about consumersindividual willingness to pay, and this
increases rmsabilities to practice personalized pricing (rst-degree price discrimination).
Therefore, personalized pricing is on the agenda as ever before. This is reected in recent
debates both in popular media (e.g. Forbes, 2014) and in academic literature (e.g. Esteves,
2010; Valletti and Wu, 2016; Prüfer and Schottmüller, 2017).
Our study is closely related to Thisse and Vives (1988), who consider a two-stage game
where each of two Hotelling rms can commit to uniform pricing before they compete in
prices. For a rm that does not commit to uniform pricing in the rst stage, it is optimal to
use personalized pricing in the second stage. Thisse and Vives (1988) show that a prisoners
dilemma outcome emerges, where both rms in equilibrium use personalized pricing even
though aggregate prot would have been higher if they both had committed to uniform
pricing.8 We build on the framework developed by Thisse and Vives, but allow each rm to
choose how closely it will match its good to individual consumer preferences; the poorer the
match, the greater is the hedonic consumer price (the sum of monetary price and mismatch
costs). The matching choice is made prior to the price competition stage, but after rms
choice of whether to commit to uniform pricing. We show that once rms are able to make
the matching choice, the prisoners dilemma outcome described above may cease to be an
equilibrium: the rms may now choose to commit to uniform pricing.
Also Ferreira and Thisse (1996)9 open up for endogenous mismatch costs prior to the
price competition stage. They consider a framework where two rms are located at each
end of a Hotelling line, and show that each rm chooses to impose high own mismatch
costs. This is similar to our nding under uniform pricing; going for high mismatch costs
induces soft pricing behavior from the rival. Hendel and de Figueiredo (1997) assume a
circular model instead of the Hotelling line, and arrive at the same qualitative result; in a
setting with two rms, each of them chooses high mismatch costs in order to induce soft
price competition. In contrast to us, neither Ferreira and Thisse (1996) nor Hendel and de
8A similar outcome is reached a two-period framework in Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) and Esteves
(2010).
9Based on the rm-specic transportation cost framework from Launhardt (1885).
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Figueiredo (1997) let rms choose between uniform and personalized pricing.10
It is well established in the literature on personalized pricing that rms in equilibrium
set price equal to marginal cost to its marginal consumer and to consumers served by
the rival (Hurter and Lederer, 1985; Lederer and Hurter, 1986; Thisse and Vives, 1988;
Bhaskar and To, 2004). We show that this has the interesting implication that, in the
terminology of Fudenberg and Tirole (1984) and Tirole (1988), a rms choice of whether
to commit to uniform pricing is also a choice of whether to give the rival strategic incentives
to undertake non-price commitments. More precisely, if a rm uses personalized pricing,
there will be no strategic e¤ect of a rivals choice of non-price commitment. This result
hinges on the assumption that rms choose both price policy and a non-price variable
prior to the competition stage. Previous studies assume either xed price policy, such that
both rms per denition use personalized pricing (Hurter and Lederer, 1985; Lederer and
Hurter, 1986; Bhaskar and To, 2004) or no endogenous non-price commitments (Thisse and
Vives, 1988). Therefore, our result that there is no strategic e¤ect from a rms non-price
commitment (e.g. mismatch costs) if the rival uses price discrimination is novel.
In an extension of the basic Hotelling model where rms are located at the extremes
of the Hotelling line, we consider a rm that uses personalized pricing and show that its
location incentives depend crucially on the pricing policy of the rival. The rm we consider
perceives a rival that charges all consumers the same price (uniform pricing) as relatively
soft. This indicates that it will locate closer to a rival that uses uniform pricing than to a
rival that uses personalized pricing. However, as noted above, the strategic e¤ect which
generates minimum di¤erentiation in the standard Hotelling model does not exist if the
rival uses personalized pricing. We show that for this reason, the rm will nonetheless
locate closer to a rival that uses personalized pricing than to a rival that uses uniform
pricing. As a corollary, it follows that if both rms use personalized pricing, they will both
have incentives to locate relatively close to each other. This result is consistent with Hurter
and Lederer (1985), Lederer and Hurter (1986) and Bhaskar and To (2004), who show that
if two rms compete with personalized pricing, they will choose interior locations on the
Hotelling line (actually, they will choose the socially optimal locations). However, neither
10In von Ungern-Sternberg (1988) rms choose mismatch costs in a circular model. However, he assumes
that mismatch costs and price are determined simultaneously. This implies that there is no strategic
interdependence between these two choice variables.
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of these studies consider the case where only one of the rms use personalized pricing. As
such, their result on location is a special case of our general result. An important lesson
from our analysis, is that it is not personalized pricing in itself that removes strategic e¤ects
of non-price commitments, it is personalized pricing by the rival that drives the result. As
far as we know, this insight has not previously been acknowledged in the literature.
Our study also relates to the literature on product customization. Big data does not
only put personalized pricing on the agenda, it also makes product customization a current
topic as more information about consumer preferences is available. The mismatch cost in
our model can be interpreted as product customization, where a rm can match its product
better to consumersmost preferred taste by decreasing the level of transportation cost.
Dewan et al. (2000; 2003) and Bernhardt et al. (2007) consider costly customization. By
contrast, we bypass any costs of customization in order to isolate the strategic e¤ects on
price. Syam et al. (2005) take a similar approach, though in a di¤erent context than ours.
However, none of the above papers studies the choice of price policy in relation to product
customization as we do.
3 The model set-up
We consider competition between two rms, i = 0; 1; located at the extremes of a Hotelling
line with length 1. The location of rm i is given by xi; where xi = 0 for rm 0 and xi = 1 for
rm 1. Consumer tastes are uniformly distributed along the line. Throughout, we assume
that both rms are active (market sharing), and we consider both personalized and uniform
pricing. Under personalized pricing (rst-degree price discrimination) each consumer is
given an individual price pi(x); where x is the consumers location on the Hotelling line.
Under uniform pricing all consumers pay the same price pi(x) = pi; independently of
location.
The consumer utility of buying from rm i for a consumer located at x can be written
as
ui(x) = v  mi jx  xij   pi(x): (1)
We assume that the parameter v > 0 is su¢ ciently large to ensure market coverage.
The second term in (1) captures the idea that consumers will in general not nd any of
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the goods to be a perfect t; the perceived mismatch costs associated with good i for a
consumer located at x is mi jx  xij ; where mi > 0: The smaller is mi; the greater is the
number of consumers who is willing to buy good i, other things equal. Put di¤erently,
decreasing mi enlarges the size of the market for rm i. This modelling of the mismatch
costs is equivalent to the rm-specic transportation cost used by Ferreira and Thisse
(1996).11
The location of the consumer who is indi¤erent between the o¤ers from rm 0 and 1;
denoted by ~x, is found by setting u0(~x) = u1(~x):
Di =
mj + pj(~x)  pi(~x)
mi +mj
: (2)
Evidently, demand for good i is decreasing in own mismatch costs, @Di=@mi =  Di=(mi+
mj) < 0, and increasing in the rivals mismatch costs, @Di=@mj = (1 Di) =(mi+mj) > 0.
We analyze a three-stage game. At stage 1, each rm might commit to using uniform
pricing towards the consumers (price policy commitment): Then, at stage 2, the rms
simultaneously decide on mismatch levels. We assume that mi is bounded by mi 2 [m;m].
At stage 3, the rms compete in consumer prices. If rm i has not made any commitment
at stage 1, it is free to choose between using uniform pricing and personalized pricing at
stage 3.
Each rm thus commits to uniform pricing if this is individually protable. Such a com-
mitment is consistent with the one price to allconcept that was introduced by department
stores 150 years ago when they through advertisement and money-back guarantees bound
themselves to apply uniform pricing (Phillips, 2012). Without such a commitment, rms
could be tempted to price according to what they expected each consumer to be willing to
pay (personalized pricing).
Below, we rst assume that one of the two rms, which we label rm k; has committed
to uniform pricing, and analyze what e¤ect this commitment might have on pricing and
choice of mismatch costs. We consider both the case where the rival uses uniform pricing
and where it uses personalized pricing. Then we perform the same analysis if rm k has
made no price policy commitment. Since the rms are intrinsically symmetric, we will,
without loss of generality, let k = 0:
11The modelling in Ferreira and Thisse (1996) builds on Launhardt (1885).
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3.1 Preliminary insights: Implications of personalized pricing
Before we solve the game presented above, we show some general results on how person-
alized pricing a¤ects rms incentives to undertake strategic commitments in non-price
variables. A non-price variable can for instance be mismatch costs, as in our main model,
or location on the Hotelling line (see section 4.2). Denote the level of the non-price variables
by n0 and n1 (corresponding to m0 and m1 in the main model). We assume that rm 0 has
commited to uniform pricing at stage 1. We maintain the assumption that the levels of the
non-price variables are determined non-cooperatively at stage 2, and that these variables
are observable when the rms compete in prices at stage 3.
First, consider the case where both rms have committed to uniform pricing. In general
we cannot say whether prices are strategic complements or strategic substitutes, but for
the sake of the argument (and without a¤ecting the qualitative results below) we assume
they are strategic complements. In either case the reduced form prot of rm 0 at stage 2
can be written as
0(n0; n1; p0(n0; n1); p1(n0; n1)): (3)

























The rst term on the right-hand side of (4) measures the change in rm 0s prot when
it increases n0; holding the rivals price p1 xed. This is the direct e¤ect of changing n0; and
in equilibrium rm 0 would solve @0=@n0 = 0 if n0 was unobservable. Let n̂0 denote the
solution to @0=@n0 = 0:
Since we have assumed that n0 is observable prior to the price decision in stage 3, p1
is a function of n0: Firm 0 thus has incentives to strategically a¤ect the price charged by
the rival through the level of the non-price variable n0 (in normal cases @0=@p1 > 0).
This e¤ect is captured by the second term on the right-hand side of (4). Suppose that
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dp0=dn0 > 0: Given the assumption that prices are strategic complements (dp1=dp0 > 0),
it follows that rm 0 will then commit to n0 > n̂0 because this induces the rival to increase
its price too. In the terminology of Fudenberg and Tirole (1984), rm 0 chooses a "fat
cat strategy"; it "overinvests" in the non-price variable to appear soft (it charges a higher
price). In contrast, if the "investment" makes rm 0 tough (i.e., dp0=dn0 < 0), it commits
to a lower value of the non-price variable (n0 < n̂0) in order to make the rival set a relatively
high price. This corresponds to a "puppy dog strategy" in the terminology of Fudenberg
and Tirole.
Now, consider instead the case where rm 1 has not made a commitment to uniform
pricing at stage 1. For now, we assume that rm 0 knows rm 1 has incentives to use
personalized pricing at stage 3 in this case (we will later verify that this holds). As shown
in the seminal contributions by Thisse and Vives (1988) and Lederer and Hurter (1986), a
rm using personalized pricing will charge an individual price equal to the marginal cost to
the lastconsumer it serves as well as all consumers served by the rival. Hence, in stage
3 rm 1 o¤ers p1 (bx) = c towards all consumers served by rm 0. This price decision is
independent of the non-price commitments made in stage 2 (n0 and n1). Firm 0s prot is
then given by
0(n0; n1; p0(n0; n1); p1 (bx)): (5)

















Hence, the strategic e¤ect is eliminated: When rm 1 uses personalized pricing, rm 0
cannot strategically a¤ect rm 1s pricing behaviour, p1(bx) = c. Neither can rm 0 a¤ect
p1(bx) = c through its choice of whether to commit to uniform pricing at stage 1.
Therefore, we have the following general result: If a rm faces a rival which uses per-
sonalized pricing, non-price commitments have no strategic e¤ect. We can state:
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Proposition 1: Suppose that rm 1 uses personalized pricing. Then, there is no
strategic e¤ect neither from rm 0s possible commitment to uniform pricing nor from its
commitment to the non-price variable n0:
Proposition 1 implies that the choice of whether to commit to uniform pricing or not
at stage 1 can be seen as a choice of whether to eliminate the rivals strategic incentives
to undertake non-price commitments at stage 2. Put di¤erently, a rm may commit to
uniform pricing if it is protable that the rival undertakes a strategic commitment at stage
2. In contrast, if it is protable that the rival does not undertake a strategic commitment
at stage 2, the rm may choose not to commit to uniform pricing.
It follows from Thisse and Vives (1988) and Lederer and Hurter (1986) that a rm
using personalized pricing o¤ers an individual price equal to marginal cost to all consumers
served by the rival. However, Thisse and Vives (1988) do not consider endogenous non-
price commitments (they do not have stage 2 in our model), while Lederer and Hurter
(1986) assume that both rms use personalized pricing (they do not consider stage 1 in our
model). Hence, none of them consider this general implication.
3.2 Firm 0 has committed to uniform pricing
3.2.1 Pricing (stage 3)
We now return to the specic model set-up in order to solve the corresponding game.
Using backward induction, we start with the rmspricing decisions (stage 3). At this
stage the rmsproduct characteristics (mismatch costs) and price policies (whether they
have committed to uniform pricing) are predetermined.




UP R0 = (p0   c)DUP R0 ; where RfUP; PPg: (6)
Throughout, the rst part of the superscript indicates the rms own price strategy (uniform
pricing, abbreviated to UP , in this case), and the second part indicates the rivals price
strategy (where R is UP or PP , where the latter stands for personalized pricing).
Suppose rst that also rm 1 has committed to uniform pricing. Setting pi(x) = pi and
pj(x) = pj into equation (2) it follows that perceived demand for rm i = 0; 1 equals:
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DUP UPi =
mj   (pi   pj)
mi +mj
(7)
By solving (6) we now nd that prices are strategic complements, and that the reaction








A higher value ofmj means that the competitive pressure for rm is marginal consumers
falls. This explains why @pi(pj)=@mj > 0: In contrast, we see that @pi(pj)=@mi = 0; rm is
optimal price does not depend directly on its own choice of mismatch costs. The reason for
this is that a higher value of mi reduces the number of consumers who prefers good i ; but
does not a¤ect the optimal price towards its remaining consumers, all else equal. However,
since an increase in mi increases the rivals price, we nonetheless nd that each rms
(potential) equilibrium price is increasing both in its own and the rivals mismatch costs,






proving that @pUP UPi =@mj > @p
UP UP
i =@mi > 0:






from which it follows that @UP UPi =@mj > @
UP UP
i =@mi > 0: Since higher mismatch
cost softens competition when both rms use uniform pricing, it leads to higher prots.
Suppose next that only rm 0 has committed to uniform pricing. Firm 1 is then free to
choose between uniform pricing and personalized pricing at the stage 3, but it will clearly
select the latter. The reason for this is that with personalized pricing, it can charge a
price from each consumer which is innitesimally lower than that of rm 0 and become
these consumerspreferred supplier (and this will be the optimal pricing strategy towards
all consumers who thereby generates a non-negative prot). No other price schedule can
possibly yield a higher prot for rm 1. Following Thisse and Vives (1988), we thus assume
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that when only rm 0 has made a price policy commitment, it will act as a Stackelberg
leader at stage 3.12 Inserting pPP1 (~x) = c into (2), it follows that rm 0s demand becomes
~x = DUP PP0 =
m1   (p0   c)
m0 +m1
:





Equation (11) is rm 0s equilibrium price as well as its reaction function. The latter
follows because the rival always charges a price equal to marginal costs for its last consumer
and for all consumers served by rm 0 (so that p1(x) = c for x 2 [0; ~x]):





Firm 1 sells to all consumers in the interval [~x; 1] ; and these consumers are charged
prices which ensure that u1(x)  u0(x): In equilibrium this constraint is binding, and from










3.2.2 Choice of mismatch costs (stage 2)
Let us now turn to rm 0s choice of mismatch costs (stage 2). With no e¤ect on our
qualitative results, we assume that the rm can costlessly choose any mismatch level it
wants within the boundaries [m;m] :
By assumption, rm 0 has committed to uniform pricing. If the rival has made the
same commitment (recall that it will not use uniform pricing at stage 3 unless it has
committed to do so), we know from equations (9) and (10) that equilibrium prices and
prots are increasing in each rms level of mismatch costs. It thus follows that rm 0 will
set m0 = m (and rm 1 will likewise set m1 = m).
12If rms set prices simultaneously when one of them has committed to uniform pricing and the other
uses personalized pricing, then we must solve for mixed strategies. See Thisse and Vives (1988, 1992).
14
In the terminology of Fudenberg and Tirole (1984) and Tirole (1988), cf. section 3.1,
rm 0 uses a puppy dog strategy if the rival uses uniform pricing: it "underprovides" re-
ductions in the mismatch level on its own good in order to induce a more soft response from
the rival. This is similar to the ndings in Ferreira and Thisse (1996), and is related to
ndings in the literature on strategic obfuscation (obfuscation complicates or prevents con-
sumers from gathering price information). Ellison & Wolitzky (2012) show that rms may
unilaterally choose to raise consumerssearch costs. This may be considered as analogue
to raising their own mismatch costs.
In contrast, if the rival uses personalized pricing, we know from Proposition 1 that a
change in rm 0s mismatch costs does not a¤ect rm 1s pricing behavior towards its
marginal consumer or any of the consumers served by rm 0; it always setspPP1 (x)

x~x =
c. Consequently, as the strategic e¤ect is eliminated rm 0 needs not worry about any
aggressive response from the rival if it reduces the perceived mismatch costs associated
with the good it o¤ers. Since a reduction in own mismatch costs raises its market share
(@DUP PP0 =@m0 < 0), rm 0 thus maximizes prot by setting m0 = m: Formally, this








To summarize the results so far:
Lemma 1: Suppose that rm 0 has committed to uniform pricing, and that the rival
(a) uses uniform pricing. Then rm 0 chooses to maximize mismatch costs associated
with its own good (sets mUP UP0 = m):
(b) uses personalized pricing. Then rm 0 chooses to minimize mismatch costs associ-
ated with its own good (sets mUP PP0 = m):
3.3 Firm 0 has not committed to uniform pricing
3.3.1 Pricing (stage 3)
Suppose that rm 1 has committed to uniform pricing, while rm 0 has made no commit-
ment. Then we know from the analysis above that rm 0 will use personalized pricing.
Due to the intrinsic symmetry of the rms, we can switch subscripts in equation (13) and
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Suppose instead that neither of the rms have committed to uniform pricing. In this
case both rms will use personalized pricing.13 Each of them will consequently set price
equal to marginal cost for its last consumer (x = ~x) and for all consumers served by the
rival (Thisse and Vives, 1988). Hence, inserting pPP0 (~x) = p
PP
1 (~x) = c into (2) yields




Equivalently, DPP PP1 = 1  ~x = m0m0+m1 :
14





3.3.2 Choice of mismatch costs (stage 2)
Now, consider rm 0s incentives to reduce mismatch costs when it uses personalized pricing.
Assume rst that rm 1 uses uniform pricing. The discussion above then indicates that
rm 0 will choose high mismatch costs, because this makes rm 1 soft. This is conrmed
by di¤erentiating equation (14) with respect to m0 :
13In equation (18) below we nd that PP PPi =
m2j
2(mi+mj)
























> 0 it follows
that rm i will use personalized pricing whatever the price policy of the rival. Thus, it is a dominant
strategy at stage 3 to choose personalized pricing for a rm that has not made any other commitment.
14It is straightforward to show that if rm 0 uses personalized pricing it will sell less if the rival uses
personalized pricing than if the rival uses uniform pricing (DPP PP0 < D
PP UP
0 ): The reason for this is




15We have PP PP0 =
R ~x
0



















If rm 1 instead uses personalized pricing, it sets pPP1 (x) = c towards its marginal
consumer. We again know from Proposition 1 that rm 0 then is unable to make its rival
softer through choosing high mismatch costs. It is therefore unambiguously benecial for
rm 0 to reduce mismatch costs, because this will increase the size of its market. Formally,









Lemma 2: Suppose that rm 0 uses personalized pricing, and that the rival
(a) uses uniform pricing. Then rm 0 chooses to maximize mismatch costs associated
with its own good (sets mPP UP0 = m):
(b) uses personalized pricing. Then rm 0 chooses to minimize mismatch costs associ-
ated with its own good (sets mPP PP0 = m):
Lemma 2 resembles Lemma 1. Each rm takes into account the fact that if the rival
uses uniform pricing, then a reduction of its own mismatch costs triggers an aggressive
price response from the rival. If the rival uses personalized pricing, on the other hand, a
rm which decreases its mismatch costs will observe higher sales without having to reduce
its price. We thus have the following striking result, which is a main lesson from the current
model:
Proposition 2: Firm is incentives to reduce the mismatch costs of its product is
independent of whether it uses uniform prices or not. It chooses to reduce mismatch costs
if and only if the rival uses personalized pricing.
Proposition 2 highlights the fact that choosing personalized pricing comes at a cost;
it gives your rival incentives to tailor its good to each consumers preferences (reduce
mismatch costs). In the next section we will consider whether this e¤ect may induce rms
not to choose personalized pricing.
Note that even though a reduction in mismatch costs is individually protable, the rms
would be better o¤ if they could make a (joint) commitment to abstain from it. To see
17




which is strictly increasing in m:
3.4 The choice of personalized pricing
Using the results that rm i sets mi = m (minimum mismatch costs) if the rival uses
personalized pricing and mi = m if the rival uses uniform pricing, we can apply equations









If one and only one of the rms has committed to uniform pricing, we likewise nd from








Let   m=m  1 dene the ratio between maximum and minimum mismatch costs,
and suppose that rm j has committed to uniform pricing. Should rm i do the same? If
it does, rm j will choose high mismatch costs (soft behavior). Equations (19) and (20)
yield
UP UPi   PP UPi =
32   4
8 (1 + )
m < 0 if  < crit =
p
4=3  1: 1547: (21)
Thus, it is not a Nash equilibrium for both rms to choose uniform pricing if the ratio
between maximum and minimum mismatch costs is below a critical value,  < crit: The
reason for this is that the gain from committing to uniform pricing and making the rival soft
is then low compared to the gain from charging each consumer according to her willingness
to pay for the good (personalized pricing). On the other hand, if  > crit, we see that
UP UPi   PP UPi > 0: Then, neither rm will regret committing to uniform pricing,
because each of them has much to gain from having a soft rival.
What should rm i do if the rival has not committed to uniform pricing (which implies
that it will use personalized pricing)? Using equations (19) and (20) we nd
UP PPi   PP PPi =
(  1)  1
4 (+ 1)







 1: 618: (22)
Hence, it is protable for rm i to commit to uniform pricing even if the rival uses per-
sonalized pricing if  > crit: Again, the intuition is that the larger is the ratio between
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maximum and minimum mismatch costs, the more valuable it is to commit to uniform
pricing in order to make the rival soft. The reason why crit > crit is that the loss in
market share from using uniform pricing is greater when the rival chooses personalized
pricing than when it uses uniform pricing.
Inspection of (21) and (22) reveals that there does not exist any equilibrium where one
rm commits to uniform pricing and the other does not16, so we can state
Proposition 3: Equilibrium constellations:
(i) If  < crit; there is a unique equilibrium where both rms choose personalized
pricing.
(ii) If  > crit; there is a unique equilibrium where both rms choose uniform pricing.
(iii) If crit   < crit; there are multiple equilibria, where both rms choose person-
alized pricing or both rms choose uniform pricing.
In sharp contrast to Thisse and Vives (1988), we thus nd that it is not necessarily true
that rms unambiguously will choose personalized pricing (which would be a prisoners
dilemma). On the contrary, once we open up for endogenous mismatch costs, personalized
pricing might not even constitute a Nash equilibrium. This is true if the span between the
lowest and the highest level of mismatch costs is su¢ ciently large. The threat that the rival
will tailor its product as closely as possible to each consumers preferences may discipline
rms and induce them to stick to uniform pricing.
4 Extensions
4.1 The mixed blessing of accessing a two-sided market
In this section, we modify the model to consider a two-sided market. One example of rms
or platforms in this context is newspapers, which attract readers as well as advertisers.
Another example is search engines, serving users and advertisers. Suppose rms have two
sources of revenue; they charge users for their consumption, as in the main model. In
addition, they charge advertisers for providing them with the usersattention. To keep
16This might change if the rms are ex ante asymmetric, e.g. with respect to initial data accumulation.
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the framework simple, we assume that consumers are indi¤erent to ad levels. Hence, their
utility is una¤ected by the advertisement side of the market.
If rm i uses uniform pricing in the user market, it charges each user a subscription fee
pi. Further, as in Anderson et al. (2017a), we assume that the rm earns b per user in the
advertising market. Its prot is therefore UP Ri = (pi + b  c)Di:
First, suppose both rms use uniform pricing in the user market. Solving @UP UPi =@pi =
0; i = 1; 2, we nd




Compared to the main model, the user price is in this case b units lower. This is because
the possibility of selling the usersattention to advertisers intensies rm rivalry to such
an extent that they compete away advertising revenue. This so-called see-saw e¤ect is
well-known from the media economics literature (see e.g. Armstrong, 2006). Total prot






which is the same expression as in the main model, cf. equation (10).
Assume instead that rm i uses personalized pricing in the user market. Since this
requires relatively disaggregated market data, it is reasonable to assume that the rm
has acquired (weakly) more information about each individual user than it would under
uniform pricing. Such individualized information could be valuable for the rm when
it approaches the advertising market. To capture this, assume that rm i which uses
personalized pricing can charge an ad premium   0 for each user. The prot level of rm
i is then PP Ri = (pi(x) + b+    c)Di:
In order to see the implications of the ad price premium, suppose that rm 1 uses
personalized pricing, while rm 0 has committed to uniform pricing. A user located in x
is now worth p1(x) + b +    c to rm 1, which is  units more than if it instead used
uniform pricing. This hurts rm 0 in two ways. First, demand for good 0 falls, since the
rival nds it protable to capture more users with personalized pricing than with uniform
pricing: More precisely, the location of rm 1s marginal consumer is now implicitly given
by pPP1 (~x) = c   b   ; where ~x evidently is decreasing in . Second, since rm 1 is
now willing to o¤er its good at a price equal to c   b    to all consumers served by the
rival, the perceived willingness to pay for good 0 falls (rm 0s demand curve shifts  units
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downward). Firm 0s prot maximizing price is therefore strictly decreasing in . Formally,
inserting for pPP1 (~x) into (2) and maximizing 0 = (p0 + b  c)DUP PP0 with respect to p0
yields
~x = DUP PP0 =
m1   
2 (m0 +m1)




Note that rm 0 will have positive sales only if m1 > : To ensure that this is always the












We derive rm 1s optimal price from equation (1) by setting u0 = u1. This yields
p1(x) = c   b + m1 2 +m0x  m1 (1  x) : The fact that rm 0s optimal price falls when
rm 1 uses personalized pricing forces rm 1 to reduce its price even towards consumers
in its own turf. However, since rm 1 sells more and makes a higher prot per user the




((p1(x) + b+    c)) dx =




Finally, it is straightforward to show that if both rms use personalized pricing, the
see-saw e¤ect once again implies that they compete away advertising revenue. Their prot





As in the main model, each rm chooses to maximize mismatch costs (m) if the rival
uses uniform pricing and minimize mismatch costs (m) if the rival uses personalized pricing.
























0 : This implies that rm i is more incentivized to use personalized pricing the greater  is.
We can thus state:
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Proposition 4: Suppose that each rm has more individual reader data if it uses
personalized pricing than if it uses uniform pricing in the user market. Suppose further
that this generates a premium in the advertising market. The greater is the premium, the
greater are each rms individual incentives to use personalized pricing, which can lead
them to end up in the low-prot equilibrium with personalized pricing.
Prots are the same under a two-sided market and a one-sided market when rms use
the same price policy due to the see-saw e¤ect. However, the premium makes rms more
incentivized to unilaterally adopt personalized pricing in a two-sided market compared to
a one-sided market. Therefore, rms might prefer a one-sided market if a two-sided market
induces switching to personalized pricing.
4.2 Location incentives
In this section, we extend the model to consider location incentives.17 In relation to section
3.1, location is a non-price variable. As such, it is interesting to examine the insights from
Proposition 1 on rmslocation.
We assume that rm 0 uses personalized pricing and ask how its location incentives
depend on rm 1s choice between uniform pricing and personalized pricing. A full-edged
location analysis will not be carried out.18 Instead, we take rm 1s location as given and
examine rm 0s location choice. We further set m0 = m1 = m in order to hightlight the
e¤ects on location.







rm 0 at some point x0 to the left of rm 1, as shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Location incentives.
17We now go back to the one-sided market context.
18Technically, the way we have modelled mismatch costs corresponds to linear transportation costs. It
is well known that this is unsuited for analyzing endogenous location when rms use uniform pricing (see
e.g. dAspremont et al., 1979).
22
The net utility of buying good 0 for a consumer located (weakly) to the right of x0 is
uxx00 (x) = v m (x  x0)  p0(x); while the net utility of buying good 1 for a consumer to
the left of x1 equals u
xx1
1 (x) = v  m(x1   x)  p1(x): Using the fact that rm 0 charges
pPP0 (x) = c from the consumer who is indi¤erent between good 0 and good 1, we nd from
uxx00 (~x) = u
xx1
1 (~x) the demand facing rm 0











1 for all consumers
between x0 and ~x: This means that
p
x2[x0;~x]
0 (x) = p1(x) +m (x0   x) m (x  x1) for x 2 [x0; ~x] : (26)
For consumers located between 0 and x0 the net utility of buying good 0 is u
x<x0
0 =




0 (x) = p1(x) m (x0   x) m (x  x1) for x 2 [0; x0] :


















which can be rewritten as
PP R0 = x0 ( c+ p1(x) +m (x1   x0)) +
( c+ p1(x) +m (x1   x0))2
4m
: (27)
Suppose that rms compete in prices at stage 2, and that rm 0 chooses location at
stage 1 (recall that we take rm 10s location as given). We solve the game through backward
induction. After solving the the second stage problem, the rst-order condition for stage 1




















which is unambiguously positive since p1(x)  c. We can now examine how the rst-order
condition of rm 0s location problem depends on rm 1s choice between uniform and
personalized pricing.
If rm 1 uses personalized pricing, it will o¤er its good at a price equal to marginal cost
for consumers located in x 2 [x0; ~x] : Inserting pPP1 (x) = c in equation (27) we then nd
PP PP0 = x0m (x1   x0) +
m (x1   x0)2
4
: (30)
Since pPP1 (x) = c in x 2 [0; ~x] ; rm 0 cannot a¤ect the price that rm 1 charges consumers
in this area, that is, dp1
dx0





. This resembles Proposition 1; only the market expansion (direct) e¤ect of rm







= m (x1   2x0) 
1
2
m (x1   x0) =
m (x1   3x0)
2
:




If instead rm 1 uses uniform pricing, it solves p1 = arg max UP PP1 ; where 
UP PP
1 =
(p1   c) (1 D0) : This gives the price
p1 =
2 (c+m) m (x0 + x1)
2
: (31)
Firm 0 faces relatively soft (potential) competition when rm 1 uses uniform pricing. Other
things equal, the rm will therefore expand demand more if it locates closer to a rival using
uniform pricing compared to a rival using personalized pricing. Therefore, we should expect





 c+ p1   3mx0 +mx1
2
=











m (2  x0   x1)
4
> 0;





19Due to symmetry (x0 = 1 x1) the equilibrium location in this case would be x0 = 14 and x1 =
3
4 : See
also Bhaskar and To ( 2004):
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m, hence one drawback of moving closer to
rm 1 is that rm 1 will respond by setting a lower uniform price. Inserting for (31) into










encourages rm 0 to locate further away from the rival. Adding the demand expansion




m (2  15x0 + x1)
8
:






: Since xPP UP0  xPP PP0 =
 2(2x1 1)
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< 0; rm 0 will locate further away from rm 1 if rm 1 uses uniform pricing
than if rm 1 uses personalized pricing. As an example, suppose that x1 = 0:75: Then we
would have x0 = 0:25 if rm 1 use personalized pricing, while we would have x0  0:18 if
rm 1 uses uniform pricing.
One implication of personalized pricing by the rival on a rms location incentives
is therefore that the rm does not need to consider any strategic response from the rival
following the rms choice of location; only the market expansion e¤ect on prot remains. In
contrast, if the rival uses uniform pricing, the strategic e¤ect induces the rm to di¤erentiate
more away from the rival in order to soften price competition. Hence, even though the rm
considers a rival which uses uniform pricing as relatively soft compared to a rival which
uses personalized pricing, it will nonetheless locate closer to a rival using personalized
pricing since the rival will not respond by lowering prices. Since rm 0 by assumption
uses personalized pricing, the result is purely driven by rm 1s choice of price policy.
Consequently, if both rms use personalized pricing, they will locate relatively close to
each other. This resembles Hurter and Lederer (1985), Lederer and hurter (1986) and
Bhaskar and To (2004), who nd that rms locate so as to minimize social costs. However,
since they assume both rms use personalized pricing, they do not identify that the e¤ect
stems from the rival using personalized pricing, not rms using personalized pricing.
From Proposition 1, we then reach the following:
Corollary 1: Suppose rms are symmetric (m0 = m1 = m). Then,
(a) a rm will locate closer to a rival which uses personalized pricing compared to a
rival which uses uniform pricing.




Traditionally, consumers are restricted to buy at most one of the two goods that are of-
fered in standard Hotelling models (which means that D0 + D1  1). We now relax this
assumption by allowing consumers to buy one unit from each rm (multi-purchasing). We
follow the concept of incremental pricing by Anderson et al. (2017b). The net utility of
buying only good i is still given by equation (1), ui(x) = v  mi jx  xij   pi(x); while the
value of buying good i in addition to good j (its incremental value) equals
uji =  [v  mi jx  xij]  pi(x); (32)
where the parameter  2 [0; 1]. If  < 1; the incremental value of each good is smaller than
its stand-alone value, for instance due to overlap in the goodsarea of use.20
Let x10 denote the consumer who is indi¤erent between buying only good 1 and buying





Note that x10 depends only on rm 0s price and mismatch cost, not on the rivals price
and mismatch cost: The attractiveness of buying good 0 in addition to good 1 only hinges
on the net utility o¤ered by good 0.
The location of the consumer who is indi¤erent between buying only good 0 and buying





We will analyze a market structure with partial multihoming. This means that some
consumers buy both goods (D0+D1 > 1), but none of the goods are sold to all consumers
(Di < 1). This market outcome is illustrated in Figure 2.21 Demand for rm is good and
20Foros, Kind and Wyndham (2018) provide an alternative utility formulation that illustrates that the
outcome does not depend on consumers having a rst and a second choice. However, their analysis does
not consider personalized pricing and endogenous mismatch costs.
21Since the line has length 1, consumers located at x < 1=2 are closer to rm 1 and therefore have good
1 as their most preferable good. Likewise, consumers located at x > 1=2 are closer to rm 2 and have good
2 as their most preferable good. Hence, it follows that
^
x = 1=2. This implies that multihoming consumers
to the left of
^
x buy good 2 for its incremental value over good 1, while multihoming consumers to the right
of
^
x buy good 1 for its incremental value over good 2.
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the distribution og singlehoming (SHC) and multihoming (MHC) consumers are (where xi
is rm is location)
Di = jxij   xij| {z }
SHC
+ jxji   xijj| {z }
MHC
= jxji   xij : (35)
Figure 2: Market outcome with partial multihoming.
Hence, total demand for good 0 is D0 = x10, total demand for good 1 is D1 = 1  x01,
and the number of multihomers is given by (x10   x01).
Let us rst consider the outcome when rm 0 uses uniform pricing.22 Its prot level is
then given by 0 = (p0   c)D0: Since D0 = x10 is independent of p1 and m1, the prot















From (37) we note that rm 0 chooses to minimize own mismatch costs whatever the
price policy of the rival.
22It is beyond the scope of the present paper to provide a complete analysis of possible singlehoming
and multihoming equilibria and their stability; we limit our attention to consider candidate equilibria with
partial multihoming. See the appendix in Anderson et al. (2017b) for a comprehensive analysis of deviation
incentives.
27
Let us now assume that rm 0 uses personalized pricing. For reasons that become
clear below, we assume that personalized pricing involves an extra marginal cost equal
to  > 0: In equilibrium rm 0 then charges pPP R0 (x) = v   m0x towards its exclusive
(singlehoming) consumers, pPP R0 (x) =  (v  m0x) towards multihoming consumers, and
pPP R0 (x) = c+ towards its marginal consumer (and those served by the rival). Thus, the
smaller the mismatch costs are, the higher price can rm 0 charge each of its consumers.
Inserting that pPP R0 (~x) = c+  into equation (33) yields
DPP R0 =
v   (c+ )
m0
;
which shows that rm 0s total sales are decreasing in m0: By reducing mismatch costs, the
rm will therefore both be able to charge a higher price and sell more since the number of
exclusive consumers for rm 0 is independent of m0; cf. equation (34). Hence, also in this
case, the rm minimizes its own mismatch costs independently of which price policy the




(v  mx  c  ) dx+
Z x10
x01
( (v  mx)  c  ) dx
=
2 (v   c  ) mx01
2
x01 +
(2 (v   c  )  m (x01 + x10))
2




and x01 = 1  v (c+)m .
From the above discussion, if consumers multihome, rms cannot a¤ect the rivals price
policy through its choice of mismatch costs. We can state:
Proposition 5: Each rm will minimize mismatch costs, independently of which price
policy the rival uses, if some consumers multihome.
As noted above, x10 only depends on rm 0s price and mismatch cost, thus rm 0s total
demand is independent of the rivals actions. On the other hand, since x01 only depends
on rm 1s price and mismatch cost, rm 1 can by its actions a¤ect rm 0s demand
composition. Specically, a reduction in m1 expands rm 1s demand by turning some of
rm 0s exclusive consumers into multihomers. If rm 0 uses uniform pricing, the demand
composition does not matter for its prot since singlehomers and multihomers are charged
the same price. However, if rm 0 uses personalized pricing, a reduction in m1 hurts rm
0 because a multihomer is only worth  of a singlehomer. Further, from Proposition 5, we
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know that rms are incentivized to minimize their mismatch costs independently of what
the rival does. We then reach the following:
Corollary 2: Assume some, but not all, consumers are multihoming. If rm i uses
uniform pricing, it is not a¤ected by the rivals choice of uniform pricing or personalized
pricing. In contrast, if rm i uses personalized pricing, it is better o¤ if the rival uses
uniform pricing.





If  = 0, the demand is twice a large under personalized pricing than under uniform
pricing, which means that the market is not covered under uniform pricing.23 Therefore,
we assume an extra marginal cost  > 0 under personalized pricing to avoid this issue.
5 Concluding remarks
In a duopoly model, we examine how a rms incentives to reduce its mismatch cost depends
on its own and on its rivals choice between uniform pricing and personalized pricing. While
a rival which uses personalized pricing will not strategically respond to a rms decisions
on its mismatch cost, a rival using uniform pricing will respond aggressively by reducing
its price if the rm lowers its mismatch cost. Therefore, rmsincentives to change their
mismatch cost depend only on the rivals choice between uniform and personalized pricing.
Firms might commit to uniform pricing in order to avoid an aggressive response from the
rival in lowering its mismatch cost, which is detrimental for the rms prot since it loses
market shares.
We let rms endogenously decide whether to commit to uniform pricing as well as the
level of the non-price variable prior to the price competition stage. These assumptions
allow us to examine the relationship between price policy commitments by either rm and
strategic commitments in the non-price variable. As non-price variables we consider the
mismatch cost in our main model and location incentives in an extension.
23Partial multihoming implies that the total demand is strictly less than 2.
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Therefore, we also contribute to the literature on personalized pricing by examining
how non-price commitments in general depend on the commitment to a uniform price
policy. It has been pointed out in previous works that a rm which uses personalized
pricing optimally sets price equal to marginal cost in the rivals market region (Lederer
and Hurter, 1986; Thisse and Vives, 1988). Given that the choice of the non-price variable
is observable prior to the price competition stage, this means that the strategic e¤ect of
a rms choice of non-price commitment in stage 2 ceases to exist if it faces a rival which
uses personalized pricing. We show that it is not price discrimination in itself that removes
strategic e¤ects of non-price commitments, it is price discrimination by the rival, and the
rival only, that drives the result. The choice of whether to commit to uniform pricing in
stage 1 can therefore be seen as a choice of whether to give the rival strategic incentives
to undertake non-price commitments in stage 2. To our knowledge, this has not yet been
highlighted in the previous literature.
Our analysis highlights one potential force which may incentivize rms to continue
using uniform pricing as the pricing standard even when they are capable of practicing
personalized pricing. Due to rapid developments in machine learning and data collection
technologies, which improve rms capability of practicing personalized pricing as well
as o¤ering tailored products, both personalized pricing and product tailoring have been
devoted great attention recently from the media (e.g. Forbes, 2014) as well as from the
academic literature (e.g. Esteves, 2010; Valletti and Wu, 2016; Prüfer and Schottmüller,
2017). Our results can help explain why rms are slower to adapt personalized pricing than
one would expect, despite that they have the technology and information to do so.
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This paper examines how price coordination, and importantly, coordination on price 
restorations, is carried out in retail gasoline markets. In the studied market, one firm breaches 
a fourteen-year lasting regular price cycle overnight by publicly announcing a change to its 
retail price policy. Prior to the announcement, the regular cycle occurred across brands and all 
over the country. I show that the recommended price of this particular company, which is 
publicly available on the company’s website, serves two functions for its network of retail 
stations. First, it determines the price restoration level. Second, it serves as a signal of when to 
implement a restoration day: Every time this company announces an adjustment to the 
recommended price in the early morning, price restoration is implemented the following 
forenoon. I further show that other companies are following the new practice as well. Hence, a 
new way to coordinate on prices and synchronize price restorations inter-brand and across local 
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Overnight, the largest firm of an oligopoly of four breaches a fourteen year-long regular 
nationwide price cycle by publicly announcing a change to its retail price policy. Prior to the 
announcement, this market experienced inter-brand retail price restorations with one single 
large jump on fixed days of the week. Immediately after, nationwide price restorations no longer 
occur on specific days of the week, yet arise frequently and systematically all over the country. 
Figure 1 plots the occurrence of restoration days by day of the week over a one-year period for 
one sample station. The change in restoration behavior shows well: To the left of the dashed 
vertical line, which marks the date of the policy announcement, restoration occurs 
systematically on Mondays and Thursdays. Following the policy announcement, price no 
longer rises on specific days of the week. 
 
Figure 1: Occurrence of restoration days by day of the week over time for one sample station. Days of 
the week are measured on the y-axis and have different point markers. Sample period is 1 June 2017 to 
31 May 2018. Dashed vertical line marks the date of the policy announcement (29 November 2017). 
Following the price policy change, how is a new shared view on price coordination 
facilitated? How is when to restore prices, and to which level to restore prices, determined? Is 
a nationwide intra-brand and inter-brand coordination, if any, achieved? These are the main 
questions addressed in this study. 
Specifically, I analyze how price coordination, and importantly, coordination on price 
restorations, is carried out in retail gasoline markets. One firm acts as a price leader by giving 
sign of when to restore prices and at which level to restore prices to, with use of one single 
signaling device. This adds to the understanding of how a new shared view to coordinate on 
prices can emerge in a market. The research context has one clear advantage: The policy change 
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occurred very recently, which has enabled direct observations and discovery of changes that 
have occurred in the market from the very beginning.   
The subject of study is the Norwegian retail gasoline industry. On 29 November 2017, the 
largest company in the market announces a price policy change on its websites, with the aim to 
have less fluctuating prices throughout the week. The company reasons the change with a 
survey it had carried out revealing that customers prefer to have more stable prices during the 
week in order to purchase gasoline whenever it suits them. One specific action the company 
carried out to achieve its goal of less fluctuating prices is to cut its recommended price1 with 
approximately twelve cents and as such decrease the maximum retail price with the same 
amount. Other than this, no more information are provided as to why, how or specific aspects 
of the new policy. Further, nothing else of particular interest for the industry has occurred 
during the same time period which could explain a policy change.2 
I address the questions by examining three datasets, each with different attributes well-
suited to increase the understanding how a mutual view on how to coordinate on price can be 
facilitated. As the policy change occurred very recently, I was able to directly discover changes 
that have arrived in the market from the very beginning. In turn, this led to a data collection 
directly aimed to answer the questions addressed in the study.  I use the first source of data to 
scrutinize the signaling device. The second source is used to uncover the systematic intra-brand 
coordination of the largest company. This data is in hourly frequency, which opens up for 
examination of the exact timing of price restorations as well as the exact level for which prices 
jump to. As prices can be quickly undercut after restoration due to local competition, hourly 
data does not overlook any of these changes. Hence, it contains the finest restoration and cycle 
details and enables thorough investigation of the coordination process after the policy change. 
Finally, the third source is utilized to uncover the inter-brand coordination and the nationwide 
implementation of the new policy. All three sources cover the calendar date of the price policy 
change, allowing for close examination of the pre-period leading up to this date as well as the 
post-period following the price policy announcement. 
I find that the recommended price of the largest company, which is publicly available on 
the company’s website, serves two functions. First, it determines the level of the price 
restoration, which also is the case prior to the price policy change. Second, and unique for the 
post-policy period, it serves as a signal of when to implement a restoration day: Every time the 
largest company announces an adjustment to the recommended price in the early morning, 
prices of its stations restore between 9 a.m. and noon the same day. In the pre-policy period, 
restorations occurred regularly on specific days of the week. Now, the practice has changed 
such that price restoration is implemented every time the largest company adjusts its 
recommended price. Hence, prior announcements of the recommended price is used as a 
signaling device to coordinate on retail prices. I find that price restoration is initiated highly 
systematically intra-brand across different local markets. Further, I show that other companies 
have adapted to the new practice. Hence, a new way to coordinate on prices and synchronize 
price restorations inter-brand and across local markets has emerged. The largest company, by 
                                                          
1Most companies post the recommended price online. According to companies’ information, the 
recommended price is a “correct” price when costs and taxes are taken into account. 
2 I did a search in newspapers to look for events occurring around the same time, however, did not find any 
happenings that could be in relation to the policy change. 
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being a price leader with use of its recommended price as a signaling device, seems to have 
succeeded in introducing a new nationwide price restoration rule to the market. 
Systematic use of retail prices to facilitate coordination is examined empirically in among 
others Noel (2007), Atkinson (2009), Wang (2009), Lewis (2012) and Byrne and de Roos 
(2017), who uncover regular behavior of retail prices also identified in this study. However, to 
the best of my knowledge, this is the first study to show that prior announcements of the 
recommended price of a company is used systematically as a signaling device to establish the 
time of a price restoration in addition to the level of a price restoration. Moreover, this paper 
departs from previous literature in one important way: Being aware of the change of practice 
from the very beginning, I made personal observations and discoveries in real-time that led me 
to collect data specifically targeting to answer the problem at hand. I believe this advantage 
enabled me to recognize small details introduced to the market that turned out to be crucial in 
understanding the evolvement of creating a new common view on price coordination.    
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the market and the motivation 
for this study. Section 3 reviews related literature. In Section 4, the data is presented. Section 5 
presents the empirical analysis. Finally, Section 6 concludes.  
 
2 Market characteristics and price behavior 
There are four major nationwide gasoline companies operating at the retail level in Norway. 
These are Circle K Norway (market share of gasoline 32.3% in 2015), St1 Holding Oy (24.3%), 
Esso Norway (20.8%), and Uno-X Norway (17.8%) (Drivkraft Norge, 2017a).3 All of them run 
both serviced and self-serviced stations. Circle K operates the brands Circle K and 1-2-3 (self-
serviced brand), St1 runs Shell and St1 (self-serviced), Esso runs the brand Esso (both serviced 
and self-serviced), while Uno-X operates the brands YX and Uno-X (self-serviced). The 
remaining market is covered by smaller chains, among others Best, Bunker Oil and Tanken. 
The nationwide companies operate fully integrated as well as vertically separated stations.4 
Vertically separated stations have long-term contracts with the upstream company regarding 
delivery of gasoline. In principle, these outlets determine the retail price independently from 
the upstream company. However, the vertical restraints that are imposed on the profit sharing 
arrangement between the stations and the upstream company can in reality shift the price 
decision to the upstream firm instead (Foros and Steen, 2013).  
Circle K, St1 and Uno-X publish recommended prices (excluding transport costs) on their 
websites.5 These prices serve, according to the companies, to reflect the correct retail price 
when the wholesale price, taxes and other factors considered as relevant are taken into account. 
When a price restoration is implemented, retail prices restore by a large amount to the level on 
the recommended price (Foros et al., 2018).  
For fourteen years, starting in 2004, there has been a regular price cycle in the Norwegian 
market with nationwide inter-brand price restorations every Monday around noon (Competition 
Authority, 2014). From 2008, another restoration day on Thursdays is introduced. Between 
                                                          
3 St1 Holding Oy performed an acquisition of Shell Norway’s retail stations in 2015. 
4 In 2016, the major companies had in total 1697 stations. Of them, 1023 were vertically company-owned 
stations while the remaining were dealer-owned (Drivkraft Norge, 2017b). 
5 St1 publishes recommended prices only for the corporate market. 
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restorations, prices are gradually undercut over subsequent periods.6 The weekly cycle is hence 
characterized by a saw-toothed pattern with an abrupt price jump every Monday and Thursday. 
Foros and Steen (2013) show that this predictable pattern is caused by a profit sharing scheme 
between the upstream companies and the downstream stations involving a maximum resale 
price maintenance (RPM) and price support. The price support of varying size enables stations 
to compete by undercutting prices, but whenever it is withdrawn, stations must increase their 
prices to the maximum RPM, which is set to the level of the recommended price, to not sell 
with a loss. Thus, inter-brand coordination of retail prices is obtained when all companies 
withdraw the price support simultaneously. 
On 29 November 2017, Circle K (2017) announces on its website that it will from this date 
cut its recommended price with 1 NOK, with the aim to have less fluctuating prices throughout 
the week. The (claimed) background for this is a survey the company had carried out, showing 
that their customers prefer to purchase gasoline when it suits them the most, rather than on 
Sunday and Monday morning when prices are at their lowest under the predictable cycle. By 
decreasing the recommended price with 1 NOK, Circle K essentially cuts the maximum retail 
price with the same amount. 
From this day, with Circle K’s announcement of a price policy change, the fourteen-year 
lasting predictable weekly cycle with price restoration every Monday and Thursday ended 
overnight. 
2.1 Motivation based on direct observations 
When I became aware of Circle K’s announcement of a price policy change, I started to 
follow prices on two stations in Bergen in the morning and in the afternoon, one Circle K station 
and one Shell station, respectively.7 I was familiar with these stations’ previous price setting 
behavior as I also had collected prices from them on an earlier occasion. In addition, I collected 
the recommended prices for the private market available for two of the companies, Circle K 
and Uno-X. Soon after, I noticed that the two stations still had restored prices in the afternoon 
on the same day to approximately the same level. The Circle K station I followed set its 
restoration price to the recommended price plus a fixed transportation cost. The Shell station 
restored its price to approximately the same level. Except that prices no longer jumped every 
Monday and Thursday, things seemed familiar: prices restore to the level of the recommended 
price, and there are signs of inter-brand coordination. 
However, after observing prices for a few weeks, I noticed that price restoration occurred 
earlier during the day than before the policy change: Already around 10 a.m., prices at the Circle 
K station had jumped to the restoration level. By 12 p.m., it had restored at the Shell-station as 
well. From past experience, I expected the recommended price to be adjusted approximately 
once per week with around 0.10 NOK in either direction. Now, I observed that changes were 
made more frequently. Moreover, adjustments were much smaller in magnitude. Also, there 
was more information regarding the recommended price on Circle K’s website than I recalled 
                                                          
6 Prices of stations are announced on large signs outside stations. Each station monitors the neighbor stations 
and report prices to the headquarter (Competition Authority, 2014).  




to have seen earlier. In particular, it now informed that the recommended price is in force from 
10 a.m. on the stated date. 
So I started to check when during the day the recommended price was adjusted by updating 
the websites of Circle K and Uno-X several times in the morning. On days when it was updated, 
Circle K was always first out with changing the recommended price between 7:45 a.m. and 8 
a.m. Whenever Circle K adjusted it, Uno-X did accordingly around one to two hours later, 
always before 10 a.m. Uno-X did not adjust its recommended price if Circle K did not do it. It 
seemed as if Uno-X followed Circle K on the recommended price, not only regarding which 
days to adjust it, but also regarding the level: Uno-X’s prices were always set 0.02 NOK above 
Circle K’s prices, both for gasoline and diesel. 
I also came to notice that every time Circle K’s recommended price was adjusted, prices of 
the two stations I followed restored to the new recommended price within the same day. Of 
curiosity, I once looked at the price sign of the Circle K station right before 10 a.m. and noticed 
the retail price changed at 10 a.m. sharp. The next time the recommended price was adjusted in 
the morning, I did the same. Again, the retail price changed exactly at 10 a.m. So a colleague 
checked another Circle K station at the same time as I was checking the station I already 
followed. Price restored exactly at 10 a.m. for both of the stations.8 According to the Norwegian 
company registry, one of the Circle K stations is company-owned, the other one is dealer-owned 
or franchise-owned. Still, these two stations systematically restored prices simultaneously at 
exactly 10 a.m. As dealer-owned stations determine their own retail prices in principle 
(Shepard, 1993), this seemed too much of a coincidence. We started to do the same for an Esso-
station nearby one day Circle K’s recommended price was adjusted in the morning. Also this 
one restored its price exactly at 10 a.m., indicating strong inter-brand coordination after the 
policy change as well. 
Questioning whether this is a local market phenomenon or whether this is a nationwide 
practice, I therefore accessed a gasoline application in Norway where users can report prices 
from all over the country in real-time.9 Following this application, I saw the same behavior of 
stations from all over the country.  
These observations are the motivation behind the data collection I have made, which is well 
suited to formally investigate the factors I spotted by direct observation.  The following 
analysis’ aim is to provide a better understanding of the role of the recommended price as a 
signaling the device, the intra-brand coordination within the network of Circle K’s stations, the  
inter-brand coordination among the companies, as well as the new price policy as a nationwide 
practice.  
 
3 Literature review 
Public announcements of price policy changes have taken place prior to this one. Andreoli-
Versbach and Franck (2015) describe a similar event to the new policy change in Norway 
                                                          
8 At some occasions, the two Circle K stations restored prices at 10:10 a.m. simultaneously. The point here is 
not that prices restore at 10 a.m. sharp as such, but rather the systematic coordination of this restoration. That said, 
it is quite peculiar to see prices jump exactly at 10 a.m. based on an indication from the website that the 
recommended price of the posted date applies from this time. 
9 This application is called “BensinPris” (“GasolinePrice”). 
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happening in the Italian market, however, the new price policy differs from the Norwegian case. 
On 6 October 2004, the market leader publicly announced its commitment to a sticky-pricing 
policy, with larger single price adjustments when price is adjusted. The authors show that the 
average time lag between price adjustments increased from six to twenty days and the absolute 
average price change increased from 1% to 5.4% for the market leader with the new price 
policy. The market leader which initiated the policy change also coordinated price changes in 
the market, as the other companies followed this new price policy. This is somewhat similar to 
the Norwegian case, except I only identify the initiator of the new price policy as the leader or 
coordinator of price restorations. 
The way Circle K uses the recommended price as well as retail prices at its stations to signal 
and potentially coordinate with rivals relates to findings in Byrne and de Roos’ (2017a). They 
show that one firm in the Australian market uses retail prices to communicate and facilitate a 
mutual understanding among rivals to transit to a new price equilibrium. Further, the authors 
argue that since prices are highly transparent and easy to adjust and experiment with, prices 
have great communicative power. Thus, explicit communication is not necessary to establish a 
collusive strategy. As other companies seem to have abandoned the regular time-dependent 
price cycle in favor of Circle K’s price policy, Circle K has succeeded in using recommended 
prices and retail prices to signal a new price behavior to its competitors. However, one 
difference from Byrne and de Roos’ (2017a) case is that prior announcements of the 
recommended price is used as a signaling device to coordinate on retail prices, together with a 
simultaneous intra-brand price jump by Circle K as an additional signal, rather than only using 
the retail price itself.  
The theoretical literature distinguishes between three types of price leadership: dominant, 
barometric and collusive. Dominant leadership occurs when a large firm decides prices and 
smaller fringe firms follow by adjusting their prices accordingly (e.g. Deneckere and Kovenock, 
1992). On the other hand, under barometric leadership, one firm has more information than 
others, thus other firms change prices whenever the better informed firm does so (e.g. Cooper, 
1997). The more informed firm has no power to impact prices of other firms, rather, its price 
serves a pure informative role. The last category involves price leadership as a way of 
facilitating tacit collusion (e.g. Markham, 1951; Rotemberg and Saloner, 1990; Mouraviev and 
Rey, 2011; Harrington, 2017). Testing and categorizing which category the Norwegian case 
best fits into is difficult without high-frequency price observations of all companies in the 
market. Nonetheless, some general points can be made. Circle K’s public announcement of a 
new price policy was an announcement not only to the public, but also, and arguably primarily, 
to its competitors in an attempt to establish a new industry-wide practice of price setting and 
underline its own commitment to it. Everything points to Circle K’s attempt being highly 
successful, as evidence from data as well as direct observations suggest the other companies 
are following Circle K’s price restorations closely. Circle K signals a price restoration day by 
changing its recommended price, hence it is a price leader in the sense of determining when 
prices are restored, and other companies are followers in the sense that they accept these days 
to be restoration days by initiating restorations of prices at their stations as well.  Although it is 
the largest company in the industry, it is not sufficiently large to fit into the category of 
dominant leadership, hence the other three companies are unlikely to take Circle K’s price as 
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given. On the other hand, whether intentionally or not, the new practice probably serves as a 
common understanding on how to coordinate on prices. 
Several papers empirically address price coordination and whether there is one or more firms 
taking the role as a price leader. Lewis (2012) documents for markets in the Midwestern U.S. 
that one particular retail chain behaves like a price leader in each city, signaling price restoration 
to rivals by simultaneously increasing prices at all its stations to the same level. Further, the 
same firm often initiates restoration in several different local markets simultaneously to further 
strengthen the signal. This is quite similar to what I find is Circle K’s role in the Norwegian 
market. Each morning of a new restoration day, the company signals a start of a restoration to 
competitors by adjusting the recommended price online. Few hours later, retail prices at its 
stations jump up to the same level, which is the recommended price, throughout the country, 
no matter which level prices are at right before the price jump. Wang (2009), looking at the 
market of Perth, Australia, also documents that one large firm initiates price restoration in the 
Australian market before the introduction of a law which allows firms only to change price once 
a day and simultaneously. After the law is set in force, three firms are identified as price leaders. 
Atkinson (2009), studying the market in Guelph, Canada, finds that five stations, all of them 
major brand stations, often increase their prices first during restorations. On the other hand, 
Noel (2007) does not find one single firm which frequently initiates price restorations in the 
Toronto market, however, large integrated firms are more likely to initiate restorations for its 
stations than independent stations. The finest data granularity used in these studies are 12-
hourly observations (Noel, 2007) or bi-hourly observations (Atkinson, 2009; Lewis, 2012). One 
of the datasets in use in this study contains hourly observations from four different cities. 
Especially in fine cycles where prices often are undercut quickly after restoration due to local 
competition, data of such a high frequency open up for thorough examination of price behavior, 
especially related to the timing and level of restoration, which may be ignored with infrequent 
data.  
This study also relates to the literature on price cycles. Cyclical prices are observed in 
several retail gasoline markets in Canada (e.g. Eckert, 2003; Eckert and West, 2006; Atkinson, 
2009; Noel, 2007), the U.S. (e.g. Doyle et al., 2010; Lewis, 2012), Australia (e.g. Wang, 2009) 
and European markets (e.g. Germany: Haucap et al., 2015; Austria: Dewenter and Heimeshoff, 
2017). The saw-tooth pattern in retail prices is often associated with Edgeworth cycles by 
Maskin and Tirole (1988). In this price cycle, two homogenous firms undercut each other’s 
prices by small amounts in an alternating move game.10 Prices eventually get close to costs such 
that one firm must increase prices in a single large jump. The other firm then follows, and the 
cycle repeats itself. Support for the existence of Edgeworth cycles is found in among others the 
U.S. (Lewis, 2012), Canada (Noel, 2007) and Australia (Wang, 2009). Some predictions of 
Edgeworth cycles fit well to the Norwegian case. First, prices make one single jump by a large 
amount during restoration, while they decrease by smaller amounts several times during the 
undercutting phase. Second, retail prices fluctuate even if the wholesale price does not. These 
observations are in line with theory. On the other hand, the underlying factors which trigger 
restoration is not as clearly in line with this phenomenon. Before the policy change, specific 
                                                          
10 Eckert (2003) extends the model to allow for asymmetric firm size, while Noel (2008) opens up for different 
kinds of asymmetric equilibria. 
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days of the week triggered price restoration. As such, price behavior in the pre-period is 
inconsistent to the theory, which predicts that restoration occurs when price is competed down 
to marginal costs. After the policy change, price restoration is initiated whenever Circle K 
adjusts its recommended price. At this point, what triggers Circle K to signal price restoration 
remains unknown. The war of attrition-phase predicted by theory causes companies to take turn 
in carrying forward the burden of restoring prices first. However, the same company initiates 
price jumps every time in this market, which is one argument against the existence of 
Edgeworth cycles.11  
Finally, this paper relates to other studies on the Norwegian market. Prior to this study, two 
papers have examined the Norwegian market in addition to market reports by the Competition 
Authority. Foros and Steen (2013), using station-specific prices from 2003 to 2006, establish a 
nationwide weekly cycle in prices with price restorations every Monday followed by smaller 
price decreases throughout the rest of the week. Moreover, based on interviews with 35 retail 
outlet managers, they describe how the gasoline companies control retail prices on independent 
stations with use of a vertical restraint involving price support and an RPM, similar to findings 
from the Australian market (Wang, 2009). Stations receive price support which enable them to 
compete by undercutting prices, but whenever it is withdrawn, they must increase their prices 
to the maximum RPM, which is essentially the recommended price, to not sell with a loss. As 
such, the upstream companies control retail prices of their stations independently of contract 
form. Thus, a price restoration is implemented when all companies withdraw the price support 
simultaneously. While the authors mark the start of the weekly cycle after the Easter of 2004, 
what caused this shift remains unknown. On the other hand, I show in detail how the new pattern 
is announced and implemented in late 2017. Foros et al. (2018), with use of station-specific 
prices from 2004 to 2015, find that an additional weekly restoration on Thursdays is introduced 
to the cycle. Moreover, they show that the additional restoration day increases firms’ 
profitability significantly.  
 
4 Data 
This paper makes use of three datasets, each with different attributes in order to better 
understand the problem at hand. The first is a daily time series of the wholesale price of 
conventional gasoline and the recommended price by the largest company in the market, 
spanning from 1 January 2013 to 31 May 2018 (referred to as time series data).12 I use this data 
to examine the relationship between the underlying cost and the posted recommended price. 
Further, I use it to study how the recommended price has evolved over time in terms of level 
and frequency, and how it serves as a signaling device to facilitate a common view of 
coordination on retail prices. 
                                                          
11 I do not identify any price in the station panel which would give a negative gross margin, which goes against 
the possible reason of price restoration due to prices which have been competed down to the cost level. Note that 
this panel includes one station from a local market known for having the most aggressive price competition in the 
country. Even for this station, gross margins are always positive after the policy change. 
12 The wholesale price is the gasoline regular unleaded 10 ppm Amsterdam-Rotterdam-Antwerp (ARA) series 
listed in US dollar/metric ton, converted into NOK/liter.  
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The second source contains station-specific retail gasoline prices, spanning from 1 January 
2017 to 28 February 2018. Prices are reported by users of a cellphone application called 
“BensinPris” (“GasolinePrice”) and cover stations throughout the country, including all major 
cities (referred to as user-reported data).13 Every price report contains information about time 
and date of the observed price, station name, station brand and address. The sample consists of 
106 361 observations from 630 different stations, covering the four largest brands as well as 
minor brands. I use this information to establish that the change in the market is nationwide and 
applied inter-brand, and to show that there are signs of price leadership. 
The last dataset consists of station-specific prices from four Circle K stations located in four 
different cities (first to fourth largest) (referred to as station panel). All of these stations operate 
under the brand of the largest company in Norway. The data period is 1 June 2017 to 31 May 
2018, covering six months with the old price regime and six months with the new one. Prices 
are reported each hour, and the reported price is the lowest one which is set within the current 
transaction hour. This data source is useful for studying the implementation of the new price 
setting regime in detail, and specifically, whether there is any systematic regularity in how price 
restoration is determined intra-brand, and whether price setting is different than previous to the 
new price setting regime announced. It also allows for detailed examination of the distribution 
of prices before and after the implementation of the new price regime, as well as fine details of 
how prices evolve during a typical cycle.14 
The commodity of interest is unleaded 95-octane gasoline.15 Prices addressed in the analysis 
are in NOK per liter, unless otherwise is stated.16   
 
5 Empirical analysis  
5.1 The recommended price: A coordination device  
In the following, I examine how Circle K can use the recommended price as a signaling 
device to coordinate the price restoration level as well as the timing of price restoration.  Figure 
2 plots the recommended price and the wholesale price of conventional gasoline over a five and 
a half year period. As expected, the recommended price of Circle K follows the wholesale price 
closely in the long run, suggesting that the recommended price eventually is set according to 
costs. 
To study the frequency of adjustments in the recommended price, I count the number of 
times Circle K changes its recommended price during the sample period. The number of 
changes per year is reported in Table 1. On average, the recommended price changes 50 times 
                                                          
13 User-reported data are also applied by e.g. Eckert and West (2003), Lewis and Marvel (2011) and Byrne 
and de Roos (2017b). Atkinson (2008) studies potential sample selection bias in these kind of data by comparing 
user-reported price data with price data collected by direct observations. He concludes that user-reported data is 
reliable for addressing questions regarding daily prices of major brand station prices. In addition, I feel confident 
in using the user-reported data as the predictable cycle in the pre-policy period is well established in this data, 
which gives credibility to the dataset also in the post-policy period.  
14 Time series data are partly accessed through Datastream and partly provided by Circle K. User-reported 
data are provided by Bit Factory, the developers of the application “BensinPris”. Station panel data are provided 
by Circle K.   
15 Similar patterns are observed for diesel. 
16 1 USD≈8 NOK in 2018-figures.  
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each year from 2013 to 2016, which counts for approximately once per week. Taking a closer 
look at 2017, the year in which the new price policy is implemented, the recommended price 
changed nineteen times from the beginning of the year to 28 November. In comparison, from 
29 November and to the end of the year, the recommended price changed nine times. Hence, 
during the one month period right after Circle K’s announcement of a price policy change, the 
recommended price was adjusted half as many times as it did in total the eleven months before 
the price policy change. Even more interesting, during the first six months of 2018, the company 
changed its recommended price approximately as many times as during a whole year for the 
previous years (on average 1.69 times a week).  
 
 
Figure 2: Recommended price of Circle K and wholesale price over time. Sample period is 1 January 
2013 to 31 May 2018. 
To further evaluate the recommended price, I look at the level of changes. I take the first 
difference in the recommended price , Δ𝑟𝑝𝑡 = 𝑟𝑝𝑡 − 𝑟𝑝𝑡−1, where t indexes day. If Δ𝑟𝑝𝑡 = 0, 
then there are two consecutive days with no adjustment in the recommended price. Since 
interest lies in days where the price actually changes, I drop all observations for which Δ𝑟𝑝𝑡 =
0. I also examine the absolute value of Δ𝑟𝑝𝑡 in order to avoid positive and negative changes 
cancelling out each other. Table 2 reports summary statistics for Δ𝑟𝑝𝑡 and |Δ𝑟𝑝𝑡 |. Of particular 
interest here is the mode, which is 0.1 NOK or -0.1 NOK for all years except for 2018, where 
the mode is -0.02 NOK. In absolute terms, the mode this year is one fifth of the mode of all 
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other years. This suggests that the recommended price is adjusted by much less in magnitude 
in 2018 compared to the other years.17  
 
Table 1: Number of times recommended price of Circle K has changed by year and day of week. Sample 
period is 1 January 2013 to 31 May 2018. 
 
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Mon 15 15 15 8 8 7 
Tue 6 5 10 5 2 10 
Wed 12 8 14 9 7 9 
Thu 6 9 15 10 4 5 
Fri 15 6 8 8 7 13 
Sat 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Sun 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Sum 56 43 62 40 28 44 
 
 
Table 2: Summary statistics of 𝛥𝑟𝑝𝑡 and |𝛥𝑟𝑝𝑡 |. Sample period is 1 January 2013 to 31 May 2018. 
 
      Mean    Median Mode    Std.dev.       Min    Max 
2013 
      
Δ𝑟𝑝𝑡 0.016 0.050 0.100 0.091 -0.150 0.150 
|Δ𝑟𝑝𝑡 | 0.088 0.100 0.100 0.029 0.050 0.150 
2014       
Δ𝑟𝑝𝑡 -0.020 -0.080       -0.100 0.097 -0.150 0.150 
|Δ𝑟𝑝𝑡 | 0.094 0.100 0.100 0.024 0.050 0.150 
2015       
Δ𝑟𝑝𝑡 -0.005 -0.050 -0.100 0.140 -0.300 0.300 
|Δ𝑟𝑝𝑡 | 0.128 0.100 0.100 0.055 0.050 0.300 
2016       
Δ𝑟𝑝𝑡 0.043 0.100 0.100 0.137 -0.250 0.250 
|Δ𝑟𝑝𝑡 | 0.134 0.120 0.100 0.049 0.050 0.250 
2017       
Δ𝑟𝑝𝑡 -0.011 0.050 0.100 0.227 -1.000 0.340 
|Δ𝑟𝑝𝑡 | 0.136 0.100 0.100 0.180 0.050 1.000 
2018       
Δ𝑟𝑝𝑡 0.020 0.020       -0.020 0.074 -0.120 0.200 
|Δ𝑟𝑝𝑡 | 0.060 0.045 0.020 0.047 0.010 0.200 
 
Hence, two changes seem to have been introduced to the recommended price along with the 
introduction of the new pricing policy. First, the recommended price is adjusted almost twice 
as frequently compared to the pre-policy periods. Second, the size of each change is on average 
much smaller. Both changes enable the recommended price to fit better as a signaling device 
because it now can be adjusted frequently as a communication tool and still keep it correlated 
                                                          
17 Note the minimum value of 2017 of 1 NOK. This is the announced decrease of the recommended price 
made by Circle K in relation to the new pricing policy. 
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with the underlying costs. My conjecture is that the recommended price is used as a signaling 
device for coordinating the price restoration level as well as the timing of price restoration. The 
former conjecture is already established in previous literature (Foros and Steen, 2013; Foros et 
al., 2018). I will argue for the latter conjecture in the analysis of the two other datasets. The 
discussion so far is well summarized in Figure 3, which plots the first difference in the 
recommended price over time (first differences equal to zero are omitted). The change in 
behavior of the recommended price in terms of frequency and level shows well from the Figure: 
Prior to 29 November 2017 (vertical dashed line), adjustments in the recommended price are 
spread out over time and lie mainly around 0.10 NOK in absolute terms. From 29 November 
2017, Δ𝑟𝑝𝑡 clusters around the zero line and occurs much more frequently.  
 
 
Figure 3: 𝛥𝑟𝑝𝑡 of Circle K over time. Sample period is 1 January 2013 to 31 May 2018.  𝛥𝑟𝑝𝑡=0 is 
omitted. Dashed vertical line marks 29 November 2017. 
 
5.2 Retail prices and restoration  
Having established a change in the behavior of the recommended price, I move on to 
examine retail prices, first with use of the station panel consisting of accurate hourly data. Data 
contain one station from each of the first to fourth largest city in Norway. These cities are 
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geographically dispersed from each other and are considered as four separate local markets.18 
Therefore, due to different local market conditions, one would expect these stations to act 
differently in terms of pricing according to the local market for which each of them is situated. 
Summary statistics of retail prices are given in Table 3 while a histogram as well as the kernel 
density distribution of prices for the whole sample is shown in Figure 4. Looking at the 
distributions, prices seem more centered after the price policy change, while more dispersed in 
both directions before the policy change. I formally examine the equality of price distributions 
before and after the policy change using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. The test clearly rejects 
the null hypothesis of equal distributions.19 Hence, price behavior significantly changes from 
29 November 2017. 
Table 3: Summary statistics of hourly retail prices. Sample period is 1 June 2017 to 31 May 2018. 
 
No. of obs. Mean Std.dev. Min Max 
Pre-period 17365 14.894 0.950 11.52 16.76 
Post-period 17664 15.135 0.806 12.49 16.78 




                                                          
18 The largest to fourth largest city are Oslo, Bergen, Trondheim and Stavanger.  The drive time between the 
cities, using Google Maps, are: Trondheim-Oslo six hours, Trondheim-Bergen ten hours, Trondheim-Stavanger 
thirteen hours, Oslo-Stavanger seven hours, Oslo-Bergen seven hours, and Bergen-Stavanger five hours. 
 




Figure 4: Histogram (top panel) and kernel density distribution (bottom panel) of retail prices for the 
pre- and post-period. Sample period is 1 June 2017 to 31 May 2018. 
 
 To examine whether the old cycle with weekly peaks every Monday and Thursday after 
noon is present in the data, I take the mean retail price at 3 p.m. for each day of the week across 
stations before and after 29 November 2017. Under the old cycle, prices are documented to be 
restored by 3 p.m. every Monday and Thursday (Foros and Steen, 2013; Foros et al., 2018). 
Indeed, Figure 5, which is a plot of the mean retail prices, demonstrates the old pattern (solid 
line) quite well: Prices are low on Sundays and Wednesdays followed by restoration on 
Mondays and Thursdays (upper panel). However, from 29 November 2017 (dashed line), the 
pattern is no longer present. Furthermore, there does not seem to be clear specific days of the 
week for which price restores after the policy change, as there are no clear-cut peaks and 
bottoms in the mean prices. The same pattern before and after 29 November 2017 is found when 
plotting mean prices for each station separately (lower panel). In addition, we see that station 4 
faces stronger competition, as prices decrease faster and to a lower level than the other three 
stations.20 
 
                                                          
20 This station is located in the fourth largest city in Norway. In this local market, competition is well known 





Figure 5: Mean retail prices at 3 p.m. per day of week before and after policy change across stations (top 
panel) and per station (bottom panel). Sample period is 1 June 2017 to 31 May 2018. 
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However, even though prices do not jump at specific days of the week, Figure 6 shows that 
they still evolve in cycles with periods of undercutting followed by large peaks. More 
specifically, there is great asymmetry in price increases compared to price decreases also in the 
post-period, as reported in Table 4. Price decreases occur on average over four times as often 
as price increases, however, each price increase is on average over 4.5 times larger than each 
price decrease. Further, price is undercut on average one to two times each day, while price 
increases occur on average once every third day. This reveals that whereas price undercutting 
happens in several stages, price restoration takes place with one single jump. 
 
Figure 6: Mean retail price at 3 p.m. across the four stations over time after policy change. Sample period 
is 29 November 2017 to 31 May 2018. 
 

















Mean Std.dev. Mean 
daily 
number 










Post-period 61 (245) 1.196 0.699 0.333  272 (1086) -0.263 0.355 1.476 
Note: Mean number is the number of observations of price increases and decreases, respectively, divided 
by the number of stations. Number of observations are reported in parentheses. The pre-period (1 June 
2017 to 28 November 2017) consists of 181 days, while the post-period (29 November 2017 to 31 May 
2018) consists of 184 days. The mean daily number is calculated by dividing the mean by the number 
of days in each period.  
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The question is then: Following the policy change, how is price restoration determined? It 
turns out that restoration days coincide close to perfectly with days for which Circle K changes 
its recommended price, that is, when  Δ𝑟𝑝𝑡 ≠ 0. Figure 7 is the same plot as Figure 6, however, 
with additional vertical lines placed on each date where Δ𝑟𝑝𝑡 ≠ 0 in order to mark days with 
adjustments in the recommended price. From 29 November 2017, the recommended price 
changes 55 times in total. For the four stations, this gives 220 possible daily observations of 
restoration. Of these, there are only four observations where the price does not restore following 
a change in the recommended price. This translates into 1.8% deviation. This strongly suggests 
that a change in the recommended price by Circle K is used as a signaling device: If the 
recommended price on a specific day is changed, stations of Circle K know that a nationwide 
restoration is coordinated the same day. Further, since stations are from four different 
geographically dispersed cities, observations suggest that Circle K succeeds in implementing 
nationwide within-brand price restorations. Later, I provide findings which strongly indicate 
that not only does Circle K manage to initiate intra-brand coordination; it also succeeds in 
initiating inter-brand coordination. 
 
 
Figure 7: Mean retail price at 3 p.m. across the four stations over time after policy change. Vertical 
dashed lines mark dates with a change in the recommended price. Sample period is 29 November 2017 
to 31 May 2018. 
Note from Table 1 and the text that the recommended price for gasoline changed 53 times 
from 29 November 2017 to 31 May 2018 (9 + 44). Most of the time, the recommended price 
for gasoline and diesel are adjusted on the same dates. However, on two occasions in the 
sample, 1 February 2018 and 27 February 2018, only the recommended price for diesel was 
adjusted while the recommended price for gasoline remained unchanged. Nonetheless, the price 
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on gasoline still restored. Direct observations made by myself in the post-sample period shows 
the same behavior. Due to this, I count these two days as restoration days and refer to restoration 
days as days where either the recommended price on gasoline, the recommended price on diesel, 
or both are adjusted. The fact that a change in the recommended price on diesel triggers price 
restoration on gasoline (and vice versa) further suggests that adjustments made to recommended 
prices serve as a signal for implementing a restoration in retail prices. 
 
 
Figure 8: Mean retail price per hour across stations separately for days with change in the recommended 
price and for days with no change in recommended price. Sample period is 29 November 2017 to 31 
May 2018. 
I look further into whether prices restore at a particular time during a signaled restoration 
day. Of the 216 observations for which price restores, price increases at 10 a.m. 118 times 
(54.6% of the time), at 11 a.m. 96 times (44.4%), and at 12 p.m. two times (0.9%). In this data, 
the reported price is the lowest price that has been valid during the current hour. This means 
that if price restores during a particular hour and not exactly at a particular hour, the restoration 
price will be the reported price of the following hour. Hence, in this sample, price restores 
54.6% of the time between 9 a.m. and 10 a.m. or at 10 a.m. sharp, 44.4% between 10 a.m. and 
11 a.m. or at 11 a.m. sharp, and finally, 0.9% of the time between 11 a.m. and 12 p.m. or at 12 
p.m. sharp.21 Price restoration seems to be strikingly systematic: Every time Circle K signals 
that the current day is a restoration day, stations restore their retail price between 9 a.m. and 11 
a.m. In Figure 8, I plot the average price each hour across stations separately for non-restoration 
                                                          
21 All four stations have restored prices at both 10 a.m. and 11 a.m., however, not necessarily during the same 
hour on the same restoration dates. 
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days (Δ𝑟𝑝𝑡 = 0) and restoration days (Δ𝑟𝑝𝑡 ≠ 0).
22 The pattern is clear and sums up the 
discussion above well: price restoration now occurs between 9 a.m. and 11 a.m. on days where 
Circle K adjusts its recommended price. Hence, prior announcements of the recommended price 
initiates coordination of intra-brand retail prices. 
Next, I study whether there is coordination in the price restoration level. Foros and Steen 
(2013) show that under the regular pattern with restoration every Monday and Thursday, prices 
jumped to the recommended price plus a fixed transportation cost.23 I find the same behavior 
after the policy change is implemented, as shown in Figure 9. In order to capture the price right 
before restoration as well as the price right after restoration, I plot the retail price at 9 a.m. and 
the retail price at 11 a.m. for all days for which the recommended price changes. Whereas the 
retail price usually is below the recommended price at 9 a.m., with few exceptions as mentioned 
above, prices have restored to the recommended price at 11 a.m. The systematic restoration of 
prices is strikingly clear-cut, both when it comes to timing of the restorations as well as the 
level of restorations. 
 
Figure 9: Retail price at 9 a.m. and 11 a.m. per station on days the recommend price changes. Sample 
period is 29 November 2017 to 30 May 2018. 
 
                                                          
22 A similar pattern is found for each separate station. 
23 The transportation cost lies between 0.06 and 0.11 NOK for the sample stations. 
54 
 
5.3 The likelihood of the occurrence of price restorations  
To more formally investigate the relationship between the occurrence of price restoration 
and time, I run regressions on the probability of a restoration in the retail price on different 
predictors for time during a week and other indicators to allow for separation between the pre- 
and post-policy change period. I create an indicator variable, 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑢𝑝𝑖𝑡, which is equal to one 
if the retail price of hour 𝑡 (on day 𝑗) for station 𝑖 increases to the restoration price from the 
previous hour. As explanatory variables I include a set of indicator variables for the clock hours 
10 a.m. to 4 p.m., denoted 𝐻𝑙 , 𝑙 = 10, . . ,16, using all other hours as baseline. I do not include 
a full set of hour indicators because no restoration is identified in the sample for the remaining 
hours. I also include a set of indicator variables for Monday to Friday, denoted 𝐷𝑘, 𝑘 = 1, . . ,5, 
using Saturday and Sunday as baseline, an indicator variable, 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡, which is equal to one if the 
hour 𝑡 is in the post-policy change period, and an indicator variable, 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑝, equal to one if 
hour 𝑡 is on a restoration day. I two-way interact all hours with all days, all hours with 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 
and 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑝, respectively, all days with 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 and 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑝, respectively, in addition to an 
interaction term between 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 and 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑝. Three-way interaction terms between hour, 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 
and 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑝, and day, 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 and 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑝 are also included. The wholesale price, 
𝑤ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑗, is controlled for. Finally, I include station fixed effects, which is equivalent to city 
fixed effects since each station is located in different cities, to control for time-invariable 
differences across stations.24  
Regressing 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑢𝑝𝑖𝑡 on these predictors allows the probability of 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑢𝑝𝑖𝑡 to change with 
the included time dimensions. In addition, I open up for these time dimensions to depend on 
each other, and I allow for behavior to be different in the two different price policy periods. The 
specification also opens up for further investigation of the role of a change in the recommended 
price. I run a logit regression and a probit regression using maximum likelihood. Clustered 
standard errors on the day level to allow for relation between prices within the same day are 
calculated. Coefficients of the models are provided in the Appendix.25 
5.3.1 Regression results 
Of particular interest for the new price policy is the variable 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑝. From the estimated 
coefficients, I therefore calculate the marginal effects on 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑢𝑝 from a change in 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑝. 
Since 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑝 is categorical, the marginal effect is calculated as the change in the probability 
of 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑢𝑝 = 1 when 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑝 goes from zero to one for different combinations of days of 
the week and hours. The other categorical variables for days of the week and hours are set to 
zero. I fix the remaining independent variables at their sample mean values. Further, I 
investigate the marginal effects of 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑝 separately for the pre- and post-period. Marginal 
                                                          
24 Hence, the specification takes the following form: 
Pr (𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑢𝑝𝑖𝑡 = 1|𝑿) = 𝑓[𝛼0 + ∑ 𝛽𝑙𝐻𝑙
16
𝑙=10 + ∑ 𝛾𝑘𝐷𝑘
5
𝑘=1 + 𝛼1𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑗 + 𝑤ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑗 +
∑ ∑ 𝛿𝑙𝑘𝐻𝑙𝐷𝑘
5











𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑗) + 𝜆𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 × 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑗 + ∑ (𝜇𝑙𝐻𝑙 × 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 × 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑗) +
16





) + 𝜏𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡].  
25 Note that some coefficients are omitted for the logit and probit specifications. The reason is two-fold. First, 
if a right-hand side variable perfectly predicts success or failure in 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑢𝑝, no coefficient can be fit to the variable 
as it adds no variation to the estimation process and hence get omitted. Second, due to many indicator variables, 
some variables are omitted due to collinearity.  
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effects with respect to 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑝 with corresponding standard errors over different days of the 
week and hours are presented in Table 5. Standard errors are calculated using the delta method.  






Day Hour dy/dx S.E. dy/dx S.E. 
      
Pre-period 
    
Mon 10 
    
Tue 10 
    
Wed 10 
    
Thu 10 
    
Fri 10 
    
Mon 11 -0.029 0.048 -0.028 0.044 
Tue 11 
    
Wed 11 -0.003 0.003 -0.002 0.003 
Thu 11 -0.004 0.005 -0.003 0.007 
Fri 11 
    
      
Post-period 
    
Mon 10 0.352*** 0.107 0.402*** 0.105 
Tue 10 0.533*** 0.053 0.524*** 0.050 
Wed 10 0.550*** 0.056 0.547*** 0.055 
Thu 10 0.585*** 0.063 0.573*** 0.060 
Fri 10 0.560*** 0.091 0.561*** 0.076 
Mon 11 0.668*** 0.075 0.682*** 0.066 
Tue 11 0.440*** 0.054 0.433*** 0.051 
Wed 11 0.414*** 0.060 0.409*** 0.055 
Thu 11 0.430*** 0.065 0.433*** 0.060 
Fri 11 0.377*** 0.077 0.384*** 0.070 
      
No. of obs.  31 553  31 553  
Note: Marginal effects are computed separately for the pre-and post- period. Delta standard errors are 
reported. Independent variables are fixed at the sample mean. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Sample 
period is 1 June 2017 to 31 May 2018. 
 
From Table 5, the effect of 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑐 on the probability of 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑢𝑝 = 1 in the post-period 
is positive and significant for hour 10 and 11 across all days. Magnitudes are in general quite 
similar across the two models. The expected probability of restoration is around 0.5 higher 
during hour 10 (10 a.m.) on days where the recommended price changes compared to days 
where it does not change. For hour 11, the expected probability of restoration is between 0.4 
and 0.7 higher compared to days with no change in the recommended price. On the other hand, 
there are no corresponding significant effects in the pre-period. Due to the omission of 
coefficients and empty cells, some marginal effects are not possible to calculate for the pre-
period. When the interaction between 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑐, days of the week and hours is such that there 
are few or no observations for which 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑢𝑝 = 1, there are few or no responses to calculate 
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the marginal effects over, or in this case, a discrete change from one state to the other, which 
probably is why the effects are inestimable. Finally, for both the pre- and post-period, I find 
either insignificant or inestimable marginal effects for all hours except 10 a.m. and 11 a.m. In 
sum, these results confirm that a significant change in the way Circle K initiates price 
restoration has taken place. 
 






Day Hour dy/dx S.E. dy/dx S.E. 
Pre-period 
    
Mon 10 0.012*** 0.010 0.006 0.009 
Mon 11 0.063** 0.029 0.060** 0.026 
Mon 12 0.097*** 0.026 0.088*** 0.027 
Mon 13 0.230*** 0.046 0.216*** 0.046 
Mon 14 
    
Mon 15 
    
Mon 16 
    
Thu 10 0.010 0.007 0.012 0.008 








    
Thu 15 
    
Thu 16 
    
Post-period      
Mon 10 -0.001 0.002 -0.002 0.002 
Mon 11 -0.002 0.003 -0.001 0.005 
Mon 12 0.002 0.014 0.005 0.016 
Mon 13 0.009 0.006 0.016 0.010 
Mon 14 
    
Mon 15 
    
Mon 16 
    
Thu 10 0.010 0.010 0.009 0.009 
Thu 11 0.001 0.005 -0.001 0.004 
Thu 12 
    
Thu 13 
    
Thu 14 
    
Thu 15 
    
Thu 16 
    
No. of obs.  31 553  31 553  
Note: Marginal effects are computed separately for the pre-and post- period. Delta standard errors are 
reported. 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑐 is set to zero. The remaining independent variables are fixed at the sample mean. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Sample period is 1 June 2017 to 31 May 2018. 
 
To examine the old pattern, I calculate the marginal effects of Monday and Thursday, 
respectively.  This is because price restoration is triggered by specific days of the week before 
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the policy change. I keep the remaining independent variables at sample means except for 
𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑐, which I set equal to zero because the recommended price is seldomly adjusted in 
the pre-period. These effects are reported in Table 6. Again, the lack of observations where 
𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑢𝑝 = 1  for other hours and days is probably the reason why the estimation of marginal 
effects is problematic for most hours in both periods. The empty cells give no basis to calculate 
the discrete change in the probability of moving from the baseline to the value of interest, which 
here is Monday and Thursday of specific hours. This underlines how systematic price 
restoration occurs in the pre-period. For the estimable combinations of days and hours, I find 
that the probability of restoration increases with around 0.09 on Mondays at 12 p.m. and around 
0.21 at 13 p.m., which is consistent with results in Foros and Steen (2013) and Foros et al. 
(2018).26 
 
5.4 Evolvement of prices between restorations 
One implication of having a regular cycle dependent on day of the week is that the duration 
between restorations is fixed: There are two days between the Monday and Thursday 
restoration, and three days between the Thursday and Monday restoration. I define the duration 
of a cycle as the number of days between two restoration days. This is essentially the 
undercutting phase. With the new price policy, the duration between two restorations in the 
sample varies between zero (two restoration days in a row) and six, with a duration of one day 
and three days occurring most frequently.27 Table 7 provides an overview of the number of days 
between restoration before and after the policy change. Note that data cover six months with 
the old price regime and six months with the new one. 
 
Table 7:  Number of days between two restorations before and after the price policy change. Sample 
period is 1 June 2017 to 31 May 2018. 
Days between  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Before 
  
25 26 1 
  
After            3 17 9 12 9 3 1 
 
One interesting question is then how prices evolve between restorations, and whether they 
evolve differently depending on the duration of the undercutting phase between two 
restorations. To investigate this, I follow Lewis (2012) and first subtract the restoration price 
off the retail price for each station in order to obtain a normalized price relative to the restoration 
level. As documented, the restoration price of Circle K’s stations is simply the recommended 
price plus a fixed station-specific transportation cost.28 I then separate undercutting periods of 
                                                          
26 If I ignore the issue with lack of data I find an increase in probability of 0.455 for hour 14 on Monday and 
0.738 for hour 14 on Thursday using the logit specification. Other combinations of days, hours and pre- and post-
period give no significant effect on the probability or restoration. Results are similar for the probit specification. 
This is in line with direct observations from the data as well as with findings in Foros and Steen (2013) and Foros 
et al. (2018). 
27 Six days between restorations occurred once during the Christmas holiday 2017. I will leave this case out 
from the rest of the analysis as holidays are special occasions. Under the old price regime, restoration occurred 
once on a Tuesday instead of a Monday due to a public holiday, resulting in four days between restorations. 
28 I do not subtract the transportation cost because it will not affect the analysis as it is fixed for each station.  
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different lengths, varying from one to five days, and look at the price distribution for the stations 
of different durations separately. I limit the analysis to daily prices by looking at the 11 a.m. 
price each day. At 11 a.m., prices are all restored if there is a restoration day. As such, it gives 
a good picture of how prices evolve on a daily basis. 
The top panel in Figure 10 presents sets of box plots of normalized prices at 11 a.m. for the 
stations, where each set is categorized by the duration to the next restoration day.29 Cycle 
durations of different lengths are given separate colors on the boxes. For instance, the green set 
of box plots represents the price distribution of two-day duration cycles. The x-axis shows the 
day number within a cycle, where day zero is the restoration day, day one is the first day 
following the restoration day, and so on. For example, the green box plot at point one on the x-
axis shows the distribution of prices of the first undercutting day (the first day following the 
restoration day) for cycles with two-day duration.  Figure 10 leaves no doubt of how systematic 
the coordination of price restorations for Circle K stations is; strictly speaking, regardless of 
duration length, at the restoration time all prices perfectly match the recommended price.30 This 
can be seen by looking at day zero (the restoration day) along the x-axis. Here, all the boxes of 
different colors, representing price distributions for varying durations of a cycle, show virtually 
no variation in price regardless of duration length. There is variation in prices over the course 
of a cycle. In general, prices seem to decrease for each day within the cycle, as the median is 
lower for each day number during a cycle. Notably, the lower duration of the undercutting 
phase, the less prices fall. This suggests that prices often jump back to the restoration price even 
if they still are not yet competed down to a sufficiently low level. Comparing the one-day 
duration prices with the five-day duration prices, a cycle of one day barely gives time to 
undercut prices, which further implies that aggressive undercutting is unlikely to be the only 
reason to initiate price restoration.  
To compare with the period prior to the policy change, I do the same exercise for the pre-
period sample, except that instead of using the 11 a.m. price as the daily observation, I now 
instead use the 3 p.m. price. The reason for this choice is that under the old pattern, prices have 
jumped within 3 p.m. during a restoration day. The average distribution of normalized prices in 
the pre-period is reported in the bottom panel of Figure 10.31 First, compare the case of a two-
day duration of the undercutting phase between the pre-and the post-policy period. Before the 
policy change, the median normalized price drops from 0.06 NOK to -0.79 NOK on the first 
day after restoration. After the policy change, the corresponding drop is from 0.07 NOK to -
0.215 NOK. On the second day after restoration, the median normalized price drops from -0.79 
NOK to -1.555 NOK for the old pattern, while the corresponding drop is from -0.215 NOK to 
-0.635 NOK for the new pattern. Clearly, prices fell on average more between Monday and 
Thursday before the policy change compared to the average cycle of the same duration after a 
policy change. Comparing the case of duration of three days between restorations shows the 
same trend: Before the policy change, the median normalized price drops on average from 0.06 
NOK to -0.815 NOK the first day, to -1.41 NOK the second day and to -2.015 NOK the third 
                                                          
29 A boxplot is read the following way: The floor of the box displays the 25 th percentile, the roof of the box 
displays the 75th percentile, while the horizontal line inside the box displays the 50th percentile. The line on the 
lower whisker displays the 5th percentile and line on the upper whisker displays the 95th percentile. 
30 Prices are a little above zero, which accounts for the transportation cost. 
31 Complete summary statistics are provided in the Appendix. 
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day. After the policy change, the corresponding average drop is from 0.08 NOK to -0.09 NOK 
the first day, to -0.65 NOK the second day and to -1.105 NOK the third day. 
In addition to considering price distributions for different durations separately I also report 
the average distribution of normalized prices of all durations together in Figure 11. Results tell 
in general the same story; for each day following a restoration, price gets lowered by more 
under the old price regime. Circle K announced with the new policy change that it will cut the 
recommended price, which essentially is the restoration price, with 1 NOK from thereon to 
avoid large fluctuations in prices.32  One way of interpreting this cut is that while the maximum 
retail price is lowered by 1 NOK, the competitive level in local markets is, all else equal, 
unaffected by the policy change. Hence, the price roof is lowered while the price floor stays 
unchanged. Therefore, one would expect the jump in price during a restoration to be on average 
1 NOK lower, and as such, smaller price drops during the undercutting phase is as anticipated. 
However, does this drop correspond to the 1 NOK cut in the recommended price? Going back 
to Table 4, which reports mean retail price changes without taking duration into account, if we 
compare the mean of price increases before (1.862) and after (1.196) the price policy change, 
the numbers tell the same story as Figure 10 and Figure 11 of a larger price jump in the pre-
period. To formally test this, I perform a two-sided t-test for comparison of means where the 
null hypothesis is that the difference between the pre-period and post-period mean in price 
increases is equal to 1.33 The test statistic is -4.33, leading to rejection of the null hypothesis at 
the 1% significance level. Thus, albeit smaller restorations in magnitude after the policy change, 
the t-test suggests that the 1 NOK drop in the restoration price has not yet been fully passed 
over to smaller price jumps of 1 NOK in size. 
Another interesting observation is that the most frequently occurred cycle duration is one 
day. Hence, prices barely fall before increasing to the restoration level, meaning that prices 
might fluctuate less, nonetheless, at a relatively high price level. 
 
                                                          
32 A direct quote from the policy announcement is: “In particular, Circle K will from today, Wednesday 29 
November, reduce the recommended price on gasoline and diesel with 1 NOK per liter on serviced stations to 
reduce de big difference between the highest and the lowest price during a week” (Circle K, 2017). 
33 The Brown- Forsythe’s test of equal variances leads to rejection of the null hypothesis of equal variances 
between price increases in the pre-and post-period at the 1% significance level, therefore I assume unequal 





Figure 10: Set of box plots with average 5th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 95th percentile of 11 a.m. normalized 
prices (top panel) and 3 p.m. normalized prices (bottom panel) categorized by cycle duration. A set of 
boxes of different colors represent distributions for varying durations of a cycle, where 0 represents 
cycles consisting of only the restoration day and 5 represents cycles with five undercutting days. The x-
axis reports the day of a cycle duration where 0 is the restoration day. Sample period is 1 June 2017 to 






Figure 11: Set of box plots with average 5th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 95th percentile of 11 a.m. normalized 
prices (top panel) and 3 p.m. normalized prices (bottom panel) averaged over all cycle durations. The 
x-axis reports the day of a cycle duration where 0 is the restoration day. Sample period is 1 June 2017 




5.4.1 Price level and persistence  
The previous analysis suggests that in general price evolves between relatively high and low 
levels during a cycle. I therefore look further on price levels and the persistence of price. 
Specifically, I examine whether there are any significant low and high price states that price 
evolve between, and if so, what average price level defines the different states. I run a simple 
dynamic two-regime Markov-switching regression on each station’s series with a state-
dependent intercept. Further, I add a control for the post-period which impact is allowed to vary 
with states.34 Retail prices are observed to fluctuate between relatively high and low prices. 
Therefore, a dynamic Markov-switching model which allows the process to develop differently 
in the different regimes is suitable for investigating these series. The specification for two states, 
𝑠𝑡 = {1, 2} is 
𝑝𝑡 = 𝜇𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽𝑠𝑡𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝜖𝑠𝑡 
where 𝑝𝑡 is retail price at time (hour) 𝑡, 𝜇𝑠𝑡  is the state-dependent intercept, 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 is an indicator 
variable equal to 1 if the time period belongs to the post-policy period and 𝜖𝑠𝑡 is white noise 
with mean zero and state-dependent variance. Results are presented in Table 8 together with 
the estimated transition probabilities between states.35 
 
Table 8: Markov-switching estimates and transition probabilities. 
 Station 1 Station 2 Station 3 Station 4 
Regime 1     
Constant 14.36*** 14.39*** 14.49*** 13.96*** 
 (0.109) (0.015) (0.016) (0.002) 
Post -0.152* 0.327*** -0.0551* 0.236*** 
 (0.082) (0.026) (0.028) (0.006) 
     
Regime 2     
Constant 15.98*** 15.77*** 15.95*** 15.55*** 
 (0.078) (0.019) (0.011) (0.037) 
Post -0.313*** 0.0814*** -0.286*** -0.0904** 
 (0.066) (0.020) (0.013) (0.039) 
pr11 0.977*** 0.981*** 0.980*** 0.984*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
pr22 0.981** 0.984*** 0.981*** 0.972*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
E(D1) 43.67 53.53 48.95 61.49 
E(D2) 52.44 61.90 51.32 35.70 
No. of obs. 8 756 8 760 8 760 8 753 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The expected duration of 
state 𝑖, 𝐷𝑖, is 𝐸[𝐷𝑖] = 1/(1 − 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑖), which is calculated with more decimals than reported in the Table 
to increase precision. Sample period is 1 June 2017 to 31 May 2018.  
 
                                                          
34 I allow the variance to differ with regimes because doing so increases the model fit. 
35 The model is estimated using maximum likelihood. The transition probability to state 𝑗 in period 𝑡 given 




Considering all four models, the specification identifies a “low price” state (state 1) with an 
average price between 13.96 NOK and 14.49 NOK and a “high price” state (state 2) with an 
average price between 15.55 NOK and 15.98 NOK. 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 has a significant impact on all stations 
and in both regimes, and seems in general to impact the average price in both directions 
depending on state and station. Importantly, the two states are still distinguishable when taking 
𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 into account. 
The probability of staying in both states are above 0.97 for all stations, suggesting that both 
the low price state and high price state are highly persistent. For station 1 to station 3, the 
expected duration of the low price state is between 43 and 53 hours, while the corresponding 
number for the high price state is between 52 and 62 hours.36 This corresponds to around two 
days duration on average for both states.  The expected durations suggest that after the policy 
change, there are still large fluctuations in price, with persistent periods of relatively high prices 
as well as persistent periods of relatively low prices over the course of an average price cycle. 
 
5.5 Evidence of inter-brand coordination  
Table 9: Summary statistics of hourly retail prices by brand. Sample period is 1 January 2017 to 28 
February 2018. 
Brand No. of stations No. of obs. Mean Std.dev. Min Max 
      
Pre-period 
     
1-2-3 24 3045 14.452 1.046 11.090 17.940 
Best 10 711 14.808 1.109 12.090 17.480 
Bunker 5 270 14.424 1.193 12.140 17.510 
Circle 136 19139 14.727 1.109 11.090 17.980 
Esso 113 17989 14.642 1.080 11.090 17.260 
Shell 182 25562 14.667 1.108 11.050 17.920 
St1 30 5704 14.242 1.107 11.110 16.970 
Uno-X 93 13366 14.345 1.116 11.130 17.950 
YX 32 2253 14.831 1.098 11.990 16.940 
Total 625 88039 14.596 1.113 11.050 17.980 
       
Post-period 
     
1-2-3 23 658 14.621 0.820 12.340 17.620 
Best 10 153 15.009 0.857 12.690 17.040 
Bunker 5 70 14.637 0.900 12.550 17.960 
Circle 134 4039 14.888 0.871 11.790 17.850 
Esso 112 3515 14.966 0.801 12.000 17.770 
Shell 181 5096 14.927 0.798 11.410 17.970 
St1 30 1130 14.511 0.887 11.700 17.980 
Uno-X 90 3173 14.490 0.862 11.870 16.290 
YX 32 488 14.856 0.892 12.350 16.950 
Total 617 18322 14.811 0.857 11.410 17.980 
                                                          
36 Station 4 stands out with almost twice as high expected duration of the low state compared to the high state. 
This is as anticipated considering the high degree of competition in the geographical area for which the station is 
located as previously mentioned. 
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Up until now, I have shown how Circle K signals intra-brand price restoration by 
implementing adjustments to its recommended price. One question remains: do changes in 
Circle K’s recommended price initiate inter-brand price restoration? The user-reported data is 
well suited for this purpose, as it covers all major brands as well as minor brands located 
throughout the country, from small rural areas to larger cities. Observations are from 17 out of 
in total 18 counties, which covers 122 out of 426 municipalities.37 Summary statistics are given 
in Table 9.  
First, I examine whether price distributions differ in the pre-and the post-period across 
different brands. From Figure 12, in general there seems to be a change to more centered prices, 
as compared to the pre-period with more dispersed prices in both directions. Applying the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of equality of distributions provides p-values between approximately 
0.00 and 0.03 for all brands, implying that price behavior is significantly different for all brands 





                                                          





Figure 12: Histogram (top panel) and kernel density distribution (bottom panel) of retail prices for the 
pre- and post-period by brand. Sample period is 1 January 2017 to 28 February 2018. 
Since this dataset is unbalanced, when examining whether the old predictable cycle is present 
in the data, only studying 3 p.m. prices will utilize less information than the data contain, in 
contrast to the balanced station panel where all 3 p.m. observations for the Circle K stations are 
available. To overcome this, I calculate the mean price for the a.m. hours (12 a.m. to 11 a.m.) 
and p.m. hours (12 p.m. to 11 p.m.) during a day for each brand, treating each day as consisting 
of two prices, one a.m. and one p.m. price. In this way, by looking at the daily p.m. prices, I am 
able to trace out if there has been a change in the price pattern for the different brands before 
and after Circle K’s policy change. In Figure 13, where the mean p.m. prices for different days 
of the week are presented separately for the pre-period and the post-period, the old pattern with 
restorations on Mondays and Thursdays after noon is visible for all brands. Further, the breach 
in the old regime is also clear, as there seems to be no pattern after 29 November 2017.  
Prices look more stable at a higher level after the price policy change, with less fluctuations 
upward as well as downward. This reflects the fact that restoration can occur on whichever day 
of the week. Hence, when averaging the p.m. prices for each day of the week, since each day 
can in essence both be a “low price” day as well as a restoration day, large peaks are smoothed 
away. All these observations point in the direction of that Circle K has managed to change how 
restoration days are determined not only for its own stations, but also for the other companies’ 
stations. Seemingly, Circle K has taken the role as a price leader and been accepted as a price 
leader by the other companies: prior announcements of the recommended price by the price 





Figure 13: Mean p.m. retail prices per day-of-the-week before and after the price policy changes across 
brands. On the x-axis, 0= Sunday,.., 6= Saturday. Sample period is 1 January 2017 to 28 February 2018. 
 
Having established a change in price behavior for other brands than those belonging to Circle 
K from 29 November 2017 as well, I investigate whether there is any relationship between 
Circle K’s recommended price and price restoration for different companies. I carry out the 
same exercise as in Figure 7 by looking at retail prices together with days for which Circle K 
changes its recommended price, except that I instead look at the mean daily p.m. prices for each 
brand over time for reasons addressed above. Figure 14 shows the same behavior for brands 
belonging to other companies. In particular, the major brands Shell, Esso and Uno-X seem to 





Figure 14: Mean p.m. retail prices by brand over time after the policy change. Vertical dashed lines 
mark dates with a change in the recommended price of Circle K. Sample period is 29 November 2017 
to 28 February 2018. 
 
Is price restoration as systematic as it is found to be for Circle K’s stations in terms of when 
price restores during the day? Although one should be careful looking at single observations 
from user-reported data, they can still give an indication of how prices behave. To keep the 
most accurate stations, I exclude all stations with less than hundred observations in the post-
period, leaving thirteen stations left. These stations cover all the four major companies from 
five different counties. Table 10 gives an overview of brand and ownership. Within a restoration 
day, I look at stations with price reports before in addition to after the 9 a.m. to 11 a.m. window 
within the same day. Then, I am able to tell whether the station’s price has restored within the 
day, depending on when the price report after the 9 a.m. to 11 a.m. window is made. In many 
cases, I observe a price report before as well as a price report within the 9 a.m. to 11 a.m. 
window. As such, for those stations on those particular days, I can study the timing of a price 
restoration more carefully. For other cases, I only observe a price before this “restoration 
window” on a restoration day and another price report the day after, or a price report the day 
before a restoration day and another price report after the restoration window on the restoration 
day. Hence, while I do not observe the exact time of restoration if any, these observations still 
indicate whether price restoration occurred within those two times.  
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I find that for all the different pairs of observations as explained above, the behavior of the 
Esso, Shell/St1 and Uno-X stations are very similar to those of Circle K stations. I see numerous 
observations showing that on days where Circle K adjusts its recommended price, retail price 
is relatively low in the early morning, while has restored within the 9 a.m. to 11 a.m. window. 
In general, I do not observe that prices restore on days where Circle K does not adjust its 
recommended price. This again suggests that the new pattern is adapted by all the four major 
companies. In addition, since the time during the day when price restores seems quite 
systematic, it suggests that the cause of price restorations by other companies is because they 
follow and adapt Circle K’s announcement of a nationwide restoration of prices for their 
stations, rather than that single stations follow Circle K stations’ restorations in the local 
market.38  
 
Table 10: Overview of brand and ownership for stations with hundred or more observations from 29 
November 2017. 
Brand Owner No. of stations 
1-2-3 Circle K 1 
Circle K Circle K 4 
Esso Esso 2 
Shell St1 1 
St1 St1 2 
Uno-X Uno-X 3 
Total 4 13 
 
After Circle K’s price policy change, Uno-X adjusts its recommended price whenever Circle 
K does so.39 In fact, based on personal observations from March to July 2018, 100% of Circle 
K’s adjustments of recommended prices are followed up by changes in the recommended prices 
of Uno-X within 90 minutes later. Further, in this period, their recommended price is always 
set 0.02 NOK above Circle K’s. Since the recommended prices are available online, 
observations made by myself suggest that while Circle K posts adjusted recommended prices 
between 7:30 a.m. and 8 a.m. on the restoration day, Uno-X adjusts their recommended prices 
accordingly between 8:30 and 9:30 a.m. the same day. This implies that at least Uno-X follows 
Circle K’s decisions on when to implement restorations for its stations. In fact, Uno-X’s use of 
the recommended price seems to work as a device to signal back to the leader that it will follow 
on the retail prices. Whereas Esso does not post recommended prices online while Shell/St1 
does so only for the corporate market, findings from the user-reported data further suggest that 
Esso and St1 now behave according to the new common view. 
 
                                                          
38 Information available online suggests that there is a mix of dealer-owned or franchise-owned and company-
owned stations in this sample, which suggests that the price policy applies regardless of contract form. 
39 The recommended price is posted on YX’s webpage, Uno-X’s serviced brand. Unfortunately, I am not able 
to examine whether this is the case also before the policy change. 
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6 Concluding remarks 
This paper examines how price coordination, and importantly, coordination on price 
restorations, is carried out in retail gasoline markets. I show that the recommended price of the 
largest company, which is publicly available on the company’s website, serves two functions. 
First, it determines the level of the price restoration. Second, it serves as a signal of when to 
implement a restoration day: Every time the largest company announces an adjustment to the 
recommended price in the early morning, price restoration is implemented the following 
forenoon. I show that a new systematic way to coordinate on prices and synchronize price 
restorations inter-brand and across local markets has emerged with the use of prior 
announcements of the price leader’s recommended price as a signaling device. This paper 
contributes to existing literature by adding to the understanding of how the creation of a new 
common view evolves in oligopoly markets, and how prior signals can successfully facilitate 
price coordination.   
Several papers empirically addressing price coordination and leadership find systematic 
coordination of prices among firms similar to the Norwegian case (e.g., Noel, 2007; Wang, 
2009; Atkinson, 2009; Lewis, 2012). However, this case is special in that the recommended 
price is used as a signaling device to coordinate on the retail prices. To my knowledge, there is 
no similar occasion yet detected in previous literature on gasoline retailing.40 Byrne and de 
Roos (2017a) show how retail prices can be used to communicate among firms, with main focus 
on how a mutual understanding originates, and this study relates as such. Yet, this case differs 
in one important way: Being aware of the change of practice from the very beginning, I made 
observations in real-time that led me to specifically scrutinize how a new common view of price 
behavior emerges. 
Concentrated markets with few firms present, homogenous products and stable demand are 
more likely to facilitate (tacit) collusion (Markham, 1951; Harrington, 2008). Price leadership 
need not aim at achieving implicit communication41; other possible theoretical explanations are 
dominant firm (Deneckere and Kovenock, 1992) or barometric (Cooper, 1997) leadership. Yet, 
leadership pricing is one common way to aid implicit collusion (Harrington, 2017). In the 
Norwegian case, undercutting of prices between restorations within the local market confirms 
that there are periods of hard competition. Nonetheless, companies can still find it gainful to 
make a commitment to regularly end the undercutting phase by simultaneously jumping prices 
back up to a more profitable level. Hence, Circle K’s systematic use of the recommended price 
as a signaling device has unlikely emerged by chance.  
Why would any firm take initiative to be the only price leader? In an infinitely repeated 
game with price leadership, Harrington (2017) shows that with partial mutual understanding of 
the collusive price the leader faces the risk of lower demand and profits because rivals might 
not follow immediately.42 However, this cost can in practice be prevented if the price leader 
instead makes an announcement regarding the future price in advance. Then, the leader can 
expect all firms to jump retail prices simultaneously rather than risk that the others do not 
                                                          
40 One example of leadership pricing in relation to prior announcement of prices is from the U.S. airline 
industry in the 1990s (Borenstein, 2004).   
41 Seaton and Waterson (2013) identify price leadership in British supermarkets, but find no evidence of 
collusion. 
42 In this context, perfect mutual understanding can be translated to explicit communication. 
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follow. To accomplish such announcements, a channel that ensures all competitors have 
received the announcement must be in place. In the Norwegian market this channel is arguably 
the website of Circle K where recommended prices are posted, and it is a suitable medium for 
three reasons. First, as the recommended price already serves the function of determining the 
restoration level, companies for sure follow each other’s recommended prices closely. Second, 
recommended prices are supposed to guide consumers on which prices are “correct” when 
taking costs into account at all times, hence the announcement of them serves a valid (claimed) 
purpose towards customers. Third, even though recommended prices are available to guide 
consumers, few consumers actually check it on a regular basis.43 As such, using the 
recommended price as a signaling device will receive little attention from others than the 
companies themselves. Therefore, abruptly changing the behavior of the recommended price 
by adjusting it more frequently by smaller amounts, followed by a simultaneous jump of all the 
stations in its network, is a relatively safe approach by the price leader to ensure that competitors 
learn that a new rule is about to be initiated. 
Hence, one possible explanation to why Circle K is the price leader is that it is in possession 
of a well-suited prior announcement channel at the same time as it now avoids the risk of losing 
demand and profits if rivals do not respond rapidly. Another explanation is that the firm in the 
price leader role can earn higher profits if there is asymmetric information. Rotemberg and 
Saloner (1990) show that if firms are somewhat asymmetrically informed of demand, the less 
informed firm can earn more by having the rival as a price leader, while the more informed firm 
yields higher profits by taking the leader role. Thus, both firms agree upon which firm should 
be the price leader. 
One question remains: Why end a stable arrangement of cycling prices after fourteen years?  
The arrangement clearly was profitable with increasing retail margins over time (Foros and 
Steen, 2013; Foros et al., 2018). Moreover, having a long-lasting cycle breached overnight with 
one single public announcement also underlines the fact that each company had the option to 
leave the practice of a regular weekly cycle every week since 2004, however, chose to stay as 
it was profitable to do so. In recent years, the predictable pattern has received increased 
attention from the Norwegian Competition Authority (2015), which on several occasions has 
expressed the opinion that the fixed cycle causes limited competition in the market. Further, in 
relation to adjustments in gasoline taxes in the beginning of 2017, the finance minister devoted 
great attention to the competitive level in the industry (TV2, 2017). In addition, the Norwegian 
Consumer Council (2017) has actively advised consumers to pay attention to the cycle and time 
their purchases in order to avoid the peak prices. Hence, one possible reason for the 
implementation of a new policy of more discrete ways to coordinate on prices and restorations 
is to receive less attention from the broad audience.  
Another possible explanation is that Circle K wishes to smooth out demand at its stations 
throughout the week. Since low price periods were highly predictable under the old cycle, 
stations might have experienced queues and depletion of inventories in the time periods prior 
to price restorations. However, this can hardly be the only incentive: Apart from the 
announcement on its website 29 November 2017, as far as I am aware, Circle K has not 
                                                          
43 In fact, conversations with the Norwegian Competition Authority reveal they do not find this price 
interesting either.  
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attempted to inform consumers about the price policy change. It is reasonable to believe that if 
capacity constraints is the main incentive, Circle K would more actively inform about the 
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A. Further information regarding the price policy announcements 
 
 











Figure A.3: Website of Circle K with posted recommended prices. Example of an announcement of only 
















Figure B.1: Occurrence of restoration days by day of the week over time for station 1 (Oslo, top left), 
station 2 (Bergen, top right), station 3 (Trondheim, bottom left) and station 4 (Stavanger, bottom right). 
Sample period is 1 June 2017 to 31 May 2018. Days of the week are measured on the y-axis and have 






Table B.1: Summary statistics of hourly retail price. Data period is 1 June 2017 to 31 May 2018. Pre-
period is 1 June 2017 to 28 November 2017. Post-period is 29 November 2017 to 31 May 2018. 
 Mean Std.dev. Min Max 
Pre-period      
Mon 14.306 0.653 12.470 16.490 
Tue 14.796 1.172 12.470 16.760 
Wed 15.288 0.902 13.090 16.710 
Thu 14.696 0.720 12.540 16.280 
Fri 15.028 1.033 11.520 16.760 
Sat 15.368 0.858 12.470 16.710 
Sun 14.766 0.749 12.470 16.710 
Total 14.894 0.950 11.520 16.760 
Post-period     
Mon 14.939 0.758 12.910 16.630 
Tue 14.780 0.810 12.910 16.630 
Wed 15.063 0.899 12.910 16.780 
Thu 15.290 0.778 12.910 16.640 
Fri 15.265 0.708 12.910 16.630 
Sat 15.350 0.734 12.490 16.710 
Sun 15.244 0.776 12.910 16.630 
Total 15.135 0.806 12.490 16.780 
 
 




 Price decrease 
  
Station Number Mean Mean daily 
number 
 Number Mean Mean daily 
number 
Pre-period 
   
 
  
1 70 1.918 0.387  272 -0.497 1.503 
2 73 1.709 0.403  583 -0.214 3.221 
3 62 1.785 0.343  419 -0.264 2.315 
4 57 2.070 0.315  116 -1.013 0.641 
Post-period 
   
 
  
1 65 1.271 0.353  248 -0.320 1.348 
2 61 0.738 0.332  250 -0.170 1.359 
3 62 1.216 0.337  461 -0.161 2.505 






Table B.3: Summary statistics of normalized price at 3 p.m. for the pre-period and 11 a.m. for the post-
period. Data period is 1 June 2017 to 31 May 2018. Pre-period is 1 June 2017 to 28 November 2017. 
Post-period is 29 November 2017 to 31 May 2018. 
Day of cycle Obs. Mean Std.dev. 5 pctl 25 pctl 50 pctl 75 pctl 95 pctl 
Pre-period 
        
2-day duration 
        
0 104 -0.191 0.721 -2.240 -0.010 0.060 0.080 0.110 
1 104 -1.103 0.864 -2.530 -2.025 -0.790 -0.410 0.060 
2 100 -1.621 0.671 -2.685 -2.095 -1.555 -1.100 -0.530 
3-day duration 
        
0 104 -0.060 0.649 -0.260 0.060 0.060 0.080 0.110 
1 104 -1.075 0.801 -2.280 -1.980 -0.815 -0.455 0.040 
2 104 -1.497 0.695 -2.460 -2.040 -1.410 -1.120 -0.190 
3 104 -1.949 0.604 -2.980 -2.255 -2.015 -1.570 -0.820 
Average all durations 
       
0 208 -0.126 0.687 -2.050 0.060 0.060 0.080 0.110 
1 208 -1.089 0.831 -2.460 -1.995 -0.805 -0.425 0.060 
2 204 -1.558 0.685 -2.560 -2.050 -1.480 -1.110 -0.410 
3 104 -1.949 0.604 -2.980 -2.255 -2.015 -1.570 -0.820 
Post-period 
        
1-day duration 
        
0 68 0.056 0.179 0.060 0.060 0.060 0.095 0.110 
1 68 -0.407 0.547 -1.610 -0.395 -0.220 -0.070 0.060 
2-day duration 
        
0 36 0.029 0.295 0.060 0.060 0.070 0.095 0.110 
1 36 -0.338 0.527 -1.760 -0.380 -0.215 -0.010 0.110 
2 36 -0.719 0.579 -1.760 -1.065 -0.635 -0.265 0.110 
3-day duration 
        
0 48 0.080 0.022 0.060 0.060 0.080 0.110 0.110 
1 48 -0.288 0.507 -1.470 -0.330 -0.090 0.040 0.110 
2 48 -0.766 0.561 -1.760 -1.275 -0.650 -0.360 0.050 
3 48 -1.099 0.524 -1.910 -1.500 -1.105 -0.765 -0.090 
4-day duration 
        
0 40 0.078 0.021 0.060 0.060 0.070 0.095 0.110 
1 40 -0.419 0.646 -1.860 -0.605 -0.190 0.030 0.060 
2 36 -0.704 0.621 -2.100 -1.120 -0.585 -0.200 0.060 
3 36 -1.137 0.545 -2.100 -1.405 -1.230 -0.755 0.030 
4 36 -1.453 0.564 -2.140 -1.840 -1.515 -1.165 0.030 
5-day duration 
        
0 12 0.084 0.024 0.060 0.060 0.080 0.105 0.130 
1 12 -0.357 0.504 -1.340 -0.705 -0.085 -0.010 0.060 
2 12 -0.994 0.666 -2.160 -1.540 -0.890 -0.495 0.030 
3 12 -0.879 0.805 -2.160 -1.420 -1.010 0.035 0.090 
4 12 -1.102 0.811 -2.160 -1.835 -1.275 -0.305 0.090 
5 12 -1.266 0.845 -2.310 -1.890 -1.530 -0.515 0.090 
Average all durations 
       




1 204 -0.366 0.550 -1.610 -0.380 -0.190 -0.010 0.080 
2 132 -0.757 0.591 -1.760 -1.210 -0.650 -0.330 0.060 
3 96 -1.086 0.572 -1.940 -1.435 -1.160 -0.725 0.060 
4 48 -1.365 0.644 -2.140 -1.840 -1.485 -1.140 0.030 





Table B.4: Coefficient estimates from the linear, logit and probit model. Dependent variable is 
𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑢𝑝𝑖𝑡. 
Variables Linear Logit Probit 
    
Mon 0.0191*** -0.1794 0.0141 
 (0.003) (0.628) (0.198) 
Tue 0.0017 0.2428 0.0652 
 (0.002) (0.580) (0.194) 
Wed 0.0020 0.4771 0.1497 
 (0.002) (0.447) (0.151) 
Thu 0.0216*** 0.3736 0.1301 
 (0.003) (0.647) (0.218) 
Fri 0.0001 -0.3992 -0.1428 
 (0.002) (0.773) (0.246) 
H10 -0.0016 0.0611 0.0074 
 (0.005) (1.219) (0.395) 
H11 0.0121* 1.3913* 0.4499 
 (0.006) (0.765) (0.278) 
H12 0.0116** 1.0422 0.3835 
 (0.006) (0.843) (0.288) 
H13 0.0158*** 0.2129 0.1349 
 (0.005) (0.892) (0.292) 
H14 0.0894*** 2.5270** 0.9265** 
 (0.014) (1.054) (0.385) 
H15 0.0165*** 3.3304*** 1.2981*** 
 (0.004) (0.883) (0.308) 
H16 -0.0002 1.6492** 0.5877** 
 (0.002) (0.794) (0.297) 
changerp -0.0051 -0.8700 -0.3139 
 (0.004) (1.416) (0.528) 
post 0.0098*** -1.9885** -0.5114** 
 (0.002) (0.891) (0.249) 
Mon×H10 -0.0184 1.8729 0.4102 
 (0.018) (1.457) (0.545) 
Mon×H11 0.0592*** 2.1920** 0.8649** 
 (0.020) (1.068) (0.394) 
Mon×H12 0.0522*** 2.9244*** 1.1102*** 
 (0.015) (1.065) (0.389) 
Mon×H13 0.1113*** 4.7097*** 1.8890*** 
 (0.026) (1.111) (0.405) 
Mon×H14 0.2410*** 3.4998*** 1.8259*** 
 (0.037) (1.206) (0.444) 
Mon×H15 0.0070 -1.9233 -0.8536* 
 (0.006) (1.459) (0.512) 
Mon×H16 0.0042 -0.4889 -0.1583 
 (0.005) (1.482) (0.484) 
Tue×H10 0.0013 0.1033 0.0695 
 (0.014) (1.277) (0.412) 
Tue×H11 -0.0084 -1.2701 -0.4319 
 (0.014) (1.055) (0.379) 
Tue×H12 0.0035 0.0496 0.0968 
 (0.010) (1.140) (0.380) 
Tue×H13 0.0074 1.3017 0.4489 




Tue×H14 0.0080 -0.8142 -0.2738 
 (0.017) (1.329) (0.501) 
Tue×H15 0.0100 -1.7032 -0.6761 
 (0.008) (1.215) (0.442) 
Tue×H16 0.0066 0.2182 0.1559 
 (0.014) (1.324) (0.429) 
Wed×H10 -0.0139 -1.3381 -0.4767 
 (0.014) (1.076) (0.383) 
Wed×H11 -0.0118**   
 (0.006)   
Wed×H12 -0.0004   
 (0.005)   
Wed×H13 -0.0018   
 (0.018)   
Wed×H14 0.0111 -1.8456* -0.7369* 
 (0.007) (1.055) (0.386) 
Wed×H15 0.0075 -0.6096 -0.2391 
 (0.010) (1.327) (0.476) 
Wed×H16 0.0175 1.1343 0.4939 
 (0.012) (1.315) (0.427) 
Thu×H10 -0.0039 -0.5127 -0.1484 
 (0.013) (1.054) (0.384) 
Thu×H11 -0.0110**   
 (0.005)   
Thu×H12 -0.0015   
 (0.004)   
Thu×H13 0.3761*** 4.2080*** 2.4653*** 
 (0.045) (1.186) (0.441) 
Thu×H14 0.1045*** 0.8126 0.5131 
 (0.018) (0.999) (0.348) 
Thu×H15 0.0129*   
 (0.008)   
Thu×H16 0.0175 1.1343 0.4939 
 (0.012) (1.315) (0.427) 
Fri×H10 0.0361 1.6208 0.6920 
 (0.026) (1.350) (0.458) 
Fri ×H11 -0.0188 -0.2630 -0.1113 
 (0.021) (1.106) (0.410) 
Fri ×H12 -0.0055 -1.2681 -0.3637 
 (0.008) (1.116) (0.382) 
Fri ×H13 0.0058 0.6311 0.2514 
 (0.008) (1.642) (0.539) 
Fri ×H14 0.0058   
 (0.019)   
Fri ×H15 0.0268**   
 (0.011)   
Fri ×H16 -0.0004   
 (0.003)   
Mon×changerp -0.0005 1.5640 0.4384 
 (0.008) (1.355) (0.532) 
Tue×changerp 0.0054 2.5989** 0.8680** 
 (0.005) (1.185) (0.409) 
Wed×changerp 0.0058* 1.1019 0.4288 
 (0.004) (1.513) (0.561) 




 (0.005) (1.223) (0.450) 
H10×changerp -0.0099 4.2572*** 2.3047*** 
 (0.009) (0.851) (0.318) 
H11×changerp -0.0098 -1.2219 -0.3778 
 (0.017) (0.919) (0.355) 
H12×changerp 0.0065 -0.7839 -0.1409 
 (0.020) (1.075) (0.486) 
H13×changerp -0.0247 -1.7398 -0.6701 
 (0.022) (1.092) (0.494) 
H14×changerp 0.0418 -0.6519 -0.1514 
 (0.066) (0.814) (0.379) 
H15×changerp -0.0135 -0.5993 -0.2585 
 (0.016) (0.624) (0.250) 
H16×changerp 0.0080 0.2035 0.0816 
 (0.016) (1.141) (0.423) 
Mon×post -0.0381*** -2.5859** -0.9736** 
 (0.003) (1.202) (0.495) 
Tue×post -0.0023 0.0560 -0.0249 
 (0.002) (1.008) (0.295) 
Wed×post -0.0015 0.6066 0.1482 
 (0.002) (1.121) (0.328) 
Thu×post -0.0414*** 0.2802 -0.0408 
 (0.002) (0.985) (0.296) 
Fri×post 0.0024 2.0901** 0.6325* 
 (0.005) (0.999) (0.330) 
H10×post 0.0050 1.6214* 0.4433 
 (0.008) (0.894) (0.324) 
H11×post -0.0129* 0.8931 0.2280 
 (0.007) (1.007) (0.340) 
H12×post -0.0071 2.4601** 0.6737* 
 (0.007) (1.136) (0.386) 
H13×post -0.0298*** 1.1732 0.1505 
 (0.009) (1.285) (0.479) 
H14×post -0.1820***   
 (0.020)   
H15×post -0.0362*** -1.7685 -0.9088** 
 (0.007) (1.135) (0.390) 
H16×post -0.0026 0.6368 0.1702 
 (0.004) (1.447) (0.460) 
changerp×post 0.0014 -0.0011 -0.0275 
 (0.006) (1.148) (0.405) 
H10×changerp ×post 0.5295***   
 (0.038)   
H11×changerp ×post 0.4531*** 5.8699*** 2.7252*** 
 (0.039) (1.420) (0.519) 
H12×changerp ×post -0.0053 -0.6932 -0.3664 
 (0.021) (1.710) (0.679) 
H13×changerp ×post 0.0200   
 (0.023)   
H14×changerp ×post -0.0393   
 (0.069)   
H15×changerp ×post 0.0079 0.7520 0.3953 
 (0.017) (1.673) (0.584) 
H16×changerp ×post -0.0082 -0.9171 -0.2503 




Mon×changerp ×post 0.0065 1.5826 0.7776 
 (0.010) (1.556) (0.627) 
Wed×changerp ×post -0.0015 0.6857 0.1691 
 (0.006) (1.306) (0.467) 
Thu×changerp ×post -0.0008   
 (0.007)   
Wholesale  -0.0015* -0.1793* -0.1172* 
 (0.001) (0.107) (0.063) 
Constant 0.0030 -5.1823*** -2.3235*** 
 (0.003) (0.489) (0.237) 
    
No. of obs. 35 029 31 553 31 553 
R-squared 0.329   
Note:  Standard errors clustered on the day level in parentheses. All models include 𝑤ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒 and station fixed 










Figure C.1: BensinPris application. Screenshot from 24 May 2018. 
 
Table C.1: Overview of counties covered. Sample period is 1 January 2017 to 28 February 2018. 
County No. of obs. 
Østfold 7977 
Akershus 25 819 








Rogaland 19 464 
Hordaland 6086 
Sogn og Fjordane 381 
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affect firm performance. Second, we examine the effects on firms' profitability from 
consumers’ changing search- and timing behavior. We use microdata from gasoline retailing in 
Norway. From 2004 to 2017, firms practiced an industry-wide day off from competition, 
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on Thursdays at noon. The additional day off from competition increases firm performance. As 
expected, a conventional price search of where to buy reduces firms’ profitability. In contrast, 
consumers who are aware of the cycle and spend effort on when to buy have a positive impact 
on firms’ profitability. If consumers spend effort on when to buy, they attempt to tank during 
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Time-dependent price patterns with a saw-tooth shape are observed in various markets. 
In gasoline retailing, several empirical studies (see Noel, 2016, and Eckert, 2013, for 
comprehensive surveys) find support for such intertemporal price dispersion as the outcome of 
a sequential competitive pricing game, known as Edgeworth cycles, as formalized by Maskin 
and Tirole (1988).1 Saw-tooth shaped price patterns can also be the outcome of intertemporal 
price discrimination (e.g. Conlisk et al., 1984). Furthermore, firms may find it profitable to add 
complexity to their price structure in order to soften price competition (Carlin, 2009, and Ellison 
and Wolitzky, 2012, among others). 
If firms charge uniform prices independently of when consumers make their purchases, 
consumers are harmed if firms manage to reduce or eliminate inter-brand price competition.2 
However, what is the effect of a short but regular period like a weekday off (or a holiday) from 
price competition? Consumers are worse off if they buy on days on which competition is absent, 
but they now have the option to move their purchases away from these periods. Furthermore, 
since the pattern is predictable, price competition can be intensified before the weekdays off 
from competition. 
Regular time-dependent price patterns make consumers face an intertemporal menu of 
prices. If consumers are endowed with a given capacity of effort for search activity, shrinking 
the time window in which competition is present reduces consumers’ ability to search for the 
where to buy. Complexity also increases since one has to consider both when to buy and where 
to buy.3 Having decided to move one’s purchases to a low-price window (e.g. a given day of 
the week or a happy hour), it becomes more costly to find the seller with the best offer within 
this time limited low-price window. If the consumer learns that when rather than where to buy 
is more effective in terms of savings, she may even reduce her search for the cheapest provider 
at any given time and instead spend her effort on adapting to the time cycle. Hence, from the 
consumer’s point of view a possible trade-off arises as spending effort on timing purchases to 
periods with low prices might increase the marginal cost of finding the cheapest provider. 
There may be countervailing forces at both sides of the market. If firms expect price 
wars to end at a given time, they do not need to be concerned about further undercutting in the 
                                                 
1 Similar findings are made for search-engine advertising (Zhang and Feng, 2005). 
2 At least if we consider product quality and variety as exogenously given. 
3 General search models (Diamond, 1971, and Stahl, 1989, are seminal papers) predict that prices increase 






next period. Consider a time-constrained low-price window such as Black Friday. Firms know 
that they can lower prices without fear of competitors undercutting on the succeeding days. For 
consumers, it is more efficient to consider when rather than where to buy in a Black Friday-
regime. They move purchases of e.g. electronic products to Black Friday. However, short low-
price windows make comparison of prices between several providers challenging. 
We focus on the retail gasoline market. If we take into account the entire commuting 
path for a driver during a week, she may substitute stations located far from each other if she 
focuses on where it is cheapest during the week. However, if she focuses on when to buy 
(Monday morning), only stations closely located to her position at that time are alternatives.4 
 
Figure 1: Retail prices and recommended prices for one gasoline station. Data period is 2 September to 
31 October 2015. Black dashed lines mark Mondays while grey dashed lines mark Thursdays. The figure 
is constructed by using the last current retail price each day, except from Monday and Thursday in which 
the highest price is used for illustrative purposes. 1 EUR ≈ 9.50 NOK. 
 
The Norwegian retail gasoline market is a picture perfect application. From 2004 to 
2017, the four major retail chains have managed to take a day off from competition on Mondays. 
Every Monday around noon, all retail outlets throughout the country symmetrically raise their 
                                                 
4 Houde (2012) considers retail gasoline competition in a Hotelling framework where consumers’ 




pump prices in accordance with the recommended price set by the retail chains’ headquarters. 
Price dispersion is then eliminated throughout the market, and all outlets raise their prices to 
the same level within approximately an hour. Recommended prices are published on the retail 
chains’ websites, hence they easily detect if a rival deviates from the established practice both 
with respect to when the prices should increase (Monday) and to which level the prices should 
be increased (the recommended price). Prices then gradually decline over the subsequent days 
of the week when competition is in force. Since 2008 firms have implemented an additional 
day off from competition on Thursdays.5 Similar to Mondays, we now observe a countrywide 
increase of retail prices to the recommended price also on Thursdays around noon. The resulting 
price cycle is illustrated in Figure 1 for one of the stations included in our sample over a nine-
week period in 2015.6 The Norwegian Competition Authority (2014, 2015), and Foros and 
Steen (2013) document that this has been a country-wide practice (on Mondays from 2004, on 
Thursdays from 2008).  Foros and Steen (2013) show that the regular pattern is controlled by 
the major retail chains and is de facto caused by the supply side. The upstream companies 
maintain the price pattern with use of a profit sharing scheme involving periods with and 
without price support arrangements.7 Topography leads to geographically isolated local 
monopolies in some parts of the country. In these locations, we observe that retail prices equal 
the recommended price throughout the week (Foros and Steen, 2013).8 As such, we define the 
recommended price as the monopoly price (Bresnahan and Reiss, 1991). Accordingly, when 
the price level in geographically competitive locations equals the recommended price, we 
interpret the situation as a day off from competition.  
In Figure 2 we illustrate gross margins on the restoration day. The illustration is eye-
catching. The figure plots real gross margins at 8 a.m. and 2 p.m. for 43 stations on Monday 21 
April 2008 and 44 stations on Monday 24 August 2015 from the same local market (Oslo, the 
capital and the most populous city in Norway).9 First, there is a huge difference between 
                                                 
5 Norwegian Competition Authority (2014). 
6 The four major nationwide gasoline companies are Circle K (market share 33%), Shell (25%), Esso 
(21%) and Uno-X (17%). See www.drivkraftnorge.no, the webpage of the Norwegian association for fuel and 
energy companies, for further details. Towards non-integrated retailers, headquarters make use of a maximum 
resale price maintenance system, recommended prices and a price support arrangement for which the upstream 
firm decides when to be operative. Symmetric cycles are hence a result of the upstream firms simultaneously 
deciding to disengage the price support on Mondays, and after 2008 also on Thursdays each week. A more 
thorough description is given in Appendix D. 
7 The underlying mechanism is described in Appendix D. 
8 This is well illustrated in a statement to a local newspaper made by the manager of an outlet with no 
nearby stations: “We had no competition, and used consistently the recommended price on gasoline” (Bergens 
Tidende, 2018). 
9 The gross margin is the retail price deducted the wholesale price for gasoline, taxes and VAT. In 2015 




morning and afternoon gross margins across all retailers and different companies. Secondly, 
during an eight-year period (2008-2015), gross margins have increased when prices are at their 
highest after restoration but, most importantly, also when prices are lowest right before 
restoration. From the consumer's perspective, Figure 2 shows that spending effort on when 
rather than where to buy is more efficient. 
Figure 2: Gross margins in NOK for gasoline stations in Oslo on Monday 21 April 2008 and Monday 
24 August 2015. Margins are in real terms (2015-NOK=1). Each black mark and corresponding grey 
mark vertically above it are observations for one station. The 2008 observations are to the left of the 
vertical dashed line, while 2015 observations are to right of the same line. 1 EUR ≈ 9.50 NOK. 
 
This leads us to the findings made by the Norwegian Competition Authority (2014, 
2015). Using data on price and quantity from 2004 to 2011 for the entire population of stations 
in Norway, they show that consumers have only marginally adjusted to the price pattern by 
moving their purchases to the low price window on Sundays, despite that the Monday peak has 
existed throughout the country since the beginning of the sample period. Therefore, the 
introduction of another day off from competition is unlikely caused by changes on the demand 
side. Neither do they find any evolvement in costs which can account for the pattern. This 
supports Foros and Steen’s (2013) pure firm-driven explanation to the driving force behind the 
cycle. Next, even with some increased adaption by consumers, gross margin per liter has been 




We exploit the established predictable restoration pattern dating back to 2004 together 
with the new restoration day appearing after 2008. The additional day off from competition 
provides us with a scenario that allows us to analyze how regular days off from competition 
influence consumer behavior and firms’ profitability. 
We proceed in two steps. First, we study the impact of the time-dependent price pattern 
on firms’ profitability. In particular, we pay attention to the effect of establishing an additional 
weekly restoration on Thursdays. To the best of our knowledge, our approach is novel.10 
With the use of a panel dataset of daily gasoline prices covering different periods 
between 2004 and 2015, we are able to investigate the effect of the development of a second 
restoration day on profitability over time. We show that the introduction of another day off from 
competition has increased firms’ gross margins throughout the week. This may explain why 
firms use a significant amount of effort on continuing to ensure that the system is in use every 
week.  
In the second step, we investigate how consumer behavior influences firms’ profitability 
by matching demand side variables from a survey dataset with the price panel. The survey is 
constructed to achieve knowledge about consumer awareness and purchasing behavior. It is 
carried out in four different years between 2005 and 2015 overlapping with the panel in addition 
to being conducted at retail stations included in the panel. The survey data allow us to scrutinize 
the interaction between the demand and supply side in a market with next to perfectly 
predictable prices.  
Results show that the Monday restoration increases firms’ profitability by 35.6%, while 
profitability in relation to the Thursday restoration increases by 22.2%. When allowing the 
Thursday effect to differ before and after the introduction of a second price peak in 2008, 
estimates suggest that being on a Thursday has an additional positive effect of 9.56% in the 
post-period, giving a total impact of 27.2%. Now, the Thursday effect is closer to the magnitude 
of the Monday effect.  
Turning to the demand side, we find that increasing the share of consumers searching 
for the cheapest outlet by 1% decreases firms’ profits by 0.5%, indicating that intensified search 
for where to buy in a market is healthy for competition, as expected. On the other hand, 
increasing the share of consumers who adapt to the cycle by following a timing rule by 1%, 
raises firms’ profitability by 0.27%. The effect is significant at the 1% level, suggesting that 
                                                 
10 Noel (2015) analyzes the effects on prices from a natural experiment (a refinery fire) where price cycles 





pure adaptation to the cycle independent of station search may be beneficial to sellers. The 
introduction of an additional day off from competition on Thursdays reduces the competitive 
time window and likely increases the price complexity for consumers. When separating the 
effect before and after the establishment of the new Thursday peak, we find that with the new 
pattern in place, profitability increases by another 0.56%. We also show that the results are 
robust to various model specifications, in particular also to long run changes in the cost structure 
and the Norwegian business cycle. 
In sum, results suggest that when more consumers spend effort on when to buy rather 
than where to buy, competition softens. This shift in consumer behavior de-incentivizes firms 
to compete since competition will only marginally affect consumers' choice of station during 
the two brief time windows with lower prices. The introduction of a second restoration day 
reduces the time window with normal price competition and increases profitability. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 reviews related literature. Section 
3 presents the data, while Section 4 provides preliminary results. Section 5 puts forth the 
methodology. In Section 6, results are presented and discussed. Robustness analyses are found 
in Section 7. Finally, Section 8 concludes. 
 
2 Literature Review 
Our point of departure is the interplay between consumer behavior and supply side 
profitability in the presence of a time-based pricing pattern. A crucial feature is the time 
dependency, leading the price pattern to be predictable for both suppliers and consumers. This 
is in contrast to random sales as analyzed in Stigler (1961), Salop and Stiglitz (1977) and Varian 
(1980), among others.11 While our study provides support for that consumers engaging in search 
for where to buy are unfavorable to firms’ profitability, our conjecture is that the cycle may 
drive consumers’ attention away from spending effort on traditional search towards rather 
considering when to buy.  
                                                 
11 Stigler (1961) was the first to develop a framework for which price dispersion is an equilibrium outcome 
due to costly search. Following Stigler (1961), Salop and Stiglitz (1977) show that price dispersion may arise in 
equilibrium with oligopolistic firms due to consumers who differ in the costs related to information acquisition. 
Whereas the price dispersion in this framework is persistent in that some sellers always have a higher price than 
others, Varian (1980) allows the same seller to set different prices over time (temporal price dispersion). In 
equilibrium, firms randomize prices in order to price discriminate between uninformed and informed consumers. 
See Tellis (1986) for a survey that makes the distinction between periodic and random sales (discounts). A 




In the literature on information acquisition, some studies emphasize obfuscation as an 
explanation for firms' pricing behavior and consumers' response to it. Obfuscation complicates 
or prevents consumers from gathering price information. Ellison and Wolitzky (2012) show 
that firms may unilaterally choose to raise consumers’ search costs (see also Wilson, 2010). 
Other papers analyze obfuscation as arising from bounded rationality on the consumer side 
where consumers for instance follow a rule of thumb. Chioveanu and Zhou (2013) show how 
firms may use price frames that confuse consumers and thereby affect consumers’ ability to 
compare prices offered. The result is lower price sensitivity and, in turn, lower degree of price 
competition (see also Piccione and Spiegler, 2012). Carlin (2009) demonstrates that firms might 
want to add complexity to the price structure, and that the number of consumers who are able 
to choose the firm with the lowest price decreases in complexity.  
De Roos and Smirnov (2015) develop a theory of optimal collusive intertemporal price 
dispersion. The motivation is the gasoline market, where they show how collusion can generate 
asymmetric price cycles which resemble Edgeworth cycles. Price dispersion clouds consumers’ 
awareness of prices, which helps firms to coordinate on dispersed prices by decreasing their 
gains from deviations through price reductions.12 
If we take into account the entire commuting path for a driver during a week, a consumer 
may substitute a number of stations located far from each other if she focuses on where it is 
cheapest during the week. This is in line with Houde (2012), where a consumer’s entire 
commuting path is treated as the consumer’s location ala a Hotelling framework. However, if 
she focuses on when to buy (Monday morning), only stations closely located to her position at 
that time are alternatives, similar to Houde’s (2012) single-address approach. In the current 
application, our conjecture is that firms can make it more costly for consumers in terms of effort 
to buy from the cheapest provider. The reason is simply that rational consumers know that they 
need to buy during a brief low price window (Monday morning). It then becomes more costly 
in terms of effort to tank at the outlet with the lowest price. Furthermore, consumers might 
adapt to a simple rule of thumb saying that they should ensure to tank on Monday morning 
(Sunday as the second choice). When acting according to a rule of thumb, the attention is 
devoted to when to buy rather than where to buy. More attention to when to buy may reduce 
price competition.  
                                                 
12 Complex price setting is found not only in commodity markets, but also in retail financial markets 
(Carlin, 2009, and Woodward and Hall, 2012), electricity markets (Waddam and Wilson, 2010) and online markets 




Price patterns with a saw-tooth shape, often labeled Edgeworth cycles (Edgeworth, 
1925), are widely observed in retail gasoline markets.13 As formally shown by Maskin and 
Tirole (1988), this pricing behavior can be the outcome of a sequential competitive pricing 
game. Firms successively undercut each other in a price-undercutting phase. The process 
continues until further undercutting becomes too costly. They then run into a war of attrition 
phase until one of them takes on the burden and raises its prices. The other firms will follow 
and increase their prices, but not to the same level as the firm that initiated the price increase.14 
Price cycles open up for intensive price undercutting between peaks. The war of attrition phase 
varies in length. Hence, equilibrium price cycles vary in duration and amplitude. Firms have a 
common incentive to end the war of attrition game as soon as possible (Wang, 2009). The 
empirical literature displays that several practices have emerged in order to end the war of 
attrition phase (see e.g. Wang, 2009, and Foros and Steen, 2013). In the current application, as 
shown by Foros and Steen (2013), retail chains symmetrically increase prices to the 
recommended prices on Mondays, and as shown in the present paper, now also on Thursdays. 
The undercutting phase might be consistent with the predictions from the Edgeworth cycle 
theory, while the price increases depend on time (day(s) of the week) rather than on a war-of-
attrition game when further undercutting becomes too costly.15 
The vast majority of papers analyzing cycles in retail gasoline markets focus on firms’ 
pricing behavior. As pointed out in the literature surveys of Eckert (2013) and Noel (2016), the 
empirical literature on retail gasoline pricing is sparse on consumer behavior. Exceptions are 
Noel (2012) and Byrne and De Roos (2017), who examine how consumers respond to retail 
gasoline price cycles.16 
An alternative explanation for price patterns with a saw-tooth shape is intertemporal 
price discrimination (Conlisk et al., 1984 and Sobel, 1984, among others17). In contrast to 
                                                 
13 Studies on pricing in gasoline retailing are carried out for markets in numerous European countries, 
e.g. Haucap et al. (2015) for Germany and Dewenter and Heimeshoff (2012) for Austria. See Eckert (2013) and 
Noel (2016) for surveys of both theoretical and empirical literature on pricing in retail gasoline markets.  
14 Eckert (2003) and Noel (2007; 2008), provide theoretical extensions of Maskin and Tirole (1988). 
These extensions show that Edgeworth cycles are not restricted to a symmetric duopoly with homogenous goods.  
15 Sequential undercutting as in Maskin and Tirole (1988) and coordination to end the war-of-attrition 
phase may be complementary. One example is that one firm takes the role as the price leader (Wang, 2009 and 
Lewis, 2012). In Norway, Foros and Steen (2013) describe how all firms increase prices at Mondays around 
noon, giving rise to a regular weekly price cycle. 
16 In contrast to the Norwegian market, cycles are less regular in the Canadian market considered by Noel 
(2012) and Byrne and De Roos (2017). The latter study finds that consumer responsiveness increases around price 
restoration periods; forward looking stockpiling behavior is anticipated as a crucial force in generating the cycles. 
Noel (2012) analyzes four purchase timing strategies consumers can follow to move their consumption. He finds 
that surprisingly few consumers use such strategies.  
17 In Conlisk et al. (1984) a monopoly firm offers durable goods. The firm uses periodic price reductions 




Maskin and Tirole (1988), firms’ incentives to reduce prices under intertemporal price 
discrimination arise from the presence of heterogeneous consumers (they differ in their 
willingness or ability to wait). Some observations are, however, inconsistent with price 
discrimination as the main driving force behind cycles. Eckert and West (2004) and Foros and 
Steen (2013), in the Canadian and Norwegian market, respectively, find that in some regions 
with high concentration, cycles are absent. Prices are then always equal to the recommended 
prices. Under intertemporal price discrimination, as in e.g. Conlisk et al. (1984), a monopolist 
will use price discrimination as well. Foros and Steen (2013) also shows that other explanations 
for weekly cycles, like costs or demand (volume) cycles are not present in the Norwegian 
market. 
A further finding from our survey data is that consumer awareness in terms of learning 
and adjustment to the simple weekly cycle evolves rather slowly. This implies that 
intertemporal price discrimination is hardly the driving force behind firms’ practice of the price 
support system and the recommended prices to ensure industry-wide identical retail prices on 
Mondays (and Thursdays).18 However, as emphasized by Noel (2012; 2016), even if 
intertemporal price discrimination is unlikely as the main driving force behind firms’ pricing 
behavior, the fact that competition creates these types of price cycles allows consumers to adapt 




We make use of three different datasets to address our research question. 
3.1 Panel data 
We use a panel covering different time periods between 3 May 2004 and 31 October 
2015.19 Data constitute daily price observations for unleaded 95-octane gasoline in NOK per 
                                                 
Consumers who do not buy stay in the market, and the residual demand increases until price cuts become 
profitable. Sobel (1984) extends the former paper to a competitive setting. Dutta et al. (1984) combine repeated 
game and durable goods models. They demonstrate that the existence of an equilibrium with temporary price 
reduction requires that firms are more patient than consumers.  
18 Results are in line with the findings of the Norwegian Competition Authority (2914; 2015), which 
confirms that the increase in the volume purchased in low-price periods only amounts to a small fraction of the 
total weekly volume.  
 
19 The Monday peak was first observed after 27 April 2004 (Foros and Steen, 2013). Hence, we limit the 




liter from 11 local gasoline stations in Bergen (second largest city in Norway). Observations 
from 2004 and partly from 2005 are from a national website-based (NWB) data set in which 
consumers reported prices via text messages or e-mails throughout the day.20 The rest of the 
dataset is collected in the afternoon (after 12 o’clock in the daytime) either by ourselves or 
provided to us by Circle K Norway.21,22 In total, we have 2,165 observations. We acknowledge 
that our panel is highly unbalanced and unequally spaced. However, we have no reason to 
suspect that unbalancedness is caused by systematic reasons. We measure profitability as real 
gross margin per liter.23 We calculate daily gross margins by subtracting the value-added tax 
(VAT), the gasoline tax, the CO2 tax and the daily Rotterdam spot price in NOK from the retail 
price. Taxes are set by the Norwegian Tax Administration.24 
Finally, all variables are measured in real terms with 2015 as the base year using the 
yearly Consumer Price Index available at the Statistics Norway's websites.25 
3.2 Survey data 
A survey questionnaire constructed to obtain knowledge about cycle awareness and 
purchasing behavior among consumers was repeatedly carried out in 2005, 2006, 2008 and 
2015 at two different gasoline stations in Bergen, giving 867 respondents in total. These data 
provide us with unique information about how consumer awareness has evolved over an 11-
year period. The surveys were conducted on the restoration days. To prevent selection bias 
among the customers we asked both before and after price restoration. The questionnaire was 
conducted with in-person interviews, in which costumers were approached and questioned 
                                                 
20 This gives us several observations per station for many dates. Therefore, we take the average of reported 
prices for each station within each day from noon in order to obtain a unique daily observation per station. 
21 Prices accessed via Circle K Norway are quoted for each hour in which the price changes. We take the 
arithmetic average of prices from noon to obtain one price each day. For days without any changes from noon, we 
use the last applicable price. This concerns mostly Sundays. 
22 Since we are dealing with afternoon prices, Monday and Thursday are regarded as the high price days 
while Sunday and Wednesday are considered as the low price days.  
23 A complete overview of local stations and period for which we have data can be found in Table A.1 in 
the Appendix. All stations except Uno-X Kokstaddalen are full-service stations, but we include the station in order 
to increase sample size and hence preciseness in estimates. We have checked that our main results are robust to 
excluding this station. 
24 The VAT rate is set to 25% of the sum of the retail price, while the gasoline tax and the CO2 tax are 
quantity taxes in NOK per liter and adjusted from year to year. Tax figures are available at the Norwegian 
Petroleum Industry Association’s (NP) websites. The Rotterdam wholesale prices are accessed through Thomson 
Reuters and provided to us by NP. These are initially quoted in $/ton, but NP gives to us already converted data 
measured in NOK/liter. Wholesale prices are not quoted for the weekends. We therefore assume Friday prices for 
Saturdays and Sundays. 




while they were filling their tanks.26 From this dataset, we measure different demand side 
factors, which are used in our study.27 
3.3 Cross-sectional data 
In addition, as a supplement to the datasets for Bergen, we use data for retail prices at 8 
a.m. and 2 p.m. from 43 stations on Monday 21 April 2008 and 44 stations on Monday 24 
August 2015 in Oslo, Norway's capital city.28 Stations for all the big four companies are 
included. From the prices, we calculate real gross margins and compare them to recommended 
gross margins. This dataset let us analyze the development of profitability over time both at the 
bottom as well as at the top of the price cycles. Hence, it allows us to better understand the price 
determination scheme in time-dependent markets. 
For the sake of examining the establishment of the Thursday restoration, we also consider 
data from the same sample for two consecutive Thursdays in 2015, namely 27 August with 
observations from 43 stations and 3 September with observations from 42 stations.  
3.4 Combining panel data and survey data 
We examine the interaction between demand side factors and firms' profitability by 
matching the measures constructed from the survey data with the price panel. Specifically, we 
match survey variables with price variables based on matching year.29 Since the survey data 
leave us with a yearly frequency in the variable measures, all observations within a year are 
matched with the same value, independent of station. Nonetheless, we bear in mind that we 
allow for stations to react differently to variation in the demand side measures. The stations in 
our panel are from the same geographical region as where the survey is carried out. Further, as 
the saw-tooth pattern in prices has been a country-wide practice, our sample is representative 





                                                 
26 Interviewers filled out the questionnaire while interviewing costumers. The survey consists of ten 
closed-ended questions and one open-ended question in addition to requests for personal information. 
27 An overview of station, date and number of respondents each year is given in Table B.2.1 in the 
Appendix. The survey questionnaire is presented in Appendix B.1. 
28 This represents all stations in the two cities. 
29 Since our panel covers 2004, 2005, 2006, 2008 and 2015 while we lack survey data for 2004, we use 




4 Preliminary descriptive results 
4.1 Firms' profitability 
We start with the cross-sectional data. For the Monday data, we calculate real gross 
margins at 8 a.m. and 2 p.m. as well as recommended gross margins for each station in 2008 
and 2015 (base year 2015). A plot of these data is presented in Figure 2 in the Introduction. We 
find some striking results. First, the average recommended margins have increased since 2008 
by 91.9%. Second, the difference in average real gross margins between these two random 
Mondays is 86.6% at 2 p.m. and as much as 510.9% at 8 a.m. Third, the Levene's test reveals 
significantly less dispersed gross margins at 8 a.m. in 2015 compared to 2008. The two-sample 
t-test shows that the increase in average gross margins at both 8 a.m. and 2 p.m. is significant.30  
 
Figure 2: Retail gross margins in NOK for gasoline stations in Oslo on Thursday 3 September 2015. 
Each black mark and corresponding gray mark vertically above it are observations for one station. 
 
In 2008, the lowest gross margin at 8 a.m. is even negative. From Figure 2, we detect 
that this is the case for several stations. In contrast, only positive gross margins are observed at 
8 a.m. in 2015. Considering the magnitude of the gross margin increase together with the 
Levene's test, we observe that synchronization of prices has been established even in the low 
                                                 





price window. Moreover, there has been an increasing trend in average gross margins as well 
as in recommended margins in Oslo during the seven-year period. 
Figure 4: Mean gross margin by day of the week and year. Day 1 corresponds to Monday, while day 7 
corresponds to Sunday. 
 
 
Moving to the Thursday data, observations depicted in Figure 3 demonstrate the exact 
same pattern as detected for Mondays in prices and hence in gross margins on Thursdays too.31 
Further, behavior is similar for two consecutive Thursdays, assuring that predictability in prices 
is not caused by sampling reasons. On 27 August, gross margins increase on average by 59.4% 
from 8 a.m. to 2 p.m., while the corresponding increase is 78.1% on 3 September. The mean 
for the 2 p.m. gross margins is around 1 NOK higher than for the 8 a.m. gross margins. Next, 
compared to 8 a.m. observations, standard deviations for 2 p.m. observations are three times 
smaller for 27 August and almost four times smaller for 3 September. From this, we observe 
that the systematic behavior in prices in 2015 is completely present on Thursdays as well. 
Around noon, prices increase to the recommended prices for practically all stations. During the 
                                                 





morning, there is a higher degree of dispersion. Furthermore, none of the stations has negative 
gross margins for any of the Thursdays. 
We now continue with the panel data. Summary statistics of the price data are reported 
in Table A.2 to A.4 in Appendix. Figure 4 depicts the mean gross margin by day of the week 
and year. We notice that the magnitude of profitability in 2015 clearly stands out compared to 
previous years. Even the Wednesday margin, just before the new day off from competition 
(Thursday), has not been reduced. Another insight is that whereas there are signs of a small 
increase in the Thursday margin in 2005 and 2008, the jump in 2015 is as clear-cut as the 
Monday peak. Nevertheless, in the following analysis, we rely on the Competition Authority's 
(2014) observation of 2008 as the start of the establishment of the Thursday restoration. 
In sum, we observe that firms’ profitability has increased in line with the implementation 
of a second day off from competition, which is consistent with our conjecture.  
4.2 Consumer behavior 
From the questionnaire, we create variables based on each respondent's reply to the 
different questions. Variables are presented as response share of the total number of respondents 
by year. Table 1 to Table 4 provide descriptive statistics for the most important questions.32 
Overall, respondents seem to become more aware of the price pattern over time. From Table 1, 
we see that whereas 35% have the impression that the retail price increases on specific days of 
the week in 2005, 44% and 53% believe so in 2006 and 2008, respectively, and as many as 81% 
in 2015. Still, the measure does not tell whether the perceptions are in line with the actual cycle 
or not. Turning to Table 2, in 2005, 11% of the respondents have the correct impression that 
Monday is the only restoration day, while 28% give the same answer in 2015. The emergence 
of a second restoration day has confused consumers further, since only 14% believe correctly 
that only Monday and Thursday are the only restoration days in 2015. 
Question 6, presented in Table 3, concerns whether consumers who are aware of the 
cycle move their purchases to low-price windows. Of those who are aware of the retail price 
increasing on specific days of the week, 31% take this information into account very often when 
making their purchases in 2005, while 39% do so in 2015.33 At first glance, this observation 
can be misinterpreted as increasing price sensitivity between 2008 and 2015. However, it might 
just indicate that more consumers move their attention towards when to tank rather than where 
                                                 
32 Tables B.2.2 to B.2.3 in the Appendix present the remainder. Summary statistics are reported in 
Table B.2.5. 





to tank simply because they follow a rule of thumb, as discussed in the Introduction. If when to 
purchase rather than where to purchase becomes the main factor to act by, it is reasonable to 
expect that these consumers more often refill at the same station (e.g. the most convenient 
station to drop by on Monday morning). Provided that consumers have a given capacity of 
effort, brief low price windows leave little scope for searching between stations. 
We are interested in establishing a measure of consumers who are concerned with when 
to purchase during a week. To follow a rule of purchasing based on timing requires the 
consumer to know when restorations occur and thereby when low price windows occur. 
Therefore, we classify a consumer as following a purchasing rule based on when to buy, 
denoted timing , if she is aware that the price increases on specific days during a week (as 
identified by Question 6 alternative “Very often” or “Fairly often” in Table 3), in addition to 
making all purchases at the same station (as identified by Question 8 in Table B.2.4). This 
measure is presented in Table 5. We note that the share of consumers classified 
as timing consumers increases over time, from 12% in 2005 to 27% in 2015. Intuitively, 
following for instance a rule of thumb based on when to tank, seems like a rational action as 
more consumers become aware of the existence of a predictable pattern in prices. As 
emphasized, our conjecture is that consumers focusing on when to buy can soften inter-brand 
price competition since focus is moved away from where to tank. 
In addition, we want a measure of searching consumers as an indication of the 
consumers concerned with where to find the lowest prices. We assume that a consumer who 
compares retail prices announced on large signs outside stations during a week drops by the 
station with the lowest price when she is in need of gasoline. It is reasonable to think that 
consumers who compare prices on signs are more focused on searching than those who do not 
check the sign. Intuitively, drivers pass many stations during the week, and while driving can 
pay attention to the price signs outside stations, which are easily visible from the road.34 Hence, 
we define a searching consumer as one who checks the signs outside stations and makes her 
purchases at more than three different stations.  Table B.2.4 shows that 36% of the respondents 
purchase at more than three different stations compared to 26% in 2005. Moreover, from Table 
4 we see that the share of consumers that check the price on signs has almost doubled since 
2005. When combining these two requirements, we note from Table 5 that the measure of 
searching consumers, search, has increased from 8% in 2005 to 17% in 2015. This suggests 
                                                 
34 Our measure of search is motivated by the standard literature in search theory in which consumers' 




that consumers have become more price conscious with time by attempting to exploit inter-
station dispersion.  
One should anticipate that both the search and the timing consumers are more present 
in the low-price window. As a simple consistency check, we therefore construct the variables 
separately for 2015-observations before and after restoration. For timing the shares are 31% and 
20% before and after restoration, respectively. For search the shares are 21% and 11% before 
and after peak, respectively. Hence, the numbers are in accordance with our anticipations.  
 
Table 1: Shows the answers from question 4: “Do you think the retail price increases on specific days 
of the week?”. Numbers in parentheses are total number of respondents by year. Shares not summing to 
100% are due to non-response. 
 
 Yes No Do not know 
2005 (289) 35 % 63 % 1 % 
2006 (151) 44 % 56 % 0 % 
2008 (225) 53 % 28 % 19 % 
2015 (202) 81 % 9 % 10 % 
 
Table 2: If yes on Question 4, which day of the week does the retail price increase? Numbers in 
parentheses are total number of respondents by year. Shares not summing to 100% are due to non-
response. 
 Only Monday Only Thursday Only Monday and Thursday 
2005 (289) 11 % 0 % 0 % 
2006 (151) 23 % 1 % 1 % 
2008 (225) 29 % 1 % 1 % 
2015 (202) 28 % 0 % 14 % 
 
 
Table 3: If yes on Question 4, how often do you take this into account when making your purchases? 
Numbers in parentheses are total number of respondents by year. Shares not summing to 100% are due 
to non-response. Shares summing to over 100% are due to rounding numbers. 
 Very often Fairly often Neither Fairly seldom Very seldom 
2005 (289) 31 % 9 % 7 % 8 % 39 % 
2006 (151) 21 % 17 % 12 % 8 % 33 % 
2008 (225) 13 % 15 % 18 % 7 % 45 % 












Table 4: Where do you check the retail price? Numbers in parentheses are total number of respondents 
by year. Shares not summing to 100% are due to non-response. 
 Do not check the price Check on the pump Check on the sign outside of station Other 
2005 (289) 46 % 7 % 31 % 0 % 
2006 (151) 35 % 15 % 50 % 0 % 
2008 (225) 48 % 13 % 38 % 0 % 
2015 (202) 38 % 2 % 60 % 0 % 
 
Table 5: Measure of timing and search by year. Numbers in parentheses are total number of respondents 
by year. 
 Timing Search 
2005 (289) 12 % 8 % 
2006 (151) 11 % 11 % 
2008 (225) 20 % 8 % 
2015 (202) 27 % 17 % 
5 Methodology 
5.1 Measuring the impact of predictable time-dependent price cycles on 
profitability 
 
We use a fixed effects model for our specification, and our main model is 
𝑀𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + ∑ 𝛿𝑗𝐷𝑗
6
𝑗=1
+ 𝛾𝑡 + 𝛽1𝐷4 × 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡07 + 𝛽2𝑝𝑤ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 
The dependent variable is the log of gross margin in real NOK per liter for station i on 
day 𝑡. Due to time-dependent cycling prices, the main explanatory variables of interest are a 
full set of day-of-week dummies 𝐷𝑗 , using Sunday as baseline. Note that we have defined our 
days as noon to noon, implying that the Sunday dummy will pick up the lowest prices in the 
week: Sunday afternoon and Monday morning. In order to investigate the development of the 
Thursday peak over time, we also include an interaction term between the Thursday dummy 
variable and a dummy variable 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡07 = 1 if the year is 2008 or later. The division in time is 
chosen based on the Norwegian Competition Authority's (2014) detection of the Thursday 
restoration for the first time in 2008. As control variables we include the log of wholesale price 
in real NOK 𝑝𝑤ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑡 and a daily linear trend 𝑡. Finally, 𝜇𝑖  are station-specific fixed effects and 
𝜖𝑖𝑡 are idiosyncratic error terms. We use White's robust standard errors.
35 
                                                 




For the sake of investigating whether the development in trend differs by day of the week, 
we also estimate a model where a full set of interaction terms between the day-of-week dummy 
variables and the linear trend is included instead of the interaction term 𝐷4 × 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡07. This 
specification is given by 
𝑀𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + ∑ 𝛿𝑗𝐷𝑗
6
𝑗=1
+ 𝛾𝑡 + ∑(𝜆𝑗𝐷𝑗 × 𝑡)
6
𝑗=1
+ 𝛽1𝑝𝑤ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 
 
5.2 Measuring the impact of consumer behavior on profitability 
We analyze the effect of two different demand side variables. We underline that changes in the 
price pattern are highly unlikely caused by the demand side. The Competition Authority (2014, 
2015), using data from 2004 to 2011 for the entire population of stations in Norway, documents 
that consumers have only marginally adjusted to the price pattern by moving their purchases to 
the low price window on Sundays, despite that the Monday peak has existed throughout the 
country since the beginning of the sample period. Therefore, it cannot be the case that the 
introduction of Thursday as a day off from competition is caused by changes in the demand 
side. This observation is also supported by Foros and Steen’s (2013) pure firm-driven 
explanation to the driving force behind the cycle. Hence, reversed causality in the sense that 
market demand changes have driven the answers we observe in stated consumer surveys is not 
supported from what we know about the market and the demand conditions.  
 The first model in the investigation of consumer behavior examines the impact of search 
behavior on gross margin development, according to the specification 
𝑀𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑡 × 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡07 + ∑ 𝛿𝑗𝐷𝑗
6
𝑗=1
+ 𝛾𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐷4 × 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡07 + 𝛼4𝑝𝑤ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 
The explanatory variable of interest is the log of searching consumers 𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑡. This 
measure is constructed as the share by year of consumers that check the price on signs outside 
stations and make purchases at more than three different stations. Identification of 𝛼1 hence 
stems from changes in the share of searching consumers over time. The inclusion of an 
interaction term between 𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑡 and the dummy variable 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡07 = 1 if the year is 2008 or 
later, further allows us to analyze the effect of search behavior on profitability after the 
establishment of a new weekly peak. In addition, the log of the wholesale price, a full set of 




We are also interested in the effect of consumers who adapt their purchases to the 
predictable cycle. The second model therefore includes a measure of the share of consumers 
who act by timing the cycle, 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑔, as the main explanatory variable: 
𝑀𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑡 × 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡07 + ∑ 𝛿𝑗𝐷𝑗
6
𝑗=1
+ 𝛾𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐷4 × 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡07 + 𝛼4𝑝𝑤ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 
 The variable measures the share of consumers who predict when low price windows 
occur during a week, for instance by following a rule of thumb, and move their purchases to 
these points in time. These consumers hence do not spend effort on price search because they 
regard timing purchases as more gainful than exploiting price dispersion across stations.36  
Finally, since we estimate a margin model over a long period, also other factors might 
influence margin development, e.g., changes in costs beyond the wholesale price. In the 
robustness section we estimate models allowing for different additional control variables to see 
whether our results are robust also when controlling for these. 
6 Results 
6.1 The impact of predictable time-dependent price cycles on profitability 
Table 6 presents our main results on price cycles. From the simplified specification in 
column (A) in which 𝐷4 × 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡07 is omitted, all day-of-week dummy coefficients are positive 
and significant except from the Saturday dummy. Being on Monday increases firms’ 
profitability by 35.6%. The effect then declines when moving to Tuesday and Wednesday, until 
reaching a new increase on Thursday to 22.2%. Throughout the rest of the week, the effect 
descends compared to Sunday, which appears to be the day with the lowest profitability during 
a week (the low price window: noon Sunday to noon Monday). Results hence demonstrate the 
presence of a weekly cycle, with large price increases on Monday and Thursday, which in turn 
increase firms' profitability.  
The linear trend coefficient is positive and significant, indicating that gross margins 
indeed have increased over time. If we calculate the effect of the trend from 3 May 2004 to 31 
October 2015, the average margin in real terms has increased by NOK 0.428 - which is a 
significant amount compared to an average margin in 2004 of NOK 1.22. The real average 
margin increased by more than 35% over the data period.  
                                                 





Model (A) shows the average cycle over the period 2004 to 2015. In model (B), we 
include the interaction term 𝐷4 × 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡07 to allow for the new restoration day introduced on 
Thursdays. The coefficient is positive and significant at the 1% level, suggesting that from 
2008, the extra effect of Thursday as the current day of the week is 9.56%. The total effect of 
being on a Thursday from 2008 is hence 27.2%, which is stronger than the average effect 
measured in model (A). Of the day-of-week dummies, inclusion of 𝐷4 × 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡07 only changes 
the coefficient of the Thursday dummy, which now decreases to 0.176. This suggests that the 
Thursday peak has not been present during the whole sample period, as coefficients now slowly 
decline from Monday and throughout the week. The positive average trend effect now suggests 
an increase in the real margin of NOK 0.441. Thus, model (B) presents very similar results, but 
also that Thursday emerges as a new restoration day.  
In order to analyze the development in trend based on days of the week, model (C) 
replaces 𝐷4 × 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡07 in favor of a full set of interaction terms between the trend variable and 
the day-of-week dummies. We find significant trend effects for four days. These are highest on 
the new restoration day Thursday, and second highest on Monday and Friday. Monday remains 
as the day on which firms earn the highest gross margins. To illustrate the development in the 
margins over time as predicted by model (C), we calculate the trend effect over the whole data 
period by adding the trend effect from each day-estimates to the benchmark estimate, e.g., for 
Thursday; 0.063 + 4198 days × 0.000102 = 0.063 + 0.428 = 0.491. This is illustrated for model 
(A) to (C) in Figure 5.  
Several features become clear from Figure 5. Models (A) and (B) display the same 
pattern except for Thursday, where model (A) predicts the average effect of the before/after 
2008 effects of the introduction of a second restoration day. First, the most flexible model (C) 
suggests that the Thursday effect has become stronger and very similar to the Monday effect, 
but that Monday still has the highest margin (0.55 vs 0.49). Second, we observe a marginally 
small trend-based reduction in the Wednesday margin over the data period (small negative trend 
coefficient). This is reasonable, since Wednesday (recall that this refers to noon Wednesday to 
noon Thursday) is now the low price window just before the second restoration on Thursday 






Table 6: Regression results. Dependent variable is log of gross margin in NOK per liter. 
 (A) (B) (C) 
Mon 0.356*** 0.356*** 0.241*** 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.051) 
Tue 0.291*** 0.291*** 0.272*** 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.052) 
Wed 0.187*** 0.187*** 0.252*** 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.052) 
Thu 0.222*** 0.176*** 0.063 
 (0.028) (0.038) (0.053) 
Fri 0.120*** 0.120*** 0.005 
 (0.030) (0.030) (0.057) 
Sat 0.023 0.024 -0.074 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.059) 
Trend 0.000105*** 0.000102*** 0.000064*** 
 (0.000008) (0.000008) (0.000017) 
Trend×Mon   0.000074*** 
   (0.000021) 
Trend×Tue   0.000011 
   (0.000026) 
Trend×Wed   -0.000040 
   (0.000025) 
Trend×Thu   0.000102*** 
   (0.000023) 
Trend×Fri   0.000074*** 
   (0.000024) 
Trend×Sat   0.000062** 
   (0.000024) 
Wholesale price -0.133*** -0.151*** -0.131*** 
 (0.033) (0.034) (0.032) 
Thu×post07  0.096***  
  (0.037)  
Constant 0.116** 0.144*** 0.178*** 
 (0.045) (0.047) (0.056) 
Observations 2,165 2,165 2,165 
R-squared 0.229 0.231 0.246 
Station FE YES YES YES 









Figure 5: Predicted daily gross margins per liter. 
 
Finally, if we compare the estimates to what we saw in Figure 1, model (C) suggests an 
increase in the Monday afternoon gross margin of 128% (2004-2015). These numbers 
correspond well with Table C.1 in the Appendix, where the increase from 2008 to 2015 was 
more than 90%. The new restoration day increases the Thursday margin by nearly 700%.  
In sum, results from models (B) and (C) propose that the introduction of a new weekly 
day off from competition on Thursdays partly explains the observed increase in profitability. 
Hence, cycling markets appear to be beneficial for firms. As firms are able to increase markups 
for most days over time, they will gain in terms of volume-weighted gross margins regardless 
of when consumers purchase. Thus, another restoration day in the middle of the week shrinks 
the initial weekly low price window. This is in line with our preliminary findings in Section 5. 
Lastly, we briefly pay attention to the effect of the wholesale price. The estimated 
coefficient on 𝑝𝑤ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑒 lies between -0.131 and -0.151. Hence, increasing the wholesale price 
by 1% decreases gross margins by approximately 0.13%. This suggests that the change in the 
wholesale price is not perfectly passed through into retail prices. This may indicate that 
profitability in time-dependent markets is to a certain extent influenced by variable costs. As 
fluctuations in prices depend on the current day of the week, whereas the development in 
wholesale prices does not behave in a similar way, prices already more than account for the 




maintaining the weekly cycle because the weekly price schedule is, overall, more gainful. We 
will anticipate that wholesale prices do not affect the margin in the long run, which is also in 
line with the results we get in the robustness section (7.1) introducing more long run trend 
control variables. The wholesale price effect is less pronounced in the robustness section.  
6.2 The impact of consumer behavior on profitability 
We now consider the impact of demand side variables by including these factors in our 
specification. First, we examine the measure of search behavior on where to buy. Results of the 
main model are presented in column (A) in Table 7, whereas the model in column (B) is 
presented for the sake of comparison. 
As expected, the effect of 𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ is negative and significant at the 1% level, suggesting 
that increasing the share of searching consumers by 1% decreases firms’ profitability by 0.5%. 
Search (where-) activity is hence unfavorable to sellers. An increased amount of search initiated 
by consumers increases consumers’ knowledge about of prices.  
Next, we elaborate on the effect of search in relation to the introduction of the Thursday 
restoration by including the interaction term  𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ × 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡07. This specification is presented 
in column (C). The coefficient of the 𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ variable is now almost doubled, indicating that a 
1% increase in searching consumers decreases profitability by 0.92%. The effect is significant 
at the 1% level. However, the coefficient for 𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ × 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡07 is 0.114, which is positive and 
significant at the 1% level. This suggests that searching consumers were more unfavorable to 
retailers before the establishment of another restoration day. In fact, estimates indicate two 
potential features: In a situation with only Monday as a restoration day, increased consumer 
search activity is even worse for retailers. However, after the introduction of a second 
restoration day, which seems to suggest that consumers are exposed to more noise, search 
activity has less negative influence on retailers because they manage to confuse consumers with 
their price setting schedule. Hence, the Thursday restoration acts as obfuscation which makes 
consumers less informed. Further, from model (D), which replaces 𝐷4 × 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡07 with a full set 
of interaction terms between the trend variable and the day-of-week dummies, we can confirm 
that gross margins have increased for most days of the week over time. The coefficients on 






Table 7: Effect of 𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ. Dependent variable is log of gross margin in NOK per liter. 
 (A) (B) (C) (D) 
Search -0.499*** -0.510*** -0.922*** -0.922*** 
 (0.094) (0.093) (0.126) (0.127) 
Search×post07   0.114*** 0.110*** 
   (0.015) (0.015) 
Mon 0.354*** 0.238*** 0.356*** 0.240*** 
 (0.026) (0.051) (0.026) (0.051) 
Tue 0.288*** 0.268*** 0.289*** 0.269*** 
 (0.026) (0.052) (0.025) (0.051) 
Wed 0.186*** 0.249*** 0.186*** 0.249*** 
 (0.026) (0.052) (0.026) (0.051) 
Thu 0.191*** 0.059 0.178*** 0.059 
 (0.037) (0.052) (0.037) (0.051) 
Fri 0.119*** 0.002 0.117*** 0.000 
 (0.029) (0.056) (0.029) (0.056) 
Sat 0.022 -0.076 0.021 -0.079 
 (0.031) (0.058) (0.030) (0.057) 
Trend 0.000201*** 0.000163*** 0.000325*** 0.000285*** 
 (0.000022) (0.000027) (0.000032) (0.000036) 
Thu×post07 0.060  0.086**  
 (0.037)  (0.037)  
Trend × Mon  0.000075***  0.000074*** 
  (0.000022)  (0.000021) 
Trend × Tue  0.000013  0.000013 
  (0.000026)  (0.000026) 
Trend × Wed  -0.000039  -0.000039 
  (0.000026)  (0.000025) 
Trend × Thu  0.000103***  0.000103*** 
  (0.000023)  (0.000022) 
Trend × Fri  0.000075***  0.000075*** 
  (0.000024)  (0.000024) 
Trend × Sat  0.000063***  0.000063*** 
  (0.000024)  (0.000024) 
Wholesale price -0.369*** -0.361*** -0.125** -0.123** 
 (0.054) (0.053) (0.057) (0.057) 
Constant -0.942*** -0.920*** -2.345*** -2.289*** 
 (0.216) (0.217) (0.339) (0.342) 
Observations 2,165 2,165 2,165 2,165 
R-squared 0.252 0.268 0.265 0.280 
Station FE YES YES YES YES 









Table 8: Effect of 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑔. Dependent variable is log of gross margin in NOK per liter. 
 (A) (B) (C) (D) 
Timing 0.269*** 0.289*** 2.094*** 2.117*** 
 (0.086) (0.085) (0.320) (0.320) 
Timing×post07   0.564*** 0.563*** 
   (0.081) (0.081) 
Mon 0.355*** 0.239*** 0.356*** 0.242*** 
 (0.026) (0.052) (0.026) (0.051) 
Tue 0.290*** 0.271*** 0.293*** 0.278*** 
 (0.026) (0.052) (0.026) (0.051) 
Wed 0.187*** 0.251*** 0.189*** 0.258*** 
 (0.027) (0.053) (0.026) (0.051) 
Thu 0.186*** 0.062 0.178*** 0.061 
 (0.038) (0.053) (0.037) (0.052) 
Fri 0.120*** 0.004 0.119*** 0.004 
 (0.030) (0.057) (0.029) (0.056) 
Sat 0.024 -0.073 0.023 -0.073 
 (0.031) (0.059) (0.030) (0.058) 
Trend 0.000045** 0.000003 -0.000180*** -0.000222*** 
 (0.000019) (0.000023) (0.000044) (0.000046) 
Thu×post07 0.072*  0.088**  
 (0.038)  (0.037)  
Trend × Mon  0.000074***  0.000073*** 
  (0.000021)  (0.000021) 
Trend × Tue  0.000012  0.000009 
  (0.000026)  (0.000026) 
Trend × Wed  -0.000040  -0.000043* 
  (0.000025)  (0.000025) 
Trend × Thu  0.000102***  0.000102*** 
  (0.000023)  (0.000023) 
Trend × Fri  0.000074***  0.000074*** 
  (0.000024)  (0.000024) 
Trend × Sat  0.000062**  0.000062** 
  (0.000024)  (0.000024) 
Wholesale price -0.291*** -0.286*** 0.058 0.063 
 (0.058) (0.058) (0.058) (0.057) 
Constant 0.914*** 1.012*** 4.649*** 4.750*** 
 (0.249) (0.246) (0.703) (0.702) 
Observations 2,165 2,165 2,165 2,165 
R-squared 0.236 0.252 0.257 0.273 
Station FE YES YES YES YES 





We now move on to examine the effect of consumers who follow a rule of thumb and 
make purchases close to the restoration, 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑔. The measure serves as a proxy for consumers 
who have learned the behavior of the present cycle and move their purchases to points in time 
with the lowest prices, regardless of station. Hence, when a consumer drops by a station it is 
due to convenience and not due to the particular station itself. Results are presented in Table 8 
column (A). Column (B) includes interaction terms between the trend variable and day-of-week 
dummies instead of  𝐷4 × 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡07 for comparability.  
The coefficient of 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑔 is 0.269 and significant at the 1% level, meaning that 
increasing the share of consumers who purchase close to the restoration by 1% increases 
profitability by 0.27%. One interpretation is that a sole adaptation to the cycle without 
participating in search is beneficial for sellers. Intuitively, consumer adjustment to predictable 
low price windows (more when-behavior) also makes consumers’ purchasing behavior easily 
foreseeable for firms. Thus, sellers have less incentives to undercut each other as harsh price 
competition will not have a large impact on consumers’ choice of station in the brief low price 
window since consumers' marginal cost of searching across stations has increased. In turn, 
competition is weakened and makes firms better off. Hence, this may explain the positive 
coefficient on 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑔. The effect is quite similar when including a full set of interaction terms 
between the trend variable and day-of-week dummies in column (B). 
We now include the interaction term 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑔 × 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡07 for the sake of investigating the 
impact of the introduction of the Thursday peak. The coefficient of 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑔 is increased to a 
significant 2.094, and the coefficient for 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑔 × 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡07 is 0.564 and significant at the 1% 
level, meaning that the effect of consumers who adapt to the cycle is larger in magnitude after 
the introduction of another weekly peak. One interpretation is that the new pattern allows 
consumers to purchase cheaply in two periods rather than one during a week. Hence, there is 
now an additional window in which firms see no point in competing with each other. The total 
effect of timing may therefore increase due to impaired price dispersion twice a week.37 
7 Robustness analysis and supplementary examination 
This section presents additional results in the interest of investigating the robustness of 
our main findings. 
                                                 
37 In models (C) and (D), the effect of trend becomes negative and significant, while the effect of the 




7.1 Inclusion of additional control variables 
First, we introduce two cost shifters, the log of the wage index in the merchandising 
sector (wage), the log of the number of self-serviced stations (self-service), and a variable 
controlling for the business cycle and overall activity level in the Norwegian economy, the log  
Table 9: Inclusion of additional variables into main models of effect of search. Dependent variable is 
log of gross margin in NOK per liter. 
 (A) (B) (C) (D) 
     
Search -0.698*** -0.702*** -0.578*** -0.568*** 
 (0.122) (0.122) (0.157) (0.156) 
Search×post07   -0.112 -0.126 
   (0.0822) (0.0811) 
GDP 2.839*** 2.715*** 3.256*** 3.182*** 
 (0.492) (0.478) (0.533) (0.518) 
Wage 0.158 0.357 -3.373 -3.595 
 (1.210) (1.204) (2.433) (2.391) 
Self-service 4.751*** 4.832*** 5.780*** 5.988*** 
 (1.112) (1.103) (1.624) (1.606) 
Trend -0.000181 -0.000234 -0.0000292 -0.0000633 
 (0.000186) (0.000185) (0.000174) (0.000173) 
Wholesale price 0.00211 0.0107 0.0347 0.0474 
 (0.0692) (0.0678) (0.0810) (0.0795) 
Thu×post07 0.0866**  0.0860**  
 (0.0366)  (0.0365)  
     
Observations 2,165 2,165 2,165 2,165 
R-squared 0.277 0.292 0.278 0.293 
Trend × day of week NO YES NO YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Day of the week and station dummies, and a constant term (not 
reported) included. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Data period is 3 May 2004 to 31 October 2015. 
of the domestic gross product (GDP) (2015 as base year).38 As our data span over ten years we 
can test whether these variables account for some of the increase in profitability over this period. 
Table 9 and Table 10 show that GDP increases profitability with 3 to 4%, suggesting 
that gross margins follow movements in the general economy. With coefficients between 0.04 
and 0.06, self-service leads to increases around 4 to 6% in gross margins. Self-serviced stations 
are cheaper to run, leaving firms with higher profitability. Whereas wage is insignificant in 
Table 9 its impact is negative and around 6% in Table 10. Hence, wage increases lead to 
between zero and negative effect on gross margins. These impacts are in line with expectations, 
regarding that we already have taken the growth in CPI into account. 
 
                                                 




Table 10: Inclusion of additional variables into main models of effect of timing. Dependent variable is 
log of gross margin in NOK per liter. 
 (A) (B) (C) (D) 
     
Timing 1.424*** 1.439*** 1.664*** 1.609*** 
 (0.237) (0.236) (0.535) (0.532) 
Timing×post07   0.126 0.0897 
   (0.234) (0.231) 
GDP 4.016*** 3.902*** 3.885*** 3.809*** 
 (0.494) (0.479) (0.495) (0.481) 
Wage -6.727*** -6.627*** -5.685** -5.889** 
 (1.910) (1.900) (2.344) (2.305) 
Self-service 4.691*** 4.766*** 3.906* 4.208** 
 (1.053) (1.043) (2.139) (2.118) 
Trend -0.0000749 -0.000122 -0.000122 -0.000155 
 (0.000178) (0.000177) (0.000169) (0.000168) 
Wholesale price 0.130* 0.140** 0.126* 0.137* 
 (0.0687) (0.0674) (0.0718) (0.0705) 
Thu×post07 0.0856**  0.0856**  
 (0.0366)  (0.0366)  
     
Observations 2,165 2,165 2,165 2,165 
R-squared 0.275 0.291 0.276 0.291 
Trend × day of week NO YES NO  YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Day of the week and station dummies, and a constant term (not 
reported) included. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Data period is 3 May 2004 to 31 October 2015. 
 
When looking at the main variables, in general, coefficients of search are quite similar 
in magnitude to the main results. The coefficients of timing are larger for model (A) and (B) 
while smaller for model (C) and (D). The post 2007 effects of search and timing are no longer 
significant. This suggests that, when controlling for more cost factors, the effect of the Thursday 
peak on the demand side variables is absent. In all models, trend becomes insignificant, 
meaning that variations in GDP, wage and self-service are accounted for by the general long 
run trend when not explicitly included in the model. Furthermore, these variables account for 
the main part of the trend variable. Accounting for more long run controls, the wholesale price 
effects are reduced in significance. Coefficients of the wholesale price changes sign as 
compared to our models above, but are very small and insignificant in Table 9, somewhat larger 
in Table 10, but only significant on a 10% level for 3 out of 4 cases. Suggesting that controlling 





7.2 Newey-West standard errors 
Table 11: Newey-West standard errors. Dependent variable is log of gross margin in NOK per liter. 
 (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) 
Search   -0.922*** -0.922***   
   (0.241) (0.241)   
Search×post07   0.114*** 0.110***   
   (0.027) (0.027)   
Timing     2.094*** 2.117*** 
     (0.604) (0.606) 
Timing×post07     0.564*** 0.563*** 
     (0.151) (0.152) 
Mon 0.356*** 0.241*** 0.356*** 0.240*** 0.356*** 0.242*** 
 (0.025) (0.050) (0.025) (0.050) (0.025) (0.050) 
Tue 0.291*** 0.272*** 0.289*** 0.269*** 0.293*** 0.278*** 
 (0.024) (0.049) (0.024) (0.048) (0.024) (0.049) 
Wed 0.187*** 0.252*** 0.186*** 0.249*** 0.189*** 0.258*** 
 (0.023) (0.044) (0.022) (0.044) (0.023) (0.044) 
Thu 0.176*** 0.063 0.178*** 0.059 0.178*** 0.061 
 (0.027) (0.039) (0.027) (0.039) (0.027) (0.039) 
Fri 0.120*** 0.005 0.117*** 0.000 0.119*** 0.004 
 (0.020) (0.039) (0.019) (0.039) (0.019) (0.039) 
Sat 0.024 -0.074** 0.021 -0.079** 0.023 -0.073** 
 (0.015) (0.032) (0.015) (0.031) (0.015) (0.031) 
Trend 0.000102*** 0.000064*** 0.000325*** 0.000285*** -0.000180** -0.000222*** 
 (0.000012) (0.000018) (0.000060) (0.000063) (0.000083) (0.000083) 
Wholesale 
price 
-0.151*** -0.131** -0.125 -0.123 0.058 0.063 
 (0.057) (0.057) (0.097) (0.097) (0.098) (0.098) 
Thu×post07 0.096***  0.086***  0.088***  
 (0.030)  (0.028)  (0.028)  
Constant 0.144* 0.178** -2.345*** -2.289*** 4.649*** 4.750*** 
 (0.077) (0.085) (0.640) (0.644) (1.332) (1.333) 
Observations 2,165 2,165 2,165 2,165 2,165 2,165 
R-squared 0.231 0.246 0.265 0.280 0.257 0.273 
Station FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Trend × day of 
week 
NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Newey-West standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Data period is 3 May 2004 
to 31 October 2015. 
One concern when working with long panels is that residuals are likely to be 
autocorrelated. Therefore, we here report Newey-West standard errors, allowing for seven lags 
due to the weekly pattern in prices.39 
From Table 11, results show that the significance of coefficients is similar to the main 
results. Generally, standard errors of demand side coefficients are almost doubled. However, 
conclusions regarding significance remain unchanged. Standard errors of the day-of-week 
dummies are mostly slightly smaller. Major conclusions are unchanged. 
                                                 
39 The number of lags coincides with a rule-of-thumb given by the integer of 4 n , for which n is the total 




7.3 Inclusion of 𝒑𝒘𝒉𝒐𝒍𝒆𝒕−𝟕 as explanatory variable 
Table 12: Inclusion of 𝑝𝑤ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑡−7. Dependent variable is log of gross margin in NOK per liter. 
 (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) 
Search   -0.904*** -0.907***   
   (0.125) (0.125)   
Search×post07   0.102*** 0.097***   
   (0.014) (0.014)   
Timing     2.203*** 2.224*** 
     (0.301) (0.301) 
Timing×post07     0.580*** 0.577*** 
     (0.075) (0.074) 
Mon 0.390*** 0.333*** 0.389*** 0.331*** 0.389*** 0.333*** 
 (0.025) (0.049) (0.025) (0.049) (0.025) (0.049) 
Tue 0.311*** 0.333*** 0.311*** 0.331*** 0.312*** 0.334*** 
 (0.027) (0.056) (0.026) (0.054) (0.026) (0.054) 
Wed 0.205*** 0.301*** 0.204*** 0.300*** 0.205*** 0.302*** 
 (0.028) (0.057) (0.027) (0.055) (0.027) (0.056) 
Thu 0.165*** 0.078 0.170*** 0.073 0.171*** 0.073 
 (0.040) (0.058) (0.039) (0.056) (0.039) (0.057) 
Fri 0.138*** 0.042 0.135*** 0.037 0.136*** 0.037 
 (0.031) (0.061) (0.030) (0.059) (0.030) (0.060) 
Sat 0.051 -0.011 0.048 -0.016 0.049 -0.015 
 (0.032) (0.063) (0.031) (0.061) (0.031) (0.061) 
Trend 0.000094*** 0.000076*** 0.000309*** 0.000288*** -0.000208*** -0.000232*** 
 (0.000009) (0.000019) (0.000033) (0.000038) (0.000042) (0.000043) 
Thu×post07 0.128***  0.113***  0.113***  
 (0.038)  (0.038)  (0.038)  
Wholesale price 
t 
-1.289*** -1.261*** -1.270*** -1.258*** -1.211*** -1.197*** 
 (0.163) (0.162) (0.157) (0.156) (0.160) (0.158) 
Wholesale price 
t-7 
1.145*** 1.144*** 1.113*** 1.105*** 1.254*** 1.248*** 
 (0.168) (0.167) (0.169) (0.168) (0.164) (0.162) 
Constant 0.146*** 0.139** -2.247*** -2.233*** 4.929*** 4.995*** 
 (0.048) (0.059) (0.330) (0.334) (0.669) (0.667) 
Long run effect 
of Wholesale 
price 
-0.144*** -0.117*** -0.158*** -0.153** 0.043 0.050 
 (0.035) (0.034) (0.061) (0.061) (0.059) (0.058) 
Observations 1,951 1,951 1,951 1,951 1,951 1,951 
R-squared 0.267 0.281 0.307 0.322 0.301 0.316 
Station FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Trend × day of 
week 
NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Data period is 3 May 2004 to 31 
October 2015. 
 
Whereas the wholesale price typically changes on a daily basis, the recommended price 
changes around once a week.40 Recommended prices serve to represent the correct retail price 
when taking costs into account. As such, the wholesale price affects recommended prices and, 
in turn, retail prices with a fall-back over several periods. In this regard, we add dynamics to 
                                                 




our specification by including the seventh lag of the wholesale price, 𝑝𝑤ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑡−7, in favor of 
allowing the retail price and hence gross margins to adjust slowly to changes in costs. 
Results are reported in Table 12. We will pay attention to the model in column (A), 
keeping in mind that estimates are quite similar for all models. The coefficient on 𝑝𝑤ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑡  is 
-1.289, while the coefficient on 𝑝𝑤ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑡−7 is 1.145. The instant effect of the wholesale price 
on firms’ profitability is negative, as 1% increase lowers gross margins by 1.27%. However, 
taking slow adjustment into account, the long-run effect is reduced to -0.14%. By comparing 
the estimates with the coefficient of -0.15 in Table 6 column (B), the long-run effect 
corresponds well to our main findings.41From columns (C) and (D), we note that adding 
𝑝𝑤ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑡−7 to the specification lowers the magnitude of 𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ and 𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ × 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡07 slightly. 
On the other hand, the coefficients of 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑔 and 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑔 × 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡07 in columns (E) and (F) 
increase slightly. In sum, results do not differ much from the main models. The size of the 
coefficient on 𝐷4 × 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡07 is 0.128 in column (B) compared to 0.096 in the leading results. 
Overall, estimates are much the same as in the main models.42 
 
8 Concluding remarks 
We empirically examine the impact of time-dependent price patterns on consumer behavior and 
firms’ profitability. The Norwegian retail gasoline market is a picture perfect application. From 
2004 to 2017, a regular country-wide weekly price pattern with a saw-tooth shape was present. 
On Mondays around noon all the four major retail chains increase their retail prices to the 
recommended price. The retail chains decide their recommended prices in advance, and publish 
recommended prices on their websites. Consequently, each retail chain knows when to raise the 
price, and to what level. Moreover, they are immediately able to observe should a rival deviate 
from the established practice. 
In local markets with high concentration (long distance between competing outlets), 
retail prices are equal to the recommended prices throughout the week. Therefore, we consider 
the level of recommended prices as a measure of the monopoly price. In less concentrated areas, 
firms undercut each other during the rest of the week, such that the price level is regularly at its 
                                                 
41 An F-test rejects the null hypothesis of the long run effect being equal to 0. 
42 To account for potential inertia of profitability we also estimated models where we allowed for an 
AR(1) process, including yesterday’s gross margin. The AR(1) term is significant, and the weekly pattern is still 
present with highest margins on Monday and Thursday in our preferred model. The trend is still positive and 




lowest on Monday morning. From 2008, retail chains managed to introduce another day off 
from competition on Thursdays. Like on Mondays, there was an industry-wide synchronization 
of retail prices to the level of the recommended prices on Thursdays.  
We combine panel data on supply side measures and survey data containing information 
on consumer behavior with a time span between 2004 and 2015. This allows us to scrutinize 
the interplay between firms’ and consumers behavior. Consumers face a menu of prices 
depending on when they buy. With a given capacity of effort, there are typically larger savings 
to gain by using effort on timing of when to buy rather than on where to buy. As expected, we 
find that conventional price search on where to buy reduces firms’ profitability. In contrast, 
consumers who are aware of the cycle and act by when to make their purchases have a positive 
impact on firms’ profitability. For consumers in a market with a predictable cycle, it might be 
rational to adopt to a simple rule of thumb: tank on Sunday or on Monday morning. However, 
competition among sellers are highly driven by price search. Consequently, if consumers 
(rationally) spend their effort on when to buy rather than on where to buy, price competition 
might be softened (even in the in low-price windows). We show that the effects are robust also 
when accounting for long run changes in cost structure and the Norwegian business cycle.  
For policy makers and consumer associations this creates a difficult trade-off when 
advising consumers. On the one hand, there are huge savings for consumers if they adapt to the 
pattern and tank gasoline in the weekly low-price windows. On the other hand, if more 
consumers, by for instance adapting to a rule of thumb, pay less attention to where to buy, 
retailers lose incentives to compete aggressively. In this respect, the weekly price pattern has 
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A Panel data 
Table A.1: Overview of gasoline stations and data periods. 
Station Brand Data periods 
1 Esso 03.05.2004-30.11.2004* 
  12.02.2005-23.03.2005* 
2 Hydro Texaco 23.01.2005-01.05.2005 
  13.05.2005-17.05.2005 
3 Hydro Texaco 03.05.2004-30.11.2004* 
  10.02.2005-23.03.2005* 
4 Hydro Texaco 31.01.2005-03.07.2005 
  28.01.2008-21.07.2008 
5 Statoil 23.01.2005-01.05.2005 
  13.05.2005-26.06.2005 
  28.01.2008-21.07.2008 
6 Statoil 23.01.2005-03.07.2005 
  17.10.2005-15.03.2006 
  28.01.2008-21.07.2008 
  22.06.2015-16.08.2015 
  02.09.2015-31.10.2015 
7 Statoil 20.06.2004-30.11.2004* 
  15.02.2005-17.02.2005* 
  17.10.2005-15.03.2006 
  28.01.2008-21.07.2008 
  02.09.2015-31.10.2015 
8 Statoil 16.05.2004-30.11.2004* 
  22.03.2005 
9 Shell 08.05.2004-20.10.2004* 
  09.03.2005-23.03.2005* 
10 Shell 17.10.2005-15.03.2006 
  28.01.2008-21.07.2008 
11 Hydro Texaco 02.07.2004-16.11.2004* 
 





Table A.2: Summary statistics. Data period is 3 May 2004 to 31 October 2015. 
  Mean Std. dev. Min Max 
2004      
Price  12.079 0.541 10.689 12.718 
Wholesale price  2.639 0.173 2.289 2.930 
Tax  5.806 0.000 5.806 5.806 
VAT  2.416 0.108 2.138 2.544 
Gross margin  1.218 0.423 0.171 1.952 
2005      
Price  12.543 0.650 10.830 14.000 
Wholesale price  2.812 0.306 2.254 3.450 
Tax  5.837 0.023 5.820 5.869 
VAT  2.509 0.130 2.166 2.800 
Gross margin  1.386 0.388 0.380 2.051 
2006      
Price  12.839 0.506 11.603 13.745 
Wholesale price  3.276 0.152 2.917 3.555 
Tax  5.819 0.000 5.819 5.819 
VAT  2.568 0.101 2.321 2.749 
Gross margin  1.176 0.442 0.078 1.982 
2008      
Price  14.487 0.696 12.517 15.869 
Wholesale price  4.362 0.516 3.533 5.293 
Tax  5.821 0.018 5.814 5.871 
VAT  2.897 0.139 2.503 3.174 
Gross margin  1.407 0.291 0.539 2.109 
2015      
Price  14.006 0.915 11.990 15.980 
Wholesale price  3.484 0.476 2.818 4.612 
Tax  5.820 0.000 5.820 5.820 
VAT  2.801 0.183 2.398 3.196 
Gross margin  1.901 0.578 0.486 2.945 
Total      
Price  13.455 1.157 10.689 15.980 
Wholesale price  3.530 0.821 2.254 5.293 
Tax  5.826 0.020 5.806 5.871 
VAT  2.691 0.231 2.138 3.196 
Gross margin  1.407 0.414 0.078 2.945 
 







Table A.3: Mean retail price by day of the week and year. Data period is 3 May 2004 to 31 October 
2015. 
 Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Saturday Sunday 
2004        
Mean 11.780 12.265 12.501 12.167 11.983 11.608 12.260 
Std.dev. 0.715 0.237 0.141 0.505 0.593 0.647 0.273 
Min 10.812 11.931 12.288 11.058 10.689 10.812 11.956 
Max 12.558 12.718 12.718 12.583 12.558 12.288 12.718 
2005        
Mean 12.846 12.701 12.549 12.572 12.434 12.366 12.335 
Std.dev. 0.492 0.568 0.680 0.645 0.636 0.671 0.689 
Min 11.084 11.072 11.120 11.120 11.120 10.830 10.830 
Max 14.000 13.564 13.782 13.782 13.600 13.661 13.661 
2006        
Mean 13.393 13.028 12.883 12.718 12.744 12.534 12.525 
Std.dev. 0.290 0.378 0.347 0.474 0.506 0.484 0.454 
Min 12.293 12.174 12.174 11.722 11.662 11.603 11.603 
Max 13.745 13.518 13.316 13.602 13.685 13.447 13.447 
2008        
Mean 14.713 14.623 14.527 14.561 14.441 14.325 14.216 
Std.dev. 0.643 0.608 0.608 0.653 0.714 0.762 0.750 
Min 13.395 13.532 13.418 12.950 12.517 12.517 12.517 
Max 15.846 15.812 15.869 15.869 15.869 15.846 15.846 
2015        
Mean 14.846 14.130 13.431 14.632 14.028 13.635 13.394 
Std.dev. 0.602 0.990 0.859 0.681 0.719 0.694 0.720 
Min 14.010 12.115 11.990 13.290 12.020 11.990 11.990 
Max 15.830 15.880 14.680 15.980 15.780 15.220 14.780 
 















Table A.4: Mean gross margin by day of the week and year. Data period is 3 May 2004 to 31 October 
2015. 
 Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Saturday Sunday 
2004 
       
Mean 1.048 1.465 1.459 1.263 1.151 0.790 1.280 
Std.dev. 0.545 0.170 0.274 0.370 0.540 0.417 0.098 
Min 0.299 1.139 1.197 0.442 0.171 0.274 1.113 
Max 1.588 1.717 1.952 1.607 1.896 1.294 1.439 
2005 
       
Mean 1.636 1.521 1.403 1.406 1.283 1.228 1.223 
Std.dev. 0.285 0.349 0.361 0.382 0.377 0.384 0.386 
Min 0.486 0.380 0.606 0.525 0.525 0.501 0.501 
Max 2.051 1.997 1.968 2.029 1.956 1.956 1.939 
2006 
       
Mean 1.604 1.327 1.232 1.110 1.085 0.918 0.917 
Std.dev. 0.289 0.351 0.289 0.423 0.468 0.434 0.410 
Min 0.594 0.449 0.717 0.315 0.126 0.078 0.078 
Max 1.961 1.822 1.613 1.982 1.924 1.734 1.734 
2008 
       
Mean 1.590 1.539 1.433 1.471 1.363 1.269 1.182 
Std.dev. 0.220 0.214 0.245 0.261 0.277 0.289 0.293 
Min 0.673 0.624 0.708 0.605 0.635 0.635 0.539 
Max 2.048 1.999 1.999 1.950 2.109 1.991 1.991 
2015 
       
Mean 2.560 1.985 1.436 2.416 1.929 1.615 1.405 
Std.dev. 0.255 0.531 0.434 0.424 0.417 0.333 0.365 
Min 1.874 0.486 0.582 0.869 0.900 0.876 0.876 
Max 2.893 2.714 2.169 2.945 2.481 2.194 2.554 
 





B Survey data 
B.1 Survey Questionnaire 
1. Type of fuel 
1. Unleaded gasoline 95: __________ 
2. Unleaded gasoline 98: __________ 
3. Diesel: __________ 
4. Other: __________ 
2. How often do you purchase gasoline? 
1. 4 times or more per month: __________ 
2. 2-4 times per month: __________ 
3. Once per month or less: __________ 
3. How often do you think that the retail price changes? 
1. Several times per day: __________ 
2. Once per day: __________ 
3. Every 2nd or 3rd day: __________ 
4. Every 7th day or less: __________ 
5. Do not know: __________ 
4. Do you think the retail price increases on specific days of the week? 
1. Yes: __________ 
2. No: __________ (Go to Question 7) 
3. Do not know: __________ 
5. If yes on Question 4, which days? 





Friday : __________ 
Saturday: __________ 
Sunday: __________ 
6. If yes on Question 4, how often do you take this into account when making purchases? 




7. How often do you fill full tank? 
(Very often) 1 2 3 4 5 (Very seldom) 
8. Where do you purchase gasoline? 
1. At the same station every time: __________ 
2. At 2 or 3 different stations: __________ 
3. At more than 3 different stations: __________ 
9. How far do you drive per year?_______ km 
10. Where do you check the retail price? 
1. Do not check the price: __________ 
2. Check on the pump: __________ 
3. Check on the sign outside station: __________ 
4. Other: __________ 














B.2 Questionnaire Overview 
Table B.1: Overview of station, date of survey and number of respondents. 
Name Brand Date of survey Day of week Number of respondents 
Hydro Texaco Tertnes Hydro Texaco 29.04.2005 Friday 39 
  06.06.2005 Monday 29 
  10.06.2005 Friday 49 
  30.03.2006 Thursday 30 
  03.04.2006 Monday 33 
  04.02.2008 Monday 50 
  07.02.2008 Thursday 39 
Statoil Helleveien Statoil 25.04.2005 Monday 47 
  29.04.2005 Friday 44 
  06.06.2005 Monday 42 
  10.06.2005 Friday 39 
  30.03.2006 Thursday 50 
  03.04.2006 Monday 38 
  04.02.2008 Monday 78 
  07.02.2008 Thursday 58 
  21.09.2015 Monday 58 
  24.09.2015 Thursday 49 
  28.09.2015 Monday 48 
  01.10.2015 Thursday 47 
Sum    867 
 
Table B.2: How often do you think the retail price changes? 




Every 2nd or 3rd 
day 






18 % 31 % 31 % 10 % 0 % 
2006 
(151) 
24 % 22 % 30 % 18 % 0 % 
2008 
(225) 
13 % 27 % 20 % 16 % 24 % 
2015 
(202) 
23 % 19 % 32 % 8 % 18 % 
 
Numbers in parentheses are total number of respondents by year. Shares not summing to 100% are 
due to non-response. 
 
Table B.3: How often do you fill full tank? 
 Very often Fairly often Neither Fairly seldom Very seldom 
2005 (289) 44 % 13 % 11 % 8 % 11 % 
2006 (151) 56 % 9 % 14 % 9 % 11 % 
2008 (225) 59 % 8 % 8 % 8 % 16 % 
2015 (202) 65 % 9 % 13 % 2 % 11 % 
 
Numbers in parentheses are total number of respondents by year. Shares not summing to 100% are 





Table B.4: Where do you purchase gasoline? 
 Same station every time 2 or 3 different stations More than 3 different stations 
2005 (289) 37 % 31 % 26 % 
2006 (151) 30 % 42 % 27 % 
2008 (225) 44 % 34 % 22 % 
2015 (202) 29 % 36 % 36 % 
 
Numbers in parentheses are total number of respondents by year. Shares not summing to 100% are 
due to non-response. 
 
Table B.5: Summary statistics. 
 
Mean Std.dev Min Max 
Timing 0.163 0.050 0.110 0.270 
Search 0.090 0.025 0.080 0.170 
Purchase at the same station 0.385 0.053 0.290 0.440 
Purchase at more than 3 stations 0.253 0.038 0.220 0.360 
Check price on the sign outside station 0.381 0.086 0.310 0.600 
Retail price increases on specific days of the week 0.469 0.130 0.350 0.810 
Fill full tank very often 0.530 0.078 0.440 0.650 
 
C Cross-sectional data 
Table C.1: Monday summary statistics in NOK per liter. 
 Mean Std.dev. Min Max 
21.04.2008 
    
Gross margins 8 a.m. 0.258 0.391 -0.435 1.170 
Gross margins 2 p.m. 1.465 0.078 1.316 1.635 
Recommended gross margins 1.438 0.071 1.361 1.553 
24.08.2015 
    
Gross margins 8 a.m. 1.576 0.182 0.642 1.890 
Gross margins 2 p.m. 2.734 0.089 2.586 2.842 
Recommended gross margins 2.760 0.040 2.706 2.794 
 





Table C.2: Thursday summary statistics in NOK per liter. 
 Mean Std.dev. Min Max 
27.08.2015 
    
Gross margins 8 a.m. 1.665 0.227 1.222 2.190 
Gross margins 2 p.m. 2.655 0.075 2.330 2.734 
Recommended gross margins 2.550 0.076 2.454 2.646 
03.09.2015 
    
Gross margins 8 a.m. 1.503 0.182 1.185 1.937 
Gross margins 2 p.m. 2.676 0.047 2.545 2.785 
Recommended gross margins 2.612 0.022 2.585 2.633 
n= 43 for 27.08.2015 and n=42 for 03.09.2015. 
 
Table C.3: Levene's test and Brown-Forsythe test for the equality of variances for real gross margins 
in 2008 and 2015. 
 Levene Brown-Forsythe 
8 a.m. 55.353*** 31.303*** 
2 p.m. 0.226 0.557 
 
H0: Population variances are equal. H1: Populations variances are different. Values are test statistics. 
Degrees of freedom are (1, 85). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Table C.4: Two-sample t-test with for real gross margins in 2008 and 2015. 
 Variance assumption Test statistics Degrees of freedom 
8 a.m. Unequal -20.090*** 59.086 1 
2 p.m. Equal -71.160*** 85 
 
H0: Population means are equal. H1 : Populations means are different. Values are test 





D Retail price determination 
Our research question heavily relies on the calendar based price cycle recognized in the 
Norwegian market. A theoretical framework illustrating the observed price behavior is given 
in Foros & Steen (2013), which suggests an explanation to how headquarters of gasoline 
companies manage to simultaneously increase retail prices to the recommended prices 
published online even for vertically separated outlets. This arrangement is depicted in Figure 
D.1. 
Figure D.1 Price support arrangements in the retail gasoline market. 
 
 
The upstream firm establishes a profit-sharing scheme consisting of two parts, dividing 
the margin 𝑝 − 𝑐 per liter of gasoline between itself and the downstream firm, where 𝑝 is the 
retail price and c is the upstream firm's input price, respectively.  
A maximum retail price maintenance (RPM hereafter) equal to the recommended price 
𝑝𝑟𝑝 is introduced in the first part of the agreement. If the retailer sets his price equal to the 
maximum RPM, the upstream firm charges him a wholesale price 𝑤𝑟𝑝 where 𝑤𝑟𝑝 < 𝑝𝑟𝑝, 
leaving the retailer with a margin 𝑀𝑟𝑝 =  𝑝𝑟𝑝 − 𝑤𝑟𝑝 per liter sold. The wholesale price exceeds 
the cost per liter of gasoline c, such that the upstream firm also receives a strictly positive profit. 




The second part is called price support, in which the retailer receives a margin 𝑀𝑝𝑠 <
 𝑀𝑟𝑝 if he sets the retail price below the maximum RPM. In contrast to the first part of the 
scheme, the upstream firm decides when the price support is in force.  
Therefore, if the upstream firm chooses 𝑤𝑟𝑝 so as to induce the retailer to set 𝑝 = 𝑝𝑟𝑝 
when the price support is inoperative, the profit sharing scheme essentially induces falling 
prices due to competition during the price support interrupted by immediate restorations when 
the support is withdrawn. Hence, theory suggests that symmetric cycles may be a result of the 
four upstream firms simultaneously deciding to disengage the price support on Mondays and 
Thursdays each week. Retailers are then effectively forced to set price equal to the 
recommended price in order to avoid negative margins. Price competition among sellers are 
thus only possible when the price support is in force, unless they want to operate with losses. 
Since the recommended prices across companies are close to identical, a deviation of a firm 
from the pricing rule will immediately be discovered by its rivals. Consequently, the 
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“…the stations’ gross margins naturally vary over time and depend on  
the local competition pressure.”  
 
Swedish Competition Authority (2013, p.128)   
1. Introduction 
The same pattern is present in most countries: Gasoline markets are highly concentrated 
upstream, consisting of tight oligopolies, but often with a dispersed downstream retail market 
where the individual gasoline stations are operated through various vertical contract 
arrangements. One important question raised is whether upstream market concentration restricts 
the level of competition downstream. The market structure has motivated much attention from 
both regulators and researchers, where pricing strategies and competition are studied.1 Local 
competition, brand identity and contractual arrangements are all factors that the literature has 
pointed to in the understanding of the competitive pressure in this market.  
We study the competitive situation in the gasoline retail sector, scrutinizing in particular 
the impact of local market conditions and station characteristics on stations’ competitive 
grounds. Specifically, in this paper we do the following. First, having access to detailed daily 
micro data at the station level, both on price and quantity, we estimate a structural model to 
uncover the degree of competition. Hence, we overcome one substantial limitation of previous 
studies, which, while endowed with rich price measures, often have to settle for aggregated 
quantity measures (see e.g. Noel, 2016 for a survey). In contrast, our volume and price data 
share the same frequency. Second, utilizing detailed knowledge on each station’s (i) brand 
identity and contractual arrangements, (ii) station amenities and (iii) local competition factors, 
we extend the model to analyze how these factors impact the competition level. We are thus 
able to address a relatively large but yet non-conclusive empirical literature on how competition 
in gasoline retailing relates to local station characteristics. Whereas most of the previous 
literature typically focuses on either one or two of these factors, we look at all three issues in 
this paper.2 
                                                          
1 For examples of government initiated studies, see for instance ACCC (2007) for the Australian market, the Irish 
CA (2003) for the Irish market and the Norwegian CA (2014) for the Norwegian market.  
2 Examples on local competition studies include Alderighi and Baudino (2015), Firgo et al. (2015), Hosken et al. 
(2008), Barron et al. (2004), Barron et al. (2007), Cooper and Jones (2007) and Clemenz and Gugler (2006). 
Examples on station amenities studies include Haucap et al. (2017), Hosken (2008) and Eckert and West (2005). 
Examples on brand identity and contractual forms studies include Verlinda (2008), Cooper and Jones (2007), 




We analyze the Swedish market, which shares features with most concentrated national 
gasoline markets. At the upstream level, the market consists of four major companies having 
99% of the market during the sample period. As in many other countries, antitrust concerns 
have been raised on several occasions. In 2005, the Swedish Market Court found the major oil 
companies guilty of illegal cooperation. They were sentenced for, among other things, 
coordinated rebate reductions, internal agreements not to compete for customers among 
themselves, and agreements on increasing the retail price (Swedish Market Court, 2005). As a 
result, the companies paid 112 million SEK in fines. Between 2007 and 2010, the market went 
through four major mergers, thereby increasing concentration further. Later, in 2012, due to 
worries on the potential lack of competition, the Swedish government required the Swedish 
Competition Authority (SCA) to initiate studies of the market structure in the industry.3  
We estimate a structural model of demand and supply at the retail level using the method 
suggested by Bresnahan (1982) and Lau (1982). Endowed with a panel of daily quantity and 
price data at the station level for a whole consecutive year (2012), together with detailed 
information on the competitive situation, including distance to competitors, number of stations, 
ownership and contractual status, station amenities and demography on local markets, we 
provide estimates of the degree of market power. The richness of the data, consisting of daily 
price and quantity measures for 180 sample stations, allows us to introduce structure into the 
model. 4 For the majority of previous literature, detailed volume data have been unavailable (as 
far as we are aware, exceptions are Slade, 1987 and Wang, 2009), restricting research to mainly 
study reduced form models using aggregate data. Others have employed proxies of quantity 
(e.g., Lewis, 2011), which are exposed to measurement errors. The gasoline market is divided 
into several local markets due to geographical restrictions; applying aggregate data might lead 
to imprecise insights into the local competition conditions. As such, we are in a favorable 
position to study the problem at hand. We get around both limitations in terms of measurement 
errors and aggregation biases, and, combined with information on local market characteristics 
and station amenities, we establish a yet unexplored channel of insights into a highly explored 
market. 
                                                          
3 As a result, the SCA initiated two studies of the competitive structure of the Swedish retail market, see Foros and 
Steen (2013) and Ganslandt and Rönnholm (2014). 
4 Our data originate from an analysis performed by Foros and Steen (2013) initiated by the SCA. To obtain 
sufficient micro information at the station level 180 stations were picked for the calendar year 2012. The data were 
collected by the NCA, and stations were chosen to be representative for the whole of the Swedish market. For 
instance, the analysis covered all companies for different regional areas in Sweden in terms of urban and regional 




Our demand estimates suggest an inelastic gasoline demand at the market level 
(significant negative elasticity of 0.72), which is in line with several other studies. The 
Bresnahan-Lau approach requires adding interaction terms between exogenous demand side 
variables and the retail price in the demand specification. Changes in these variables both shift 
and pivot the demand curve, hence the degree of market power is identified through these terms. 
Therefore, a critical requirement for this identification process to work empirically is that the 
exogenous demand variables chosen enter the demand equation in a well-behaved fashion. We 
use local income, local population and supply of public transportation in the region in these 
price interactions. They all come in significant, and produce reasonable and significant 
elasticities. The income elasticity suggests a normal good (elasticity=1.12) and an increased 
supply of public transportation reduces demand (elasticity=-0.44), suggesting substitutability, 
both elasticities also being significant. The interaction term with local population size is 
significant, and the elasticity suggests a marginal positive demand effect of 0.01, though not 
significant.  
Using the information from the demand estimates we identify market power through the 
estimated supply relations. We find that retailers do exercise some (significant) market power 
in the Swedish market, but despite the high upstream concentration, the market power is very 
limited on the downstream level. This result is in line with what others have found using much 
more aggregated data (Houde, 2012; Manuszak, 2009).  
Despite the very modest findings of market power, the competitive level varies 
significantly with local retail station characteristics. First, we estimate separate models where 
we control for the different characteristics in turn.  When it comes to local competition, we 
show that the degree of market power varies with both the distance to the nearest gasoline 
station and with the local density of stations. A station with no competitors within a distance of 
5 km or more, as compared to a station with the nearest competitor very close by (like 20 meters) 
has twice as high markup as the average station. High station density within a radius of 3 km 
also lowers market power. Gasoline station amenities are a potential source to differences in 
market power, as a higher level of service tends to raise a seller’s market power. In particular, 
we find that self-service stations have close to no market power. Finally, contractual form and 
brand identity seem to matter, too. However, we are not able to distinguish the effects fully in 
the sense that the only brand in our data which operates commissioned gasoline stations (and 
only such stations) also has a significantly higher markup than the other brands which 




When controlling for all three characteristics (local competition, amenities and 
brand/contractual form) in the same models simultaneously, our results generally indicate 
higher market power. Further, we find similar effects for the three groups of retail station 
characteristics as we do when estimating them separately. Indeed, there is one clear result: local 
station characteristics significantly affect the degree of market power for the local gasoline 
station. 
 To illustrate our results, we construct estimates for two stations with different local 
competitive characteristics. We show that differences in local station characteristics, even 
within the scope of the variation in our sample, have a large effect on local market power. The 
magnitude in these local differences implies that in some local markets, the station will be able 
to extract market power. In other markets, local competition factors will remove this possibility.  
Hence, we both establish the effects of local station characteristics on market power and 
show that these differences can more than offset the average market power found in the baseline 
model where we do not account directly for these effects on the estimated markup. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we discuss the literature on 
measurement of market power and provide an overview of the most common sources of market 
power in gasoline retailing. Section 3 presents the structural Bresnahan-Lau model, while 
Section 4 decribes the data and the industry. Section 5 presents the empirical specification of 
the Bresnahan-Lau model. The results are discussed in Section 6. Finally, Section 7 concludes. 
2. Literature review 
2.1 Measuring market power in gasoline retailing 
 
Previous literature suggests several factors that might impact local price competition in retail 
gasoline markets. These are mainly demographics, station amenities, contractual forms, and 
station location and density. The majority of empirical studies look at the retail price as a 
function of independent determinants and derive the potential effects on competition from these 
results. Data from several different countries, e.g. the US, Canada, Australia and European 
countries, are used. Our approach is to estimate the market power parameter directly by 
applying the oligopoly model by Bresnahan (1982) and Lau (1982). To the best of our 
knowledge, few papers estimate the degree of market power explicitly, and no study has yet 
used the Bresnahan-Lau method in examining gasoline retailing.5  
                                                          
5 See Bresnahan (1989) for a discussion of this model. Several studies have applied this methodology in various 




Further, as already emphasized, our price and quantity data are of daily frequency, at 
the station level and consecutive for a whole year, allowing us to obtain precise estimation of 
structural demand and supply models. Even though high-frequency price data are available in 
most retail markets, quantity data at the station level have so far been rare in the literature of 
gasoline retailing. As far as we are aware, the only exceptions are Slade (1987) and Wang 
(2009).  
A few papers estimate structural models of supply and demand in order to evaluate the 
degree of market power. Slade (1987) estimates demand, cost and reaction functions at the 
station level for the sake of modeling a repeated game approach to competition between 
stations. Using data on daily price, volume and cost figures from stations in Vancouver, Canada, 
she finds that the actual outcome is less profitable than the cooperative solution while more 
profitable than the non-cooperative solution, suggesting that sellers in this market exercise some 
market power. 
Houde (2012) considers stations close to the same commuter route as substitute stations 
as perceived by consumers. Estimating a model of spatial competition using bi-monthly station 
level data as well as data on road network structure for Quebec, Canada, he finds low markups 
and hence concludes that the degree of market power is low. With the use of monthly volume, 
price and station characteristics data from Hawaii, USA, Manuszak (2009) estimate a discrete 
choice model of demand and supply models for both the upstream- and the downstream market, 
and finds that the downstream market power is low.  
In addition, many studies relate the degree of market power of retailers to how retail 
prices and margins respond to changes in input prices. For instance, Borenstein and Shepard 
(1996) examine price patterns that are consistent with models of tacit collusion and find that 
retail margins are higher when the wholesale price is anticipated to fall as predicted by these 
models. Further, Borenstein et al. (1997) and Deltas (2008) relate asymmetric response of retail 
prices to wholesale price changes to market power of retailers by estimating lag adjustment 
models.    
                                                          
and McComb (2003), Shaffer (2002;1993) Suominen (1994), for petroleum: Considine (2001), for cement: 
Rosenbaum and Sukharomana (2001), for cigarettes: Delipalla and O’Donnel (2001), for beef processing: Muth 
and Wohlgenant (1999); for salmon: Steen and Salvanes (1999); for sugar: Genesove and Mullin (1998); for 
advertising: Jung and Seldon (1995), for lumber: Bernstein (1994), for coconut oil: Buschena and Perloff (1991) 




2.2 Sources of market power in gasoline retailing 
 
Local competition 
When it comes to local competition, studies have found ambiguous relations between station 
density and price. On the one hand, Barron et al. (2004), Barron and Waddel (2007) and 
Clemenz and Gugler (2006) show that higher station density tends to lower average prices, 
suggesting that a higher number of sellers raises local competition. This is in line with our 
findings, which propose that a seller’s market power decreases in the number of neighbour 
stations. Similarly, Alderighi and Baudino (2015) suggest that stations’ prices rely on neighbour 
stations’ prices within around 1km.  On the other hand, Hosken et al. (2008) find no relation. 
However, they show that price tends to increase with the distance to the closest station. 
Comparable results are found by Cooper and Jones (2007). We cannot directly relate our 
findings to these, as we do not examine the effect on price explicitly. Nonetheless, we show 
that a seller’s market power parameter tends to increase with the distance to the closest 
competitor and decrease with station density. Firgo et al. (2015) suggest that sellers who have 
a central location in a market relative to their competitors in a market have a stronger influence 
on pricing decisions of competitors and on the equilibrium market price. 
 
Station amenities 
Regarding the impact of station amenities on prices and competition, previous studies provide 
mixed results. Eckert and West (2005) find that local market structure and station characteristics 
affect sellers’ (uniform) price setting and suggest the presence of imperfect competition. 
Haucap et al. (2017) document that prices are positively related to station service levels. In 
contrast, Hosken et al. (2008) find no impact of station amenities.  
 
Brand identity and contractual forms  
Turning to the effect of contractual forms and brand identity, Eckert and West (2005) show that 
major brand stations with supplier control are more likely to set the market mode price, 
suggesting that the presence of vertically integrated major brand stations might increase 
incentives to tacitly collude. Cooper and Jones (2007) document that interbrand competition is 
more intensive than intrabrand competition. Hastings (2004) finds that the presence of 
independent retailers serves to decrease prices due to higher local price competition, while 
Verlinda (2008) finds that brand identity impacts how sellers respond to cost shocks, suggesting 





3. The Bresnahan-Lau model 
We make use of the Bresnahan-Lau model, after Bresnahan (1982) and Lau (1982). By 
simultaneous estimation of market demand and a cost relation, a parameter referring to the level 
of competition in the market is identifiable.  
Market demand is described by the function 
 𝑄 = 𝐷(𝑃, 𝑍; 𝛼) + 𝜖 (1) 
where 𝑄 is aggregate quantity, 𝑃 is price, 𝑍 is a vector of exogenous demand side variables, 𝛼 
a vector of parameters which are to be estimated and 𝜖 the error term. 
Under the assumption that sellers are profit maximizing, the structure of the supply side 
depends on whether sellers are price-takers or not. Under perfect competition, the first-order 
condition of the profit maximization problem leads to price equal to marginal cost 𝑐(·), which 
can be written as  
 𝑃 = 𝑐(𝑄, 𝑊; 𝛽) + 𝜂 (2) 
where 𝑊 is a vector of exogenous supply side variables, 𝛽 a vector of supply side parameters 
and 𝜂 the error term. However, if sellers are not price takers, perceived marginal revenue is set 
equal to marginal cost. The price relation is then6 
 𝑃 = 𝑐(𝑄, 𝑊; 𝛽) − 𝜆ℎ(𝑄, 𝑍;  𝛼) + 𝜂. (3) 







Hence, 𝑃 + ℎ(·) is industry marginal revenue while 𝑃 + 𝜆ℎ(·) is the seller’s perceived marginal 
revenue. 𝜆 can be interpreted as the industry average conjectural variation elasticity, where firm 












That is, 𝜆𝑖 measures firm 𝑖’s anticipated change in the output of all remaining firms following 
a change in its own output. Likewise, 𝜆 measures the industry’s average level of competition 
                                                          
6 Profit maximization at the industry level is (simplified by omitting vectors of explanatory variables and 
parameters) 𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑄  Π = 𝑄𝐷
−1(𝑄) − 𝐶(𝑄), where 𝐷−1(𝑄) is the inverse demand function and 𝐶(𝑄) the cost 
function. Solving for 𝑃 from the first-order condition yields  𝑃 = (𝜕𝐶(𝑄)/𝜕𝑄) − (𝜕𝐷−1(𝑄)/𝜕𝑄)𝑄. The average 
fraction of a firm’s industry profits is 𝜆, hence 𝑃 = (𝜕𝐶(𝑄)/𝜕𝑄) − 𝜆(𝜕𝐷−1(𝑄)/𝜕𝑄)𝑄, which is equivalent to Eq. 




and lies in the range [0,1] if it is to be given meaningful economic translation. 𝜆 = 0 thus 
implies perfect competition, 𝜆 = 1 implies a perfect cartel, while intermediate values refer to 
various sorts of oligopoly regimes. 
Bresnahan (1982) and Lau (1982) show that by interacting exogenous demand side 
variables 𝑍 with 𝑃 in the demand specification, changes in these variables both shift and pivot 
the demand curve such that 𝜆 can be econometrically identified. Formally, assuming that both 
the demand function and the marginal cost function are linear, the latter of which is given by 
𝑐(·) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑄 + 𝛽2𝑊, the simultaneous equation system consisting of the demand and 
supply relation is7 
 𝑄 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑃 + 𝛼2𝑍 + 𝛼3𝑃𝑍 + 𝜖 (6) 
 
𝑃 = 𝛽0 − 𝜆 [
𝑄
𝛼1 + 𝛼3𝑍
] + 𝛽1𝑄 + 𝛽2𝑊 + 𝜂. 
(7) 
By first estimating Eq. (6) of the equation system, 𝛼1 and 𝛼3 can be treated as known 
parameters. In Eq. (7), there are two included endogenous variables, 𝑄 and 𝑄∗ = 𝑄/(𝛼1 +
𝛼3𝑍), and two excluded exogenous variables, 𝑍 and 𝑃𝑍. The term 𝛼3𝑍 allows separation 
between 𝑄 and 𝑄∗ = 𝑄/(𝛼1 + 𝛼3𝑍) and hence identification of 𝜆.  If 𝑃𝑍 is omitted in Eq. (6), 
𝑄∗ = 𝑄/𝛼1. Then, we would have two structural parameters 𝜆 and 𝛽1, but only one estimate 
based on the coefficient of 𝑄. The supply relation is still identified, but we would not know 
whether we have to do with the case of 𝑃 = 𝑐(·) or 𝑀𝑅 = 𝑐(·). Hence, inclusion of the 
interaction term 𝑃𝑍 is crucial for identification of the level of competition in the market. 
The Bresnahan-Lau model along with other conjectural variation (CV) models received 
critique in the late nineties for being atheoretical, in particular from Corts (1999). His argument 
is that inference regarding the extent of market power cannot be made without specifying 
underlying behavior. More specifically, he argues that the mapping between equilibrium 
variation and the equilibrium value of the elasticity-adjusted price cost margin is not valid, 
unless average and marginal responses of margins to demand shifters are the same. However, 
at the same time Genesove and Mullin (1998) assessed actual, as opposed to potential, bias in 
CV models as predicted by Corts, using data on observed costs and margins in the sugar refining 
industry. The sugar refining industry’s very simple fixed coefficient technology serves as an 
                                                          
7 Note that the inverse demand function is 𝐷−1(𝑄) = (𝑄 − 𝛼0 − 𝛼2𝑍)/(𝛼1 + 𝛼3𝑍). Hence, ℎ(·) =
𝑄(𝜕𝐷−1(𝑄, 𝑍; 𝛼)/𝜕𝑄) =  𝑄(1/(𝛼1 + 𝛼3𝑍)).  Marginal revenues are  𝑀𝑅 = (𝜕(𝑄 × 𝑃)/𝜕𝑄) = 𝑃 + ℎ(·) = 𝑃 +
 𝑄/(𝛼1 + 𝛼3𝑍). If there is monopoly pricing, the equilibrium condition is 𝑐(·) = 𝑀𝑅, and solving for 𝑃 we obtain 
𝑃 = 𝛽0 − (𝑄/(𝛼1 + 𝛼3𝑍)) + 𝛽1𝑄 + 𝛽2𝑊. It follows that the econometric specification for supply is  𝑃 = 𝛽0 −





objective benchmark to the estimated models. They find that estimated and actual cost margins 
are quite close, and the potential bias as suggested by Corts very small, if even existing, which 
they argue favors the atheoretical CV model. They directly address Corts’ argument (p.369): 
“The proper test of a methodology is not the correctness of its assumptions, however, but its 
success or failure in doing what it is meant to do. So while acknowledging the failure of an 
assumption to hold, we examine how well the methodology does in reproducing the full-
information estimates of conduct and cost”. In a very recent study discussing among other 
things the CV models, Aquirregabiria and Slade (2017) also conclude accordingly. The 
Bresnahan-Lau and Genesove- Mullin conduct approach is thus still valid as an empirical way 
of measuring market power. It was recently applied in an empirical study of pass-through, 
where Weyl and Fabinger (2013) postulate a model where the elasticity-adjusted Lerner index 
is set equal to a conduct parameter in the fashion of Bresnahan (1989) and Genesove and Mullin 
(1998). 
  
4. Overview of industry and data  
4.1 Industry characteristics 
During the sample period, there are four major companies in the Swedish market; Statoil 
Fuel & Retail AB (operating the brands Statoil and Jet), St1 Energy AB (operating the brands 
St1 and Shell), OK-Q8 AB and Preem AB.8 These four companies run 2 416 of 2 716 retail 
stations (Ganslandt and Rönnholm, 2014).  Statoil Fuel & Retail AB has a market share in 
volume of gasoline of 34.9%, St1 Energy AB of 22.6%, OK-Q8 of 27.9% and Preem AB of 
14.2% (SPBI, 2013). In total, the four majors have a market share of over 99%, and the 
Herfindahl index of the industry is 2 173, suggesting that the market is concentrated.9 The 
majority of retail stations are vertically integrated in the sense that the upstream company owns 
the stations and is responsible for running them. The rest of the stations are either commissioned 
agent stations, franchise stations or dealer owned stations.10 
                                                          
8 Of these brands, Jet and St1 only operate self-serviced retail stations. 
9 Typically, the other stations are small. As opposed to the 99.6% market share in volumes, the four firms have 
more than ten percentage points fewer stations (89%). 
10 In gasoline retailing, the most common contract types are (i) company-owned contracts, which correspond to 
full vertical integration, (ii) franchising contracts which assign some control to the upstream firm, and (iii) open-





Market power is a highly relevant issue in this industry, hence assessing the degree of 
competition in the market is important. This is underlined both by the vast existing general 
literature on the topic, and, more specifically, by a high focus on the part of the regulators on 
competition challenges in the Swedish gasoline market. In 2005 the Swedish Market Court 
found the major oil companies were found of illegal cooperation during the year 1999. They 
were penalized for, among other things, coordinated rebate reductions in order to sort customers 
into different groups, internal agreements not to compete for customers among themselves, and 
agreements on increasing the retail price (Swedish Market Court, 2005). Common for these 
actions was their potential to soften competition. In total, the companies paid 112 million SEK 
in fines.11 At that time, there were six major companies operating; OK-Q8 (market share 
26.20%), Statoil (24.0%), Shell (16.70%), Hydro (11.9%), Preem (10.90%) and Jet (8.3%) 
(Foros and Steen, 2013). This corresponds to a Herfindahl index of 1 874, which is lower than 
the 2012 level. The growth in concentration is mainly due to four major mergers taking place 
between 2007 and 2010.12 This also led to steadily increasing gross margins over the period by 
around 30%.13 Later, in 2012, and partly due to this development and worries about the potential 
lack of competition, the SCA was required by the government to initiate studies of the market 
structure in this market.14   
 
4.2 Data 
The data period is 1 January 2012 to 31 December 2012 and the sample consists of 180 
stations. Sample stations are from four different geographical regions. These are «larger cities» 
(Stockholm, Gothenburg and Malmo, the respective first, second, and third largest cities in 
Sweden), «smaller cities» (cities with population of between 33 000 and 80 000), «E6 
highway»15 and «rural areas» (population below 10 000). Regions can be subdivided into 
counties and municipalities.16 An overview of station and municipality distribution for the 
sample is provided in Table 1. 
                                                          
11 In 2005, one US dollar was worth between 6.8 and 7.6 SEK.  
12 In 2007, Statoil acquired Norsk Hydro, in 2008 Statoil acquired Jet from Conoco Phillips, in 2009 St1 acquired 
158 automat stations from Statoil, and in 2010 St1 bought Shell (Ganslandt and Rönnholm, 2014). 
13 See report by the Swedish Competition Authorities (2013), in particular Figure 3.11, p 123. 
14 As a result, the Swedish CA initiated two studies of the competitive structure of the Swedish gasoline retail 
market, see Foros and Steen (2013) and Ganslandt and Rönnholm (2014). 
15 E6 is a part of the international E-road network. We consider it a separate geographical region as customers who 
frequent stations along the highway mostly are busy highway commuters. Further, it is likely that demand around 
highways is more variable in relation to weekends and holidays.  
16 Sweden is divided into 21 counties and 290 municipalities. Some counties are represented in several of the 
geographical regions because the E6 highway is located near several larger and smaller cities. Our sample consists 




Table 1: Station and municipality distribution across geographical regions. 
Region Number of stations Number of municipalities 
Larger cities 81 8 
Smaller cities 32 6 
E6 highway 26 9 
Rural areas 41 28 
Total 180 51 
 
Information on station characteristics and facilities includes the distance to the nearest, 
second nearest and third nearest competitor, as well as which company a station belongs to. 
These data are obtained from the firms through the SCA. From the information on distance to 
the nearest competitors, we compute the number of stations within three km from each seller, 
which we use as a measure of station density. Further, a carwash indicator and a self-service 
indicator are obtained from the petroleum companies’ websites.17 
Table 2: Overview of data definition and sources. 
Data definition Variable name Level Frequency Source 
95 octane gasoline retail price 
per liter 
P Station Daily SCA 
Volume in liters sold of 95 
octane gasoline 
Q Station Daily SCA 
Rotterdam wholesale price per 
liter (Platts) 
Wholesale price Industry Daily SCA 
Brand Brand Station Yearly SCA 




Station Yearly SCA 
Number of stations within 3 
km radius 
Station density Station Yearly SCA 
Average disposable income in 
1000 SEK 
Y Municipality Yearly Statistics 
Sweden 
Population number in 1000 Population Municipality Quarterly Regional 
Facts 
Supply of public transportation 
in 1000 kilometers per capita  
Public 
transportation 
County Yearly STA 
 
We assemble data on demographics from ‘Regional Facts’, data on average disposable 
income18 from Statistics Sweden, and data on public transportation19 from the Swedish 
                                                          
17 Some facility information is accessed in 2017. Hence, we implicitly assume that these facilities are the same in 
2017 as in 2012. 
18Disposable income is measured as the sum of all tax deductible and non-tax deductible income subtracted taxes 
and other negative transfers. 
19 The supply of public transportation measured in kilometers is the sum of kilometers driven by buses, trains, 




Transport Analysis (STA) based on the stations’ location, using their addresses. These data are 
either at the municipality or the county level and are either quarterly or yearly data. A complete 
overview of data and sources as presented in Table 2.  
 
 
Figure 1: Average weekly retail price for each geographical region (left axis) and wholesale price 
(right axis). Sample period is 1 January 2012 to 31 December 2012. 
 
Figure 2: Average weekly quantity sold at the station level in different geographical regions. Sample 








































































Figure 1 depicts the retail price averaged over stations within each geographical region. Prices 
across regions are quite similar, but, rural areas have slightly higher prices than other regions 
in most parts of the sample period. Prices are highest during the spring and autumn months, and 
fluctuations seem to follow those observed in the wholesale price. On the other hand, as shown 
in Figure 2, the average quantity sold for stations varies more across regions as compared to 
prices. Average quantity sold per station is highest in the cities and the E6 highway, while 
lowest in rural areas. Volumes resemble the population in these areas, as more inhabitants 
naturally lead to higher consumption of fuel. The E6 highway is one of the main commuting 
highways in Sweden, which explains the high average volume sold in this region. Further, the 
summer holiday season stands out for the E6 highway with an upward peak in the volume sold 
in the summer months (July and August) due to increased traffic. Descriptive statistics of the 
main variables are presented in Table 3. 
Table 3: Statistical properties of main variables (number of stations n=180). 
Variable name Mean St.dev. Min Max 
P 14.755 0.473 13.300 15.950 
Q 5190.336 3775.662 11.000 29833.630 
Wholesale price 5.394 0.358 4.800 6.151 
Y 384.522 58.941 295.700 616.700 
Public transportation 81.407 18.257 31.707 114.630 
Population 244.058 277.776 3.196 881.235 
Number of stations 49.951 33.322 4 122 
Distance to competitor 1.819 3.731 0.020 30 
Station density 2.396 1.416 0 4 
Carwash 0.307 0.461 0 1 
Self-service 0.364 0.481 0 1 
Vertically integrated 0.761 0.426 0 1 
Commissioned agent  0.205 0.403 0 1 
Franchise 0.011 0.106 0 1 
Independent 0.023 0.149 0 1 
 
5. Empirical specification of the Bresnahan Lau model 
The first equation in our simultaneous equation system is the demand function 
 𝑄𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝒛
′𝜶𝒛 + 𝑃𝑖𝑡𝒛
′𝜶𝑷𝒛 + 𝒙
′𝜶𝒙 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡, (8) 
where 𝑖 indexes station and 𝑡 indexes day of the week. 𝑄𝑖𝑡 is the daily volume sold in liters and 
𝑃𝑖𝑡  is the price per liter at station 𝑖 at time t. In the theory section, we showed that the inclusion 
of interactions between variables in 𝒛 and 𝑃𝑖𝑡 are crucial for the identification of the supply side 
equation, and that the choice of 𝒛-variables hence identifies the markup in the Bresnahan-Lau 




include from neither the theoretical nor the empirical literature on the Bresnahan-Lau model. 
Typically, one chooses variables that from theory are believed to both be exogenous to quantity 
demanded and very likely shift demand. There are several candidates used in the literature, but 
the most commonly used variable is either related to factors believed to affect demand through 
income or market size, or variables related to substitute products.20 The 𝒛-variables validity are 
empirically evaluated in these models based on two factors, whether they enter significantly in 
the estimated demand equation and whether the demand elasticities where these 𝒛-variables 
enter predict reasonable values according to theory and market characteristics. In our case, we 
choose 𝒛 as a 𝐾 × 1 column vector of exogenous variables consisting of average disposable 
income, average disposable income squared and the population in the municipality. Increased 
disposable income is believed to shift the demand curve for gasoline outwards, likewise will 
gasoline demand increase with population. Furthermore, we introduce a variable representing 
a substitute, by including the number of 1000 kilometers driven by public transportation per 
capita in 𝒛 . Gasoline as a fuel does not have any obvious substitutes, thus we are not able to 
include the price of a substitute good in 𝒛. Nonetheless, the use of public transportation is a 
substitute for car consumption and as such serves a similar function as a substitute price. Hence, 
in we include four interaction terms, three that relates to income and market size, and one 
variable representing a substitute variable.  
We also include additional exogenous variables which do not interact with 𝑃𝑖𝑡 in the 
𝐾 × 1 column vector 𝒙, consisting of the number of stations in the regional county, distance to 
the nearest competitor and a dummy for whether station 𝑖 is self-serviced or not. In addition, 𝒙 
includes a full set of day-of-the-week dummy variables using Monday as baseline, a full set of 
month dummy variables using January as baseline, and a full set of region dummy variables 
(Foros and Steen, 2013). We include three regional dummy variables, one for smaller cities, 
one for rural areas and one for E6 highway stations. The larger cities serve as reference 
category. A complete overview of variable definitions, data source, granularity and frequency 
                                                          
20 Prices of substitute goods and income are commonly applied as 𝒛-variables in studies of commodity markets 
(e.g., Steen and Salvanes, 1999; Buschena and Perloff, 1991; Rosenbaum and Sukharomana, 2001). Time trends 
and seasonal factors have also been applied (e.g., Buschena and Perloff, 1991; Considine, 2001). In the banking 
literature, market interest rates, which serve as substitute prices, and GDP, a measure of macroeconomic activity, 
are used (e.g., Toolsema, 2002; Shaffer, 1993, 1994; Suominen, 1994). Graf and Wozabal (2013) use a temperature 
index as an exogenous demand rotator in their study of electricity markets. Jung and Seldon (1995) include the 





is presented in Section 4. Finally, 𝜖𝑖𝑡 is the idiosyncratic error term representing unobserved 
factors which have an impact on the quantity demanded on each station. 
The supply specification is 
 
 𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝜆𝑄𝑖𝑡
∗ + 𝛽1𝑄𝑖𝑡 + 𝒘




∗ = −𝑄𝑖𝑡/(𝛼1 + 𝒛
′𝜶𝑷𝒛). 𝒘 is a 𝐾 × 1 column vector of exogenous supply side 
variables consisting of the daily wholesale price, a dummy for whether station 𝑖 offers carwash 
or not, a dummy for whether station 𝑖 is self-serviced or not, a full set of month dummy 
variables, a full set of region dummy variables, contractual form dummies and a full set of brand 
dummy variables.21  𝜂𝑖𝑡 is the idiosyncratic error term which represents unobserved differences 
in sellers’ marginal costs while 𝑄𝑖𝑡 is the actual quantity sold at station 𝑖 on day 𝑡.
22  
A fundamental endogeneity problem arises as quantity demanded affects the price 
sellers set, while price setting also affects the quantity demanded by consumers. Hence, the two 
variables of interest are simultaneously determined within the model, causing 𝑃𝑖𝑡 to be 
correlated with 𝜖𝑖𝑡 in Eq. (8) and, likewise, 𝑄𝑖𝑡 to be correlated with 𝜂𝑖𝑡 in Eq. (9). To correct 
for the biases, we apply two stage least squares (2SLS). We use the wholesale price as an 
instrumental variable for 𝑃𝑖𝑡 in the demand equation. In the supply relation, the variables 
included in 𝒛 are used as instrumental variables for 𝑄𝑖𝑡.   
We use the wholesale price as an instrument for 𝑃𝑖𝑡 because the wholesale price is the 
main input cost for gasoline and is hence a valid instrument.23 Further, there is no obvious direct 
relationship between the cost of input factors and the quantity demanded in the retail market, 
implying that the wholesale price is uncorrelated with 𝜖𝑖𝑡. This instrument thus generates 
exogenous variation related to 𝑃𝑖𝑡 which we can take advantage of when estimating the impact 
of the retail price on quantity demanded. 𝑄𝑖𝑡 is instrumented by the 𝒛 variables; namely the 
average disposable income, the average disposable income squared, the size of the local 
population and the regional supply of public transportation. These variables are all good 
candidates as they directly influence gasoline consumption through a positive income or 
                                                          
21 The variables included in 𝒘 have an impact on a seller’s marginal costs. Consequently, by using 𝑃𝑖𝑡  as the left 
hand side variable we can estimate the supply relation without knowing marginal costs.  
22 In order to estimate the equations and impose market clearing, we assume that prices clear the market, allowing 
us to treat 𝑄𝑖𝑡 as the equilibrium quantity. We believe this is a reasonable assumption to make since the Swedish 
retail market is not under governmental regulation neither at the demand, nor the supply side during the sample 
period. 
23 Swedish oil companies are price takers in the European gasoline market.  The correlation between the instrument 




negative substitution effect, and through the fact that an increase in the population increases the 
demand for cars and fuel. However, they have no clear partial effect on the retail price or factors 
determining sellers’ marginal costs, therefore being uncorrelated with 𝜂𝑖𝑡. 
Data differ in various dimensions. The main variables Q and P vary from day to day and 
between stations. Wholesale price varies from day to day. Station characteristics are fixed over 
time, but have significant variation across stations. The remaining independent variables vary 
across either municipality or county, but are fixed over time.24 In order to use all within and 
between variation across different dimensions, we use pooled OLS as an estimation method 
(Baltagi and Griffin, 1983). First, we estimate Eq. (8) using two-stage least squares in order to 
find the best linear combination of instrumental variables.  Next, we use the estimated 
parameters from Eq. (8) to calculate 𝑄∗. Finally, we estimate Eq. (9), again using two-stage 
least squares.  
                                                          




6. Empirical results 
6.1 Market power in the Swedish retail gasoline market 
 
Demand 
Results for the demand equation (8) together with elasticities are presented in Table 4.25 All 
four 𝒛-variables come in significant, both alone and through the interaction terms, confirming 
empirically that they can be used for identifying markup in the supply relation. Due to the 
interaction terms, parameter values and corresponding signs give little direct intuition. 
Elasticities are therefore a better measure in order to gain intuition, and to validate the chosen 
demand variables to interact with price.  
The average price elasticity is estimated to be -0.72 and is significant, implying that 
gasoline demand is downward sloping and inelastic to responses in fuel price. The income 
elasticity is positive, significant and slightly larger than one (1.11), meaning that gasoline is a 
normal good.26 Results are within the range of elasticities found in other demand studies.27 
Further, as εY is higher than εP, holding all other factors fixed, the demand for gasoline will 
increase for proportional increases in income and price.  
The elasticity of public transportation proposes that better access to public transportation 
lowers the gasoline demand with a negative significant elasticity of -0.44. Hence, public 
transportation is a substitute for car travel, although not a perfect one. The population elasticity 
is marginally positive, though not significant. Being careful in interpreting a low insignificant 
number, this still suggests that the number of licensed drivers rises with population, which in 
turn increases the gasoline consumption. Contrary to expectations, although elasticities are 
small, the effect of the number of stations is positive, while the effect of the distance to 
competitor is negative. Larger markets typically have more stations, which suggests higher 
market demand. Likewise, in a dense market, the distance to the closest competitor is lower 
than in less dense markets, where the distance between outlets is larger. This we attribute to our 
control for market size, which is defined at the regional level, and thus very likely too wide to 
  
                                                          
25 Consider the simplified demand equation; 𝑄 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑃 + 𝛼𝑧𝑍 + 𝛼𝑃𝑍𝑃𝑍. Then, the elasticity of Z is given by 
𝜖𝑍 = (𝛼𝑍 + 𝛼𝑃𝑍𝑃)(𝑍/𝑄), where we use sample means of P, Z and Q. 
26 When testing the hypothesis H0: εY=1, we reject the hypothesis at the 1% level. Thus, the income elasticity is 
significantly higher than 1. 
27 See e.g. the survey by Basso and Oum (2007), as well as Johansson and Schipper (1997) and Baltagi and Griffin 


















Number of stations 10.114*** 
 (0.761) 




P × Y -594.20*** 
 (73.642) 
P × Y2 0.678*** 
 (0.084) 
P × Public Transportation -52.219*** 
 (10.518) 




















Day of the week dummies YES 
Month dummies YES 
Region dummies YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors of elasticities are calculated 
using the delta method. Sample period is 1 January 2012 to 31 December 2012. 
fully account for all cross-market differences. The local market effects instead turn out through 




Focusing on the interaction terms, we see that coefficients are strongly significant, 
which is important in order to identify the coefficient of Q* in the supply equations. In total, 
the demand function behaves well and proposes plausible predictions. 
 
Supply 
Turning to the supply relation, baseline estimation results of Eq. (9) are presented in Table 5. 
All variables come in significantly and with anticipated signs. The marginal effects are difficult 
to interpret directly and we have therefore provided elasticities in the table as well. Marginal 
costs are increasing in Q, but only marginally (elasticity=0.002).  
Table 5: 2SLS estimation results of Eq. (9) and corresponding elasticities. 


























Month dummies YES 
Region dummies YES 
Brand dummies YES 
Contractual form dummies YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors of elasticities are calculated 
using the delta method. Sample period is 1 January 2012 to 31 December 2012. 
 
Increases in the wholesale price also raises costs (elasticity=0.39), but due to the high data 




variables both influence costs; self-service reduces costs (elasticity=-0.002), whereas car-wash 
facilities increase costs (elasticity=0.002).28 
Scrutinizing the markup parameter, the model predicts 𝜆 to be significant and larger than 
zero, but very low.  An estimate of 0.005 suggests that Swedish gasoline retailing is not a pure 
competition market. This is in line with several other studies that find that despite high upstream 
concentration, the retail level does experience competition, e.g., Houde (2012), Manuszak 
(2009) and Slade (1987). This suggests that even though the market is highly concentrated as 
there are few brands present in the Swedish market, there is sufficient competition between 
sellers at the retail level.29  
However, in the baseline model we do not identify to which extent potential effects on 
the firms’ markup level depend on station characteristics. The literature points in particular to 
three groups of station characteristics that might influence the level of market power locally; (i) 
local competition level, (ii) station amenities and (iii) brand identity and contract forms. We 
will look at these groups in turn below.   
 
6.2 Sources of local market power  
 
Local competition 
To analyze the effects of local competition, we estimate modified supply relations (Eq. 
(9)) where we interact Q* with variables that measure local competition. The variables are 
alternative measures of closeness to competitors. The first is distance to competitor, and the 
second is station density. Results are presented in Table 6. 30 
Both models perform in the same manner as our baseline model. The new interaction 
terms both suggest that local competition level influences market power. The larger the distance 
to the nearest competitor, the higher is the market power. Likewise, the more stations within 
the close vicinity, the less market power is attainable for the stations. 
  
                                                          
28 The instruments perform well in both models. The 1st stage adjusted R2 of Eq. (8) and (9) are 0.999 and 0.689 
for the demand function and the supply relation, respectively. 
29 According to Corts (1999), the CV models perform poorly only when the estimated market power as measured 
by 𝜆 is large (Genesove and Mullin, 1998). We find only a very modest level of market power. 
30 There are fewer observations used in the estimation of the models in Table 6 because information about distance 
to the nearest sellers is missing for some stations. We do not replace missing values in order to avoid smoothing 
effects. However, results are qualitatively the same when replacing missing values with the mean value for each 




Table 6: 2SLS estimation results of Eq. (9) with inclusion of interactions between Q* and local 
competition measures. 
 Distance to competitor Station  
density 
   
Q 0.000005*** 0.000007*** 
 (0.000001) (0.000001) 
Wholesale price 1.062*** 1.063*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) 
Q* 0.005*** 0.008*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0004) 
Q*×Distance to competitor 0.001***  
 (0.0005)  
Q*×Station density  -0.001*** 
  (0.0001) 
Carwash 0.086*** 0.085*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
Self-service -0.066*** -0.062*** 
 (0.023) (0.023) 
Constant 8.967*** 8.951*** 
 (0.037) (0.037) 
   
Q* + Q*×Distance to competitor 0.005***  
 (0.0003)  
Q* + Q*×Station density  0.007*** 
  (0.0003) 
   
εQ 0.002*** 0.003*** 
 (0.0004) (0.0004) 
εWholesale price 0.388*** 0.389*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
εCarwash 0.002*** 0.002*** 
 (0.00007) (0.00006) 
εSelfservice -0.002*** -0.002*** 
 (0.0006) (0.0006) 
   
Observations 58,345 58,345 
R-squared 0.843 0.843 
Month dummies YES YES 
Region dummies YES YES 
Brand dummies YES YES 
Contractual form dummies YES YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors of elasticities are calculated 
using the delta method. Sample period is 1 January 2012 to 31 December 2012. 
 
Taking a closer look at the coefficients, we can get an idea of how sizeable the effect of local 
competition is. The distance to competitor coefficient is 0.001 and the interpretation is as 
follows: If the distance to the nearest rival of seller i increases by one km, seller i’s markup 
increases with 0.001. Hence, the total effect of Q* for a station with a distance of one km to its 




the markup according to the distance to the closest competitor. The average station in our 
sample is located 1.82 km from its closest competitor. The distance variable has, however, a 
rather high variation, and varies from 0.02 to 30 km across all stations in the sample. This 
implies for instance, that if we compare a station with no competitors closer than 5 km to a 
station with a next-door neighbour station, the baseline markup parameter from Table 5 is 
doubled. Obviously, though one should be careful with the interpretation when we are far away 
from the mean value, rural stations are typically a long distances away from their neighbours, 
and they will have substantially more market power than those who have close competitors.  
This suggests that the longer the distance between outlets, the higher market power each 
seller will have because the fuel they offer is more horizontally differentiated from the 
consumers’ point of view. Intuitively, a la Hotelling (1929), the further the distance to the 
closest competitor, the more consumers are in seller i’s “backyard” and hence regard seller i as 
the most preferred seller, other things equal.  
In column (B), we interact Q* with station density. The baseline estimate of 𝜆 is now 
0.008, and slightly higher compared to the benchmark; however it is still small, but positive and 
significant. The interaction-term coefficient is negative, implying that if seller i faces an 
additional outlet within its neighbourhood (3 km radius), its market power decreases to 0.008 
+ (-0.001) = 0.007. One possible explanation to this is that the higher the station density, the 
more stations are within each consumer’s reach and so each seller’s good has more substitutes. 
Other things equal, increasing spatial competition thus reduces each seller’s market power. 
However, the station density variable has less variation than the distance to competitor variable, 
with a minimum of zero, a maximum of 4, and an average of 2.4. This implies that the maximum 
scope for this variable (4×-0.001) is lower than for the distance to competitor variable. This 
gives some support to the findings of Hosken et al. (2008), namely that nearness to the closest 
competitor is more important than density.  
 In total, results indicate that raising the density of stations or lowering distance between 
sellers have a detrimental effect on each seller’s markup and hence a positive effect on local 
competition. These findings are in line with those of Barron et al. (2004), Barron et al. (2007) 
and Clemenz and Gugler (2006).  
 
Station Amenities 
We move on to examine station amenities. From Table 1 we see that for our price and quantity 
observations, 31% of our sample have carwash amenities, 36% are self-service stations and 




differences in service level affect market power.  Using the full service stations without carwash 
amenities as reference category, we interact Q* with carwash and self-service and estimate the 
supply relation (Eq. (9)). We present the results in Table 7.  
Table 7: 2SLS estimation results of Eq. (9) with inclusion of interactions between Q* and station 
amenities. 



















Q* + Q*×Carwash 0.01*** 
 (0.0003) 














Month dummies YES 
Region dummies YES 
Brand dummies YES 
Contractual form dummies YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors of elasticities are calculated 
using the delta method. Sample period is 1 January 2012 to 31 December 2012. 
 
Again, we find signs, parameter magnitudes and significance as in our baseline model. 




markup (𝜆) of 0.011. Our results imply that there is no significant difference in markup for the 
full service stations with carwash. These have the same markup as the full service stations 
without carwash. On the other hand, the self-service stations have a significantly lower markup 
than the others. The interaction term between Q* and selfservice is significant and sizeable, 
suggesting that self-service stations have close to no markup. The estimate is still positive and 
significant at a 5%-level, but as low as 0.0006. 
  This suggests that market power increases with station service level. One explanation is 
that a seller might be able to charge a markup that covers more than the actual cost of providing 
service to customers. Our findings have some similarities to the results of Haucap et al. (2017), 
who show that carwash facilities affect retail prices positively, while stations without store 
facilities, tend to have lower prices.31  
Our results are also in line with Eckert and West (2005) who find that station characteristics 
affect sellers’ price setting, this as opposed to Hosken et al. (2008) who do not find any impact 
of station amenities on market power. 
 
Brand identity and contractual forms 
Several studies have argued that brand identity and contractual forms affect the stations’ 
performance. In Table 8 we allow 𝜆 to vary with brand identity. Again, parameters, significance 
and elasticities are similar to those of our baseline model, and the explanation power is 
marginally increased.  
Preem has a higher 𝜆 than the other brands (0.012), followed by OK-Q8 (0.01), Shell 
(0.009), Statoil (0.009), St1 (0.003), and lastly, Jet (-0.0005). All estimates except that of Jet 
are highly significant. This latter result is in line with the finding that self-service stations do 
not have any markup: Jet stations are all self-service stations. Related to this result, it is 
interesting to note that the other self-service brand, St1, has only one third of the markup as 
compared to the others, but here the positive markup estimate is significant. One possible 
explanation is that St1 and Shell have a common owner, and, as such, some of Shell’s brand 
name effect potentially carries over to St1. Statoil has owned the Jet stations since 2008, but Jet 
has a very long prior history of being the low-price market challenger, suggesting that it is 
harder for Jet than St1 to increase its prices in 2012. 
  
                                                          





Table 8: 2SLS estimation results of Eq. (9) with inclusion of interactions between Q* and brand 
identity dummies. 
 Brand identity 
Q 0.000006*** 
 (0.000001) 




















Q* + Q*×Preem 0.012*** 
 (0.0005) 
Q* + Q*×Okq8 0.01*** 
 (0.0004) 
Q* + Q*×Shell 0.009*** 
 (0.0009) 
Q* + Q*×Jet -0.0005 
 (0.0003) 













Month dummies YES 
Region dummies YES 
Brand dummies YES 
Contractual form dummies YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors of elasticities are calculated 





The finding of higher Preem margins is at first glance surprising all the time they have 
less than half the market share (14%) of both Statoil/Jet (35%) and OK-O8 (28%). However, 
Preem has a similar market share in terms of the number of stations as OK-Q8 and Statoil/Jet 
and has a significantly higher market share for diesel.32 In our sample, Preem is also different 
in terms of which type of retail stations are represented. Even though commissioned stations 
are common in all the companies running full-service stations (Swedish Competition 
Authorities, 2013), in our sample, Preem only operates commissioned agent stations. The other 
five brands’ stations are all typically fully vertically integrated outlets.33 Thus, a potential 
explanation for the higher Preem markup is the contractual form they have chosen. 
Unfortunately, we are not able to distinguish between the brand identity effect and the 
contractual form effect since no other brands are using commissioned agent contracts in our 
sample. It is, however, not unreasonable to attribute some of this Preem-effect to the contractual 
form given their smaller market share.  
 
Combining local competition, station amenities and brand identity 
We learned above that three characteristics stand out. First, local competition, both measured 
by closeness to the next gasoline station and by the local density of stations, matters to the 
amount of market power extracted by the gasoline stations. Second, station amenities are 
important, especially whether the station is fully serviced or not. Third, we saw that Preem 
stands out, experiencing significant higher markups than the others, which might be due to their 
different contact structure in our sample, operating only commissioned agent stations. 
 Now we combine these three characteristics, local competition, station amenities and 
controlling for Preem, in the same models. Since local competition is controlled for in two 
different fashions (refer Table 6), In Table 9 we estimate two supply relations, one where we 
interact Q* with distance to the closest competitor and the other two characteristics, the other 
interacting Q* with station density and these other two characteristics.  
 As before, the models have similar predictions as the baseline model when it comes to 
magnitudes for cost parameters and elasticities. The models also have higher explanatory power 
than the baseline model in Table 5.  
  
                                                          
32 OK-Q8, Preem and Statoil/Jet had between 600 and 700 stations in 2012. They also sold around a third of the 
diesel in Sweden in 2012 (Swedish Competition Authorities, 2013). 
33 We have 38 Preem stations in our sample, making up 21% of the sample. The remaining 142 stations are run by 
the other five brands, whereof as many as 136 are fully vertically integrated (96%). In our sample we only see 2 




Table 9: 2SLS estimation results of Eq. (9) combining local competition, station amenities and brand 
identity/contractual form. 




   
Q 0.000005*** 0.000008*** 
 (0.000001) (0.000001) 
Wholesale price 1.062*** 1.062*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) 
Q* 0.009*** 0.017*** 
 (0.0003) (0.0005) 
Q*×Distance to competitor 0.0004***  
 (0.0001)  
Q*×Station density  -0.002*** 
  (0.0001) 
Q*×Self-service -0.009*** -0.011*** 
 (0.0003) (0.0004) 
Q*×Preem&Commisioned 0.003*** 0.003*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Carwash 0.072*** 0.070*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
Selfservice -0.067*** -0.057** 
 (0.023) (0.023) 
Constant 8.995*** 8.982*** 
 (0.030) (0.030) 
   
Q* + Q*×Distance to competitor 0.009***  
 (0.0003)  
Q* + Q*×Station density  0.014*** 
  (0.0004) 
Q* + Q*×Selfservice 0.00001 0.006*** 
 (0.0003) (0.0004) 
Q* + Q*×Commisioned 0.012*** 0.02*** 
 (0.0005) (0.0006) 
   
εQ 0.002*** 0.003*** 
 (0.0004) (0.0004) 
εWholesale price 0.388*** 0.388*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
εCarwash 0.002*** 0.002*** 
 0.00007 (0.00008) 
εSelfservice -0.002*** -0.002*** 
 (0.0006) (0.0006) 
   
Observations 58,345 58,345 
R-squared 0.846 0.846 
Month dummies YES YES 
Region dummies YES YES 
Brand dummies YES YES 
Contractual form dummies YES YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors of elasticities are 





All the interactions between Q* and the station characteristics are significant in both models, 
and Q* is even more precisely estimated than in the baseline model. In sum, both the models in 
Table 9 perform better than the baseline model, suggesting that we can estimate the markup 
more precisely when we also account for the different sources of market power.  
 The baseline estimate of Q* in the station density model is higher in this combined 
model than in all the other models. Also, the distance to the closest competitor model suggests 
a high baseline estimate of Q*. When looking at the marginal effects of the characteristics 
measured through the interactions with Q*, these have the same signs as above. 
Looking at local competition effects, the effect of distance to closest competitor effect 
is still significant, but smaller in magnitude than what we found in Table 6. The model with 
station density suggests a higher negative marginal effect. However, given the variance in these 
two continuous characteristics (distance and density), the potential influence on market power 
is still highest from distance to the closest competitor.34 The station amenity measured through 
the self-service interaction exactly cancels the baseline effect in the model with distance to the 
closest competitor, whereas in the station density model we find some significant market power 
also for self-service stations. The effect of being a Preem and commissioned agent-run station 
is still significant and positive, and the marginal difference between these commissioned agent-
run stations and the other brands’ fully vertically integrated stations is increased as compared 
to Table 8. 
We find a clear result: local station characteristics significantly affect the degree of 
market power for the local gasoline station. To illustrate our results, we construct estimates for 
two stations with different characteristics. First, from our distance to the closest competitor 
model: Compare a Preem-owned commissioned agent operated full-service station with 
average distance to its competitor (1.82 km), with one of the other brands’ self-service stations, 
typically vertically integrated, competing with a next door neighbour. The “Preem station” has 
an estimated markup (𝜆) of 0.013, the “other station” has no markup (estimated 𝜆 = 0.000008).35 
Second, from our station density model: Compare a Preem-owned commissioned agent 
operated full-service station with an average density of stations (2.4) within a vicinity of three 
kms, to another brand’s vertically integrated self-service station that has four stations within 
                                                          
34 Remember that the variance in the distance to competitor is 0.02 to 30 km whereas the station density variable 
only varies between 0 and 4 stations. 
35 Estimated 𝜆 for the “Preem station” from the distance to competitor model: Baseline (0.009) + Distance to 
competitor (0.0004 × 1.82) + Self-service (-0.009 × 0) + Preem&Commissioned (0.003 × 1) = 0.0127. Estimated 
𝜆 for “the other station”: Baseline (0.009) + Distance to competitor (0.0004 × 0.02) + Self-service (-0.009 × 1) + 




three kms. The “Preem station” has an estimated markup (𝜆) of 0.015, the “other station” has a 
marginally negative markup (estimated 𝜆 = -0.002).36 In sum, though we should be careful when 
comparing small numbers, local station characteristics influence market power to such an extent 
that in some local markets, a station will be able to extract market power, whereas in others the 
competition will remove this possibility. 
 
7. Concluding remarks 
Endowed with detailed consecutive daily micro data at the gasoline station level from Sweden 
on both prices and quantities we estimate a structural model to uncover the degree of 
competition in the retail market. We apply a Bresnahan-Lau (1988) model utilizing detailed 
knowledge on each station’s (i) brand identity and contractual arrangements, (ii) station 
amenities and (iii) local competition factors. We analyze how all these three factors impact on 
the competition level.  
The paper addresses a relatively large but still non-conclusive empirical literature on 
how competition in gasoline retailing relates to local station characteristics. Micro data at the 
station level on both quantity and price have typically been hard to obtain, restricting previous 
research to mainly study aggregate data and reduced form models. Our approach is thus 
different from the majority of previous literature, both due to the richness of our data, and 
because we can combine several local station characteristics within the same model.  
Our demand estimates suggest an inelastic gasoline demand, which is in line with other 
studies of gasoline markets. The Bresnahan-Lau approach requires adding interaction terms 
between exogenous demand side variables and the retail price in the demand specification. We 
use local income, local population and supply of public transportation in the region in these 
price interactions. They all come in significant, and produce reasonable and significant 
elasticities. The income elasticity suggests a normal good, and an increased supply of public 
transportation reduces demand, suggesting substitutability, both elasticities also being 
significant. The interaction term with local population size is significant, and the elasticity 
proposes a marginal positive demand effect, though not significant.  
                                                          
36 Estimated 𝜆 for the “Preem station” from the density model: Baseline (0.017) + Station density (-0.002 × 2.4) + 
Self-service(-0.011 × 0) + Preem&commissioned (0.003 × 1) = 0.0152. Estimated 𝜆 for “the other station”: 





Using the information from the demand estimates, we identify market power through 
our estimated supply relations. We find that retailers do exercise some market power in the 
Swedish market on average, but despite the high upstream concentration also in Sweden 
(C4=99%), the market power is very limited on the downstream level.  
Despite the very modest findings of market power, the competitive level varies 
significantly with local retail station characteristics such as the degree of local competition, 
station amenities and brand identity/contractual form. We show that the degree of market power 
varies with both the distance to the nearest station and the local density of gasoline stations. A 
higher level of service tends to raise a seller’s market power, in particular we find that self-
service stations have close to no market power. Finally, contractual form and brand identity are 
also found to matter, but we are not able to distinguish the effects fully in the sense that the only 
brand in our sample (Preem) that operates commissioned gasoline stations (and only such 
stations) also have a significantly higher markup than the other brands that predominantly have 
fully vertically integrated stations. 
Swedish Competition Authorities stated in 2013 (p.128)  “…the stations’ gross margins 
naturally vary over time and depend on the local competition pressure.”. We find a clear result 
reflecting this observation: local station characteristics significantly affect the degree of market 
power for the local gasoline stations. We show that differences in local station characteristics, 
even within the scope of the variation in our sample, have a large effect on local market power. 
The results show that the magnitude of these local differences implies that in some local 
markets, a station will be able to extract market power, in other markets the local competition 
factors will remove this possibility.  
Hence, not only do we establish the effects of differences and importance in local station 
characteristics on market power, our results also indicate that local differences in station 
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